Sington v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 225847.
• Citation: 245 Mich. App. 535,630 N.W.2d 337
• Parties: Charles SINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a/k/a Daimler Chrysler Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

630 N.W.2d 337

245 Mich. App. 535

Charles SINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a/k/a Daimler Chrysler Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 225847.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted February 14, 2001, at Detroit.

Decided May 1, 2001, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication June 27, 2001.

Zamler, Mellen, Shiffman & Kay, P.C. (by Paul S. Rosen) (Daryl Royal, of Counsel), Southfield, Dearborn, for the plaintiff.

Kemp, Klein, Umphrey & Endelman (by Valencia L. Jarvis), Troy, for the defendant.

Before SMOLENSKI, P.J., and JANSEN and FITZGERALD, JJ.

SMOLENSKI, P.J.

Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) order dated February 14, 2000, which affirmed the magistrate's decision denying plaintiff's claim for weekly wage-loss benefits. We reverse and remand to the WCAC for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff worked for defendant over the course of twenty-six years, from 1971 to 1997. Plaintiff performed various production jobs for defendant over the course of his career, including working as an assembler, as a press operator, and stacking and loading parts and equipment. During his last three years of employment, between 1994 and 1997, plaintiff experienced problems with his shoulders and upper arms that affected his ability to work. Plaintiff underwent two surgeries, returning to work after each surgery under medical restrictions related to his upper arm and shoulder use. In March 1997 while on vacation, plaintiff suffered a stroke that rendered him permanently and totally disabled.¹

Plaintiff filed a petition for worker's compensation benefits, alleging work-related injuries to both shoulders. At trial, the magistrate accepted the parties' stipulation that plaintiff's left shoulder injury was work-related, but determined that plaintiff's right shoulder injury was not work-related.² Despite the existence of a work-related injury to plaintiff's left shoulder, the magistrate nevertheless denied plaintiff's claim for worker's compensation benefits. The magistrate's decision rested on two main determinations. First, the magistrate held that plaintiff was not performing "reasonable employment" on his last day of work. Therefore, the magistrate concluded that the "reasonable employment" provisions of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), set forth in M.C.L. § 418.301(5), did not apply to plaintiff. Second, the magistrate determined that plaintiff's left shoulder injury did not result in a wage loss. Applying Haske v. Transport Leasing, Inc., Indiana, 455 Mich. 628, 566 N.W.2d 896 (1997), the magistrate determined that plaintiff was not entitled to worker's compensation benefits because he had not established a compensable disability.

Plaintiff appealed the magistrate's decision to the WCAC, which affirmed the denial of benefits. The WCAC's decision also rested on two main determinations. First, the WCAC rejected plaintiff's reliance on Powell v. Casco Nelmor Corp., 406 Mich. 332, 279 N.W.2d 769 (1979), holding that the Legislature's adoption of the WDCA "reasonable employment" provisions nullified Powell's holding. Second, the WCAC upheld the magistrate's factual finding that plaintiff was not engaged in "reasonable employment" on his last day of employment, but was performing his "regular job." Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the WCAC's decision denying his claim for benefits. We reverse.

II. Standard of Review

In worker's compensation cases, the judiciary reviews the decision of the WCAC, not the decision of the magistrate. Mudel v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 462 Mich. 691, 709, 614 N.W.2d 607 (2000). We review de novo those questions of law involved in any final order of the WCAC. Id. at 697, n. 3, 614 N.W.2d 607; DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 461 Mich. 394, 401, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000); MCL 418.861a(14). However, we review the WCAC's factual findings under the "any evidence" standard:

As long as there exists in the record any evidence supporting the WCAC's decision, and as long as the WCAC did not misapprehend its administrative appellate role (e.g., engage in de novo review; apply the wrong rule of law), then the judiciary must treat the WCAC's factual decisions as conclusive. [Mudel, supra at 703-704, 614 N.W.2d 607.]

See also M.C.L. § 418.861a(14). Nevertheless, "a decision of the WCAC is subject to reversal if it is based on erroneous legal reasoning or the wrong legal framework." DiBenedetto, supra at 401-402, 605 N.W.2d 300.

