Sinico v. Barry

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
• Decision Date: 03 February 2020
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1:18-CV-01259
• Citation: Sinico v. Barry, Civil No. 1:18-CV-01259 (M.D. Pa. Feb 03, 2020)
• Parties: KELLY J. SINICO, Plaintiff, v. SALLY A. BARRY, et al., Defendants.

KELLY J. SINICO, Plaintiff, v. SALLY A. BARRY, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 1:18-CV-01259

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 3, 2020

Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

This is an action brought under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Plaintiff, Kelly J. Sinico ("Sinico"), alleges that she was subjected to adverse employment actions by the Defendants because she was receiving in vitro fertilization treatment ("IVF") for her infertility. The case is presently before the court on two motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sinico first filed suit in this case on June 21, 2018. (Doc. 1.) She subsequently filed an amended complaint on September 5, 2018, and a second amended complaint on December 18, 2018. (Docs. 7, 18.) On June 7, 2019, United States District Judge Yvette Kane granted Sinico leave to file a third amended complaint, which Sinico did later that day. (Docs. 33, 34.)

According to the allegations in the third amended complaint, Sinico began working as a juvenile probation officer with the Lebanon County probation office on October 12, 1998. (Doc. 34 ¶ 3.) She continued to work there until June 30, 2017, when she was asked to attend a meeting with the Director of Probation, Defendant Sally A. Barry ("Barry"). (Id. ¶ 11.) At that time, Defendant Barry stated that Sinico's "personal issues" were interfering with her work. (Id.) Barry then terminated Sinico's employment. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.)

At the time of Sinico's termination, Barry and the other defendants were aware that Sinico was receiving IVF to treat her infertility. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Because of Defendants' awareness of that fact, Sinico understood the reference to her "personal issues" to mean that her supervisors were unhappy with her requests for accommodations and use of leave time. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Sinico alleges that prior to her termination, the Defendants denied multiple requests that she made for accommodation of her IVF treatment. On May 23, 2017, Defendant Christner denied Sinico's request for sick leave to attend a fertility treatment session, instead converting the request to one for vacation leave. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) On June 5, 2017, Sinico requested accommodations for an embryo transfer she was scheduled to have on June 10, 2017. (Id. ¶ 65.) Specifically, Sinico informed her supervisors that she would be on bed rest for 48 hours after the transfer, that she would be limited to minimal movement for another 48 hours, andthat she needed to be given light duty or leave for another eleven days after that. (Id.) The next day, Defendant Penberth called Sinico into his office for a meeting. (Id. ¶ 66.) During that meeting, Sinico asked Penberth if she could be allowed to work in a less stressful environment for two weeks. (Id. ¶ 68.) Penberth denied the request and denied all but two days of the leave Sinico had requested in her June 5, 2017 request. (Id. ¶ 69.) Penberth stated that he needed to deny the request for leave because Defendants Christner and Whitman would be on vacation during the time for which Sinico requested leave and because Penberth and Assistant Supervisor Dowhower¹ would be at training on one of the requested days. (Id. ¶ 70.)

The day after Penberth denied Sinico's requests for accommodation, Penberth and Defendant Christner called Sinico for a meeting. (Id. ¶ 71.) Penberth and Christner told Sinico that they needed to conduct a "case review" with Sinico and then gave her a memorandum that was comprised "solely of extensive and critical comments of [Sinico's] work performance." (Id.)

On June 22, 2017, Sinico learned that she was pregnant and requested accommodations from Defendants Christner and Penberth in the form of a week of sick leave in July 2017. (Id. ¶ 76.) Neither Christner, Penberth, nor the otherDefendants responded to Sinico's request before they terminated her employment on June 30, 2017. (Id. ¶ 77.)

Shortly before the termination of her employment, on either June 27, 2017 or June 28, 2017, Sinico smelled strong paint fumes while she was working in her office, which resulted from renovations that the probation office was undergoing. (Id. ¶ 79.) Sinico complained about the fumes to Defendants Christner and Whitman and said that she was worried the fumes could harm her pregnancy. (Id. ¶¶ 80-81.) Christner acknowledged that she was aware of Sinico's pregnancy and directed Sinico to work in a different office with the door closed and a window open. (Id. ¶ 82.)

