Siqueiros v. Gen. Motors LLC
| Decision Date | 25 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-07244-EMC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | RAUL SIQUEIROS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant. |
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant General Motors LLC ("GM" or "Defendant") knowingly manufactured and sold a car engine with inherent defects that caused excessive oil consumption and engine damage. The alleged defects affect 2011 to 2014 model-year GM vehicles. Plaintiffs assert claims under various state consumer-protection and fraud statutes on behalf of a nationwide class as well as various statewide classes. Plaintiffs filed their class action complaint on December 19, 2016. See Docket No. 2 ("Compl."). They have since amended their pleadings several times; the operative complaint is the seventh amended complaint. See Docket No. 286 ("7AC").
Before the Court are (1) GM's second motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, see Docket No. 291 ("Second MSJ"); (2) Plaintiffs' second motion for class certification pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), see Docket No. 287 ("Second Class Cert. Mot."); and (3) Plaintiffs' motion for determination of Manuel Fernandez's adequacy to serve as California class representative pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4), see Docket No. 289 ("Fernandez Adequacy Mot.").
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part GM's motion for partial summary judgment and Plaintiffs motion for class certification. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion to determine that Mr. Fernandez is adequate to serve as California class representative.
This order assumes the parties' familiarity with the lengthy factual and procedural background of this case and therefore only recites the facts and background necessary to resolve the pending motions.
Plaintiffs allege that GM's Gen IV Vortec 5300 LC9 engine suffers from an "inherent" oil-consumption defect. 7AC ¶ 7. The "primary cause" of the alleged defect is the piston rings installed by GM. Id. ¶ 8. These piston rings "do not maintain sufficient tension to keep oil in the crankcase," and the oil migration that occurs as a result allows oil to "burn[] or accumulate[] as carbon buildup on the combustion chamber's surfaces." Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiffs allege that the oil-consumption defect causes safety problems in three ways: (1) oil consumption can lead to a lack of adequate lubrication in the engine and dropping oil pressure levels in vehicles, see id. ¶ 19; (2) the presence of excess oil in the combustion chamber can cause spark plug fouling, which can cause engine problems, see id.; and (3) when drivers experience these problems while driving, they may be forced to pull over and stop alongside a road or highway (or they may be stranded in such a location with an inoperable vehicle), which places them in danger, see id. ¶ 14, 120-21.
In order to address manageability concerns, the parties agreed to follow a bellwether process for class certification wherein Plaintiffs' initial motion for class certification would belimited to California, New Jersey, Ohio, North Carolina, and Texas. See Docket No. 113.
Plaintiffs filed their first motion to certify a class in the four bellwether states on September 3, 2019. See Docket No. 175 ("First Class Cert. Mot."). Shortly thereafter, GM filed its first motion for partial summary judgment, see Docket No. 184 ("First MSJ"), and a motion to exclude certain testimony of Plaintiffs' expert witness, see Docket No. 201.
Initially, Plaintiffs sought to include all four Gen IV engine designs (the LC9, the LMG, the LH9, and the LMF) in the class definition, but in the reply in support of Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Plaintiffs limited the proposed class definition to vehicles with LC9 engines with Active Fuel Management (AFM). See Docket No. 207 ("Reply in Supp. of First Class Cert. Mot.") at 7. The LC9 engine was installed in the 2010-2014 Chevrolet Avalanche; 2010-2014 Chevrolet Silverado; 2010-2014 Chevrolet Suburban; 2010-2014 Chevrolet Tahoe; 2010-2014 GMC Sierra; 2010-2014 GMC Yukon; and the 2010-2014 GMC Yukon XL (the "Class Vehicles"). 7AC ¶ 2; see also Reply in Supp of First Class Cert. Mot. at 7.
On April 23, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part GM's first motion for partial summary judgment on certain of Plaintiffs' claims in the four bellwether states, including all of Plaintiffs' New Jersey claims. See Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC ("Sloan III"), No. 16-CV-07244-EMC, 2020 WL 1955643, at *6-*36 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020). The Court also denied GM's motion to exclude certain testimony of Plaintiffs' expert witness, id. at *36-*39, and certified the following classes in the three remaining bellwether states:
Id. at *52. Importantly, the Court restricted the definition of "Class Vehicles" to only those vehicles manufactured on or after February 10, 2011, the date upon which the second of two engine modifications—the redesigned rocker cover—was incorporated into vehicle production. Id. at *53. As a result, the Class Vehicles exclude any vehicle that has already received adequate piston replacement, i.e., piston replacement in which the new pistons were not merely new versions of the same defective pistons. Id.
In June 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion to substitute the California class representative and GM filed a motion to decertify the California class. See Docket Nos. 246, 247. These motions relied on the fact that Raul Siqueiros could no longer serve as the California class representative because his vehicle was manufactured before February 10, 2011.
On July 16, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their sixth amended complaint. See Docket No. 250 ("6AC"). Two weeks later, GM filed a motion to dismiss Count 1 of the sixth amended complaint—Plaintiffs' Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) claim—and Plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene on behalf of the new putative California class representatives. See Docket Nos. 255, 259.
On August 26, 2020, Plaintiffs Dan Madson, Joseph Brannon, Derick Bradford, Monteville Sloan,1 Michael Ware, Barbara Molina, Drew Peterson, Ross Dahl, Mike Warpinski, Joseph Olivier, James Faulkner, Kevin Hanneken, Steve Kitchen, Thomas Shorter, and Marc Perkins voluntarily dismissed all their claims without prejudice. See Docket No. 271.
On September 14, 2020, the Court granted in part with prejudice GM's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' MMWA class allegations but denied it with respect to their individual MMWA claims. See Docket No. 278. The Court also denied GM's motion to decertify the California class and granted Plaintiff's motion for permissive intervention, substituting Plaintiffs Manuel Fernandez and Robert May for Mr. Siqueiros as California class representatives. See id. at 16.
On November 6, 2020, the parties stipulated to amend the California class as follows:
California Class. All current owners or lessees of a Class Vehiclethat waswho purchased or leased the vehicle in new condition in the State of California. The Court certifies the claims of the California Class for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for breach of implied warranty, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq.
See Docket No. 288. That same day, Plaintiffs filed their seventh amended complaint, the operative complaint, See 7AC, as well as their second motion to certify classes in Arkansas, Idaho, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, see Second Class Cert. Mot. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for determination of Mr. Fernandez's adequacy to serve as California class representative. See Fernandez Adequacy Mot.
On December 2, 2020, GM filed its second motion for partial summary judgment. See Second MSJ.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a "court shall grant summary judgment [to a moving party] if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Id. at 252. At the summary judgment stage, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. See id. at 255.
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