Singo v. Skrmetti
| Decision Date | 09 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:23-CV-00008 |
| Parties | PERRY SINGO, #318005, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN SKRMETTI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Perry Singo, an inmate of the Turney Center Industrial Complex in Only, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tennessee Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti, alleging “systemic judicial bias in Tennessee Courts as a direct result of the State's Judicial Election process thereby depriving pro se prisoner litigants of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States and federal law.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2).
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts' “duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff is a convicted felon currently in the custody of the state of Tennessee.[1] On June 30, 1999, Plaintiff was indicted on thirteen counts on a variety of sexual charges involving his six-year-old stepdaughter. The True Bill was not signed by the prosecutor, foreperson of the grand jury, district attorney general, or Clerk of Court. Plaintiff believes that the lack of a signature voids his indictment. He has pursued this theory in state and federal court, to no avail.
According to Plaintiff, “[t]he attacks on the [state] judiciary and the efforts of politicians to change the judiciary so it will do things the politicians want is affecting due process and denying fair trials in the Tennessee judiciary.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff contends that the average Tennessee state court judge has an unconstitutional “potential for bias” because that judge faces re-election at some point. (Id. at 24). This “systemic judicial bias in Tennessee Courts [is] a direct result of the State's Judicial Election process thereby depriving pro se prisoner litigants of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States and federal law.” (Id. at 1-2).
The complaint alleges that “the Justices and Judges in the Tennessee courts have been in several election cycles . . . which your Petitioner believes had a debilitating effect on the outcome of his proceedings in various courts.” (Id. at 22). Specifically, the complaint alleges that the circuit court judge who originally tried Plaintiff's case and ruled on Plaintiff's direct appeal and petition for post-conviction relief was “clearly biased” against Plaintiff and “completely ignored the principles of the state constitution.” (Id. at 23). Further, the complaint alleges that the appellate court judges who ruled on Plaintiff's appeals also were “clearly biased” against Plaintiff and “completely ignored the principles of the state constitution.” (Id.) Plaintiff believes that this bias was a result of the judicial retention laws.
The complaint asks this Court to find “the Constitution of Tennessee, article 6, §§ 3 & 4 and the Tennessee Plan, as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 17-4-101 et. seq.” unconstitutional. (Id. at 25). The complaint additionally asks that Plaintiff be awarded injunctive relief recalling the mandate in his state criminal case and, ultimately, a judgment vacating his criminal conviction and remanding for such further proceedings as may be necessary to grant Plaintiff a “meaningful opportunity to locate counsel and present his defense before a fair tribunal.” (Id.)
“Standing is a threshold question in every federal case[.]” Moncier v. Haslam, 1 F.Supp.3d 854, 858 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 793 (6th Cir. 2009)); see Tennessee State Conference of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Hargett, 441 F.Supp.3d 609, 624 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (). To establish standing, Plaintiff must show that (1) he suffered an injury in fact-a legally-protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) Defendant likely caused the injury; and (3) that judicial relief would likely redress the injury. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing these elements. Id. at 561 (citations omitted). The Court will now discuss whether Plaintiff has standing to assert his claims herein.
First, to have standing, a plaintiff must allege that he or she has suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete, particularized injury from the challenged action. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016). The Supreme Court has said that imminence is a “somewhat elastic concept,” but that “it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes[.]” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2. An injury in fact is the invasion of a legally-protected interest that is neither conjectural nor hypothetical. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (). For an injury to be sufficiently distinct, or “particularized,” it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the complaint alleges that “the Justices and Judges in the Tennessee courts have been in several election cycles . . . which your [Plaintiff] believes had a debilitating effect on the outcome of his proceedings in various courts.” (Doc. No. 1 at 22) (emphasis added). Plaintiff connects what he calls his “biased” state criminal court proceedings to a series of state judicial retention elections and the alleged conduct of certain state actors, but the connections Plaintiff makes are conjectural and hypothetical. While Plaintiff may believe there is a “potential” for state judge bias (see Doc. No. 1 at 24) and that a connection exists as he describes, he has not sufficiently alleged that he has suffered an injury in fact as a result that is concrete and particularized, actual and imminent-not merely speculative. See Protect Our Aquifer v. TVA, No. 2:20-cv-02615, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2023 WL 1459265, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 1, 2023) () .
The Court finds that the complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff has suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete or particularized injury in fact caused by Defendant's enforcement of the challenged state laws and constitutional provisions. “Federal courts are not a forum to litigate the legality of governmental conduct at large.” Id. at *11 (citing TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez, __ U.S. __, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021)). As a sister court put it,
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