Sinico's amended complaint raises six claims. In Count I, she alleges that Defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the RA. (Id. ¶¶ 117-20.) In Count II, she alleges retaliation in violation of the RA. (Id. ¶¶ 121-27.) In Count III, she alleges discrimination and wrongful discharge on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA. (Id. ¶¶ 128-31.) In Count IV, she alleges that Defendants interfered with her ability to take FMLA leave in violation of the FMLA. (Id. ¶¶ 132-41.) In Count V, she alleges retaliation in violation of the FMLA. (Id. ¶¶ 142-46.) In Count VI, she alleges discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA. (Id. ¶¶ 147-57.) The third amended complaint names as Defendants Barry, Christner, Penberth, the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania, and John C. Tylwalk ("Tylwalk"), the President Judge of the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas, which oversees the probation department. (Id. at 1.) The individual defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.) Sinico seeks prospective injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement as well as various forms of monetary relief. (Id. at 29.)

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

On June 27, 2019, Defendants Barry, Christner, and Penberth ("the Probation Defendants") moved to dismiss the third amended complaint. (Doc. 35.) The Probation Defendants argue that all claims against them in their individual capacities under the ADA and the RA should be dismissed because neither statute allows for liability against an individual. (Doc. 38 at 4-5.) The Probation Defendants then argue that all claims against them in their official capacities should be dismissed because they are entitled to sovereign immunity. (Id. at 9.) The Probation Defendants further argue that Sinico's FMLA claims should be dismissed because claims for damages and liquidated damages under the FMLA's self-care provisions are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Id. at 9- 10.) Finally, the Probation Defendants argue that the individual-capacity FMLA claims should be dismissed because Sinico has not alleged sufficient facts to state an FLMA claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id. at 10-11.)

Sinico opposes the Probation Defendants' motion to dismiss. She argues the Probation Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity as to her official-capacity claims because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania waived sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds. (Doc. 40 at 5-6.) She further argues that her claims for individual liability under the ADA and RA should not be dismissed because official-capacity claims seeking injunctive relief are cognizable against individual defendants under the Supreme Court's holding in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). (Id. at 6-8.) Finally, she argues that she has pleaded sufficient facts to state FMLA claims against the Probation Defendants. (Id. at 8-15.)

Defendants Tylwalk and the Commonwealth ("the Commonwealth Defendants") separately moved to dismiss Sinico's third amended complaint, raising several arguments for dismissal. (Doc. 36.) The Commonwealth Defendants first argue that Sinico's FMLA claims should be dismissed because states are entitled to sovereign immunity from claims under the FMLA's self-care provision. (Doc. 37 at 7-8.) The Commonwealth Defendants similarly argue that Sinico's ADA claims are barred by sovereign immunity. (Id. at 8-10.) Next, the Commonwealth Defendants argue that the individual-capacity ADA and RA claims against Tylwalk should be dismissed because neither statute allows for individual liability. (Id. at 10-11.) The Commonwealth Defendants further argue that the ADA claims against them should be dismissed because Sinico failed toexhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. (Id. at 11-13.) Additionally, the Commonwealth Defendants argue that Sinico's claim for liquidated damages under the RA should be dismissed because the RA does not allow liquidated damages. (Id. at 14.) Finally, the Commonwealth Defendants argue that all individual-capacity claims against Tylwalk under the FMLA should be dismissed because Sinico has not pleaded sufficient facts to state an FMLA claim upon which relief may be granted against Tylwalk. (Id. at 14-15.)

Sinico filed a brief in opposition to the Commonwealth Defendants' motion to dismiss on July 22, 2019. (Doc. 39.) First, she argues that the Commonwealth has waived sovereign immunity under the RA by accepting federal funds. (Id. at 7-10.) Second, she argues that she sufficiently pleads claims against Tylwalk in his individual capacity because he had supervisory liability for the actions of the other defendants as the President Judge of the judicial district. (Id. at 10-12.) Finally, she argues that she has met the requirements for an exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement under the Third Circuit's holding in Glus v. C.G. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980).

The court will analyze the Defendants' motions to dismiss below. Ultimately, both motions are granted in part and denied in part.

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In...