III. Continued Validity of Powell v. Casco Nelmor Corp.

Plaintiff argued below that his stroke, a supervening medical condition that was not work-related, should not operate as a bar to receipt of wage-loss benefits occasioned by his left shoulder injury. Plaintiff relied on Powell, supra at 351-352, 279 N.W.2d 769, where our Supreme Court held that an employee's "inability to continue favored work, where that inability arises from a supervening event for which the worker is not responsible, does not create a legal bar" to wage-loss benefits. The WCAC rejected plaintiff's argument, holding that the Legislature nullified Powell when it adopted M.C.L. § 418.301(5). The WCAC held:

First, plaintiff's attempt to utilize Powell v. Casco Nelmor Corp., 406 Mich. 332, 279 N.W.2d 769 (1979) for the proposition that intervening non-work-related events cannot act to cut off benefit entitlement must fail. The point is not, as plaintiff argues, that the Michigan Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Powell. The point is that the Michigan Legislature did, by passing the reasonable employment provision in the Act.

In 1982, the Legislature amended the WDCA to include the "reasonable employment" provisions.³ The WDCA provides, in relevant part:

(5) If disability is established pursuant to subsection (4), entitlement to weekly wage loss benefits shall be determined pursuant to this section and as follows:

(a) If an employee receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment from the previous employer, another employer, or through the Michigan employment security commission and the employee refuses that employment without good and reasonable cause, the employee shall be considered to have voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force and is no longer entitled to any wage loss benefits under this act during the period of such refusal.

* * *

(d) If the employee, after having been employed pursuant to this subsection for 100 weeks or more loses his or her job through no fault of the employee, the employee shall receive compensation under this act pursuant to the following:

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(e) If the employee, after having been employed pursuant to this subsection for less than 100 weeks loses his or her job for whatever reason, the employee shall receive compensation based upon his or her wage at the original date of injury. [MCL 418.301.]

Our Supreme Court has never expressly spoken concerning the continued validity of Powell in light of the Legislature's adoption of subsection 301(5) of the WDCA.⁴ However, in Lee v. Koegel Meats, 199 Mich.App. 696, 502 N.W.2d 711 (1993), overruled in part by Russell v. Whirlpool Financial Corp., 461 Mich. 579, 586, 608 N.W.2d 52 (2000),⁵ this Court reviewed the WCAC's holding that the Legislature's adoption of subsection 301(5) had nullified Powell. A panel of this Court, including our current Chief Justice Corrigan, rejected the WCAC's analysis:

The commission majority erred in suggesting that the amendments of § 301 of the statute rendered nugatory the decision in Powell v. Casco Nelmor Corp, supra; rather, it seems that the amendments are consistent with Powell, albeit adding certain glosses appropriate to the legislative process, and consistent as well with other judicial decisions in the area of favored work such as Bower v. Whitehall Leather Co., 412 Mich. 172, 182 ff, 312 N.W.2d 640; 412 Mich. 172, 312 N.W.2d 640 (1981), the statute as amended specifically borrowing such concepts as "good and reasonable cause" for declining or terminating favored work.

In Powell, the Supreme Court recognized three legal propositions, the third being that "inability to continue favored work, where that inability arises from a supervening event for which the worker is not responsible, does not create a legal bar." [Lee, supra at 702-703, 502 N.W.2d 711.]

Because this Court has previously ruled that the Legislature's adoption of subsection 301(5) did not nullify the Powell holding at issue here, the WCAC erred as a matter of law in holding otherwise. Furthermore, even in the absence of Lee, we would conclude that the portion of Powell on which plaintiff relies is consistent with the "reasonable employment" provisions contained in subsection 301(5). Plaintiff cited Powell for the proposition that an employee's "inability to continue favored work, where that inability arises from a supervening event for which the worker is not responsible, does not create a legal bar" to wage loss benefits. Powell, supra at 352, 279 N.W.2d 769. The language contained in subsections 301(5)(d) and 301(5)(e) mandates the same conclusion.

Subsections 301(5)(d) and 301(5)(e) establish specific guidelines for awarding wage-loss benefits to injured employees.⁶ Subsection 301(5)(d) provides that an injured employee who accepts an employer's offer of "reasonable employment" and subsequently loses his job, "through no fault of the employee," shall receive wage-loss benefits as specified in that section. Subsection 301(5)(e) provides that an injured employee who accepts an employer's offer of "reasonable employment" and subsequently loses his job, "for whatever reason... shall receive compensation based upon his or her wage at the original date of injury." An employee who leaves "reasonable employment" because of a supervening medical condition that is not work-related falls within that statutory class of employees who leave employment either ...