Sinon v. Town of Wolcott

• Decision Date: 30 December 2015
• Docket Number: NNHCV116023483S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Nicholaus Sinon v. Town of Wolcott et al

Nicholaus Sinon v. Town of Wolcott et al

No. NNHCV116023483S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

December 30, 2015

Filed Date December 31, 2015

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Jon M Alander, Judge of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff has filed this action for damages against the defendants town of Wolcott and Bryan Spiotti, a Wolcott police officer, asserting that he suffered injuries when he was unlawfully tased by Spiotti.^[1] The plaintiff asserts that the use of the taser by Spiotti constituted excessive force in violation of the fourth amendment and was the result of a policy or custom of the town of Wolcott that sanctioned the use of tasers where less forceful means of detaining a suspect were available.^[2]

The defendants have moved for summary judgment. Spiotti asserts that the plaintiff's excessive force claims fails as his actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and, alternatively, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Wolcott asserts the claim against it must fail because no excessive force was used and there is no evidence of the existence of any unconstitutional policy or custom regarding the use of tasers. The plaintiff argues that there are disputed issues of material fact as to all these legal issues, that is whether the force used by Spiotti against the plaintiff was excessive, whether Spiotti is entitled to qualified immunity and whether Wolcott had a policy or custom encouraging the improper use of tasers by its police officers. The plaintiff contends that these factual disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of either defendant.

The law governing the defendants' motion for summary judgment is well established. " Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . Scrapchansky v Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 450, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather, to determine whether any such issues exist. Cortes v. Cotton, 31 Conn.App. 569, 575, 626 A.2d 1306 (1993). [I]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . Johnson v Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 535, 626 A.2d 244 (1993). Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Lancia, 46 Conn.App. 150, 158, 698 A.2d 938 (1997).

" It is not enough for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence. If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893 (2003). The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105-06, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).

The following facts are undisputed.^[3] During the evening hours of August 31, 2008, a party with approximately 20 individuals in attendance was occurring at 8 Roosevelt Avenue in Wolcott. Ultimately, physical altercations erupted between multiple partygoers in the front yard as well as the street. The police were called with a report that a group of youths was fighting in the street. Officer Spiotti was the first police officer to respond to the scene. Spiotti observed approximately five to ten males arguing and struggling in the street. Donald Paquin and another individual were arguing face-to-face. After Spiotti separated the two, the plaintiff Nicholaus Sinon came running from Spiotti's left, jumped in the air at Paquin and pushed Paquin toward Spiotti. Paquin then turned and pushed Sinon away, which resulted in both of them falling to the ground.

At this point, the parties' views of the facts diverge. What follows are the facts viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.^[4] After, Sinon and Paquin fell to the ground, Spiotti pulled out his taser^[5] and said " stay on the ground." ^[6] Despite the officer's order, Sinon stood up. He was immediately tased by Spiotti and fell back down, striking his head on the ground.

In his objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff does not address the defendants' claim that, prior to firing his taser at the plaintiff Spiotti warned the plaintiff to comply with his orders or he would be tased. The uncontradicted evidence offered by the defendants, both in the form of Spiotti's affidavit and the deposition testimony of Chelsey Donaldson, establishes that Spiotti warned the plaintiff prior to firing his taser.

I

CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE OFFICER

A Excessive Force

Officer Spiotti contends that his use of his taser was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and therefore not excessive. The plaintiff asserts that summary judgment is not appropriate as there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of Spiotti's actions. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, I find that Spiotti's actions were objectively reasonable given the situation he confronted at the time he fired his taser.

The place to start with any excessive force analysis is the seminal case of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In Graham, the court held that a claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making any arrest investigatory stop, or seizure of a person is governed by the fourth amendment's " objective reasonableness" standard. Id., at 388. " [T]he question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id., at 397. The analysis concerning excessive force requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id., at 396. Fourth amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion to effect it. Id. " The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id., at 396-97.

In this case, the plaintiff's actions made him subject to arrest for breach of peace and possibly assault on Paquin as well as interfering with an officer for his failure to obey the officer's command to stay on the ground. It was also reasonable for Officer Spiotti to believe that the plaintiff posed a threat to him and to Paquin. A physical melee was occurring around the officer. The plaintiff had just jumped on Paquin, physically assaulting him. After falling to the ground, the plaintiff stood up in contravention to the officer's command to stay on the ground and despite a warning that he would be tased if he got up. These facts would lead a reasonable police officer to conclude that the plaintiff may well intend to continue his physical assault on Paquin or direct his aggression toward the officer. See Davis v. Callaway, 2007 WL 1079988 (D.Conn. Apr. 9, 2007) (It was objectively reasonable for a police officer to believe that a person who jumped up in violation of a direct order would attempt to physically interfere with the officer.)

The third Graham factor--whether the individual is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight--also supports the reasonableness of the officer's response. The plaintiff was ordered to stay on the ground and was warned that he would be tased if he failed to do so. Despite the order and warning, the plaintiff stood up. Under circumstances that were " tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving, " Graham v. Connor, supra, 490 U.S. 397, it was reasonable for Officer Spiotti to suspect that nothing good would come from that act--that the plaintiff intended to continue his assault, resist arrest or possibly flee. Under the totality of circumstances facing the officer, his onetime use of his taser, after warning the plaintiff that disobedience would result in its use, was objectively reasonable and did not constitute excessive force.

This conclusion finds support in other cases. In MacLeod v Town of Brattleboro, 548 Fed.Appx. 6 (2d Cir. 2013), the court ruled that the use of a taser by a police officer on an individual, who had previously engaged the officer in a high speed chase and who disobeyed an order to kneel on the ground by rising to his feet, was not excessive force. In Brown v. Cwynar, 484 Fed.Appx. 676 (3rd Cir. 2012), the firing of a taser by a...