Sipe v. Copwell
| Decision Date | 02 January 1894 |
| Docket Number | 82. |
| Citation | 59 F. 970 |
| Parties | SIPE et al. v. COPWELL. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Ong & Hamilton, for plaintiffs in error.
Hutchins & Campbell, for defendant in error.
Before LURTON, Circuit Judge, and BARR and SEVERENS, District Judges.
This is a suit upon a judgment rendered by the supreme court of Rhode Island against the appellants, Sipe and Sigler, and in favor of the appellee, Copwell. 23 A. 14. The defense interposed by the answer was that the judgment was void because jurisdiction was obtained by the service of process upon the defendants thereto when they were in attendance upon the supreme court of Rhode Island, as parties defendant to a suit then pending for trial. A demurrer to the answer was sustained, (51 F. 667,) and judgment rendered for the plaintiff in default of further defense. The judgment of the circuit court upon the demurrer filed by the appellants is now assigned as error.
Is the judgment of the Rhode Island court void? We think it is not. That court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter. This is not contested. It had jurisdiction of the defendants by personal service of the writ of summons. The defendants pleaded in abatement the circumstances under which they had been summoned, and insisted that they were exempt from summons while in attendance as parties to another suit then and there pending against them in the same court. This presented an issue for adjudication. It was decided adversely to the contention then and now urged by appellants. The determination of that question was clearly within the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island court. Its solution depended upon the statute or common law of that state. It decided that the Rhode Island statute, exempting witnesses from arrest or summons while in attendance as witnesses, did not apply to any other than witnesses. It further decided that there was nothing in the public policy of that state which exempted parties to pending suits from service of process in new suits.
Whether these questions were rightly or wrongly decided is a matter of no importance in the present aspect of the question. The court had jurisdiction to determine these issues. The soundness of the adjudication cannot be questioned in a collateral attack. Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Trust Co. v. Seasongood, 130 U.S. 482, 9 S.Ct. 575; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 108 U.S 18, 1 S.Ct. 614, 617....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co.
...of due process of law, under the Constitution of the United States. Frawley v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. TO. C.) 124 F. 259; Sipe v. Copwell (C. C. A.) 59 F. 970; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, " 170 U. S. 100, 18 S. Ct. 526, 42 L.......
-
Hall v. Wilder Manufacturing Company
...in that original proceeding. Tootle v. Buckingham, 190 Mo. 195; Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317; LaRue v. Kempf, 186 Mo.App. 70; Sipe v. Capewell, 59 F. 970. The question jurisdiction cannot even be tried twice in the same proceeding. Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 550; Newcomb v. Railroad, 1......
- Payne v. Blevins
-
National Metal Co. v. Greene Consol. Copper Co.
...entire absence of service is interestingly illustrated in the decisions in the case of Capwell v. Sipe (C.C.), 51 F. 667, affirmed 59 F. 970, 8 C.C.A. 419. See, also, Hollingsworth Barbour, 4 Pet., at p. 476, 7 L.Ed. 922. If the allegations of the complaint in this case are true, there was ......