Sirer v. Aksoy

Decision Date22 October 2021
Docket Number21-cv-22280-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
PartiesEMIN GÜN SIRER, Plaintiff, v. EMRE AKSOY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

BETH BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Emre Aksoy's (Defendant or “Aksoy”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Lack of Standing, and Jurisdictional Issues, ECF No. [16] (“Motion”). Plaintiff Emin Gün Sirer (Plaintiff or “Sirer”) filed a Response, ECF No. [22], and the Defendant did not file a Reply. The Court has carefully considered the Motion and Response, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves a claim for defamation arising from statements allegedly made by Aksoy on social media accusing Plaintiff of being a member of a terrorist organization. Plaintiff is the founder and CEO of Ava Labs, which built and launched a blockchain-based and open-source platform, known as Avalanche, for launching decentralized applications. ECF No [1] at ¶¶ 13-14. Transactions in Avalanche rely on a crypto-asset called AVAX, which can be bought and sold on various crypto-asset exchanges. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. According to the Complaint, Defendant is a “product marketing expert” and “crypto thought leader, ” who maintains an active social media presence through YouTube and Telegram channels. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Defendant also is paid by issuers of some of the crypto-assets he promotes. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff is alleged to be a citizen of New York, while Defendant is alleged to be a citizen of Turkey. Id. ¶ 10. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that personal jurisdiction over Defendant is proper because he has purposefully availed himself of the benefits of conducting business in Florida.” Id. ¶ 12.

In the Motion, Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint for failure to state a claim, failure to satisfy a condition precedent, failure to join an indispensable party, and lack of personal jurisdiction.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Failure to state a claim

A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, ” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). “To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). [T]he court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

B. Failure to join an indispensable party

Dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to join a party under Rule 19, is a “two-step inquiry.” Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); N.H. Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 14-0099-CG-N, 2014 WL 3428911, at *2 (S.D. Ala. July 15, 2014).

“First, a court must decide whether an absent party is required in the case under Rule 19(a).” Int'l Importers, Inc. v. Int'l Spirits & Wines, LLC, No. 10-61856-CIV, 2011 WL 7807548, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2011) (citing Molinos Valle Del Cibao v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1344 (11th Cir. 2011)). If a court determines that an absent party does satisfy the Rule 19(a) criteria, i.e., that the party is a required party, the court must order that party joined if its joinder is feasible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2); Collegiate Licensing Co. v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 842 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1365-66 (N.D.Ga. 2012). If the absent party is not required, the litigation continues as is. See, e.g., Devs. Sur. & Indem. Co. v. Harding Vill., Ltd., No. 06-21267-CIV, 2007 WL 465519, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2007).

If the party is required and joinder is not feasible, the district court moves to the second inquiry; that is, whether “in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.” Raimbeault v. Accurate Mach. & Tool, LLC, 302 F.R.D. 675, 683 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b); and Challenge Homes, Inc. v. Greater Naples Care Ctr., Inc., 669 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1982)).

C. Personal jurisdiction

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 2000).

“Once the plaintiff pleads sufficient material facts to form a basis for in personam jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the defendant to challenge plaintiff's allegations by affidavits or other pleadings.” Carmouche v. Carnival Corp., 36 F.Supp.3d 1335, 1388 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015). A defendant challenging personal jurisdiction must present evidence to counter the plaintiff's allegations. Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009). “Where . . . the Defendant submits affidavit(s) to the contrary, the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009); Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990).

“A plaintiff suing a nonresident defendant bears both the initial burden of alleging a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and, if that jurisdiction is challenged, the ultimate burden of establishing that its exercise is proper.” Dollar Rent a Car, Inc. v. Westover Car Rental, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-363-FtM-29CM, 2017 WL 5495126, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2017) (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013); Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009).

III.DISCUSSION

Because the Court must have personal jurisdiction over Defendant to reach the merits of Plaintiff's claim against him, the Court considers the arguments with respect to personal jurisdiction first.

A. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant

Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction in this case because Defendant is a citizen of Turkey, and contrary to the allegations in the Complaint, he does not conduct business in the state of Florida, nor did the alleged act of defamation occur within Florida.[1] As a result, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the requirements of the long-arm statute or due process. In response, Plaintiff argues that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because he was personally served with process while voluntarily visiting Florida on vacation. Upon review, the Court agrees with Plaintiff.

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [s]erving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant [] who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located[.] Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A). “As a general rule, Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over nonresidents when that nonresident is properly served with service of process while voluntarily present in the state. Keveloh v. Carter, 699 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (citing Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990) and Garrett v. Garrett, 668 So.2d 991, 994 (Fla. 1996) (Wells, J. concurring)).

Here the record indicates that Defendant was personally served with process at Miami International Airport, see ECF No. [10-1]. While Defendant asserts that he had traveled to Miami on vacation, he has not challenged the validity of the service effectuated upon him. As a result, the Court need not determine whether he conducted business in Florida or otherwise...

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