Siri v. Town of Hingham

• Decision Date: 09 March 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-40138-TSH
• Parties: GINGER SIRI, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HINGHAM, DAVID M. JONES and KERRY T. RYAN, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

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GINGER SIRI, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HINGHAM, DAVID M. JONES and KERRY T. RYAN, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-40138-TSH

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

March 9, 2023

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO ENJOIN

TIMOTHY S. HILLMAN, UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Siri Ginger, proceeding pro se against Defendants Town of Hingham, David M. Jones and Kerry T. Ryan, alleges that the Town conspired with Jones, the Chief of Police^[1] for Hingham and Ryan, Hingham's Town Counsel, to make fraudulent criminal charges against her and to falsify criminal records. Jones and Ryan are being sued in their individual capacities. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and further request that the Court enjoin the Plaintiff from filing further complaints alleging the same set of facts without leave of Court.

Procedural Background

The Complaint pending in this Court marks the third time Plaintiff has filed a complaint based on the same events and alleging the same claims against the Defendants. In general the complaint claims that the Town and its police employee Jones conspired and caused the Plaintiff harm based upon her arrest in 2012. One of the cases was dismissed by the Massachusetts Superior Court on May 12, 2017. The other case was dismissed by the Plaintiff in a Stipulation of Dismissal, with prejudice, which was filed on November 15, 2021.

Here the Plaintiff included the Town Counsel as a Defendant, alleging that he conspired with Jones. Ryan was involved in separate real estate litigation on behalf of the Town of Hingham with the Plaintiff that resulted in a June 26, 2017, Massachusetts Superior Court Judgment issued against her and an October 13, 2021, order to enforce that 2017 Judgment. Defendants contend that adding Ryan to this iteration of the claim is in retaliation for his prior successful representation of the Town. Defendants argue that the attempt by the Plaintiff to bring the same claims should be dismissed given that it is barred by res judicata, the statute of limitations and several other arguments.

Background

The Plaintiff was formerly a resident of Hingham, Massachusetts. The Complaint seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges that the Defendants “acted with reckless and malice intention, willfully percolate[d] in a joint conspiracy with Town officials to deprive the Plaintