Siple v. First Franklin Fin. Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 May 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. RDB-14-2841
• Parties: DENNIS SIPLE and MARION SIPLE, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

DENNIS SIPLE and MARION SIPLE, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. RDB-14-2841

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

May 15, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Dennis Siple and Marion Siple ("the Siples" or "Plaintiffs") bring this pro se action against Defendants First Franklin Financial Corporation ("First Franklin"), U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Nationstar"), Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America"), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), Juan Soto ("Soto"),¹ Wendy Sevier ("Sevier"),² Mark D. Meyer ("Meyer"), John A. Ansell III ("Ansell"), Kenneth Savitz ("Savitz"), Diane S. Rosenberg ("Rosenberg")³, Equifax Information Services, LLC ("Equifax"), Trans Union, LLC ("Trans Union"), Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian"), and twenty unnamed and unknown parties.⁴ In a thirteen-count Complaint, the Siples allege violations of the Fair CreditReporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964, and various state law claims sounding in negligence, contract, and real property. In addition, Plaintiffs request injunctive relief, as well as declaratory judgment pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

Currently pending before this Court are Defendants Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Sevier's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint (ECF No. 12); Defendant Trans Union's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13); Defendant Experian's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15); Defendant Equifax's Motion to Join Trans Union and Experian's Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 35); Defendants Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Sevier's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37); Defendants Ansell, Meyer, Rosenberg, and Savitz's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42); Defendant Equifax's Motion to Join Trans Union and Experian's Replies in Support of their Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 54); Defendant U.S. Bank's Motion for Leave to File Response to Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 59); and Defendant U.S. Bank's Motion to Join Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Sevier's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60). The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014).

For the following reasons, Defendants Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Sevier's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint (ECF No.12) is MOOT;⁵ Defendant Trans Union's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE; Defendant Experian's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE; Defendant Equifax's Motion to Join Trans Union and Experian's Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 35) is GRANTED;⁶ Defendants Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Sevier's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37) is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE; Defendants Ansell, Meyer, Rosenberg, and Savitz's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42) is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE; Defendant Equifax's Motion to Join Trans Union and Experian's Replies in Support of their Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 54) is GRANTED;⁷ Defendant U.S. Bank's Motion for Leave to File Response to Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 59) is GRANTED;⁸ and Defendant U.S. Bank's Motion to Join Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar; and Sevier's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60) is GRANTED.⁹ In sum, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.

BACKGROUND

In a ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to theplaintiffs. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Moreover, a pro se litigant's complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the litigant can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Yet, a plaintiff's status as pro se does not absolve him of the duty to plead adequately. See Stone v. Warfield, 184 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Md. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Univ. of Md. Sch. Of Law, 130 F.R.D. 616, 617 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd, 900 F.2d 249, 1990 WL 41120 (4th Cir. 1990)). As this Court has explained, even pro se litigants must "state their claims in an understandable and efficient manner." Bell v. Bank of America, N.A., Civ. A. No. RDB-13-478, 2013 WL 6528966, *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013).

This case arises out of a foreclosure dispute between Plaintiffs Dennis and Marion Siple and the fifteen named Defendants. See Compl. On May 12, 2007, Plaintiffs executed an Adjustable Rate Note ("the Note) in the amount of $236,000 to refinance a property located at 422 Big Elk Chapel Road in Elkton, Maryland ("the Property"). Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs also executed a Deed of Trust for the Property on the same day. Id.; see also Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Sevier's Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, ECF No. 37-2 (Deed of Trust).

Although Plaintiffs' Complaint is not clearly stated, it appears that their claims stem from an allegedly novated mortgage agreement. Compl. ¶¶ 76-76.d, 148. Essentially, in or about October 2008, the Siples contend that they received a phone call from an unknown individual, promising a lower payment rate if they defaulted on their mortgage. Id. ¶¶ 76-77. Over the next three months, Plaintiffs paid less than their monthly mortgage payments and thus defaulted. Id. ¶¶ 76.a-76.c. Nationstar, the current servicer of the loan, initiatedforeclosure proceedings on March 14, 2014 in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland. Id.; see also Mem. in Supp. of Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Wendy Sevier's Mot. to Dismiss, 2, ECF No. 37-1. The Siples removed the foreclosure action to federal court, but the action was remanded back to the state court on September 11, 2014. See Mem. in Supp. of Bank of America, First Franklin, Nationstar, and Wendy Sevier's Mot. to Dismiss, at 2; see also Compl. ¶ 2.

Plaintiffs filed the subject action seeking $50,000,000 in damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, various civil penalties, and other relief related to the foreclosure dispute. Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In their respective Motions to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' lengthy and rambling Complaint fails to state any claims for which relief may be granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is "to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

The Supreme Court's recent opinions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), "require that complaints in civil actions bealleged with greater specificity than previously was required." Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In Twombly, the Supreme Court articulated "[t]wo working principles" that courts must employ when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, while a court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not afforded such deference. Id. (stating that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to plead a claim); see also Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) ("Although we are constrained to take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the context of pro se litigants, however, pleadings are "to be liberally construed," and are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted); accord Brown v. N.C. Dept. of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 724 (4th Cir. 2010).

Second, even a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege "a plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (recognizing no pro se exception to the requirement to plead a "plausible claim for relief"); see also O'Neil v. Ponzi, 394 F. App'x. 795, 796 (2d Cir. 2010) ("We must dismiss pro se complaints that are frivolous or fail to state a claim."). Although a "plaintiff need not plead the evidentiary standard for proving" her claim, she may no longer rely on the mere possibility that she could later establish her claim. McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway Administration, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1088931, *11-12 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (discussing Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) in light of Twombly and Iqbal). Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While the plausibility requirement does not impose a "probability requirement," id. at 556, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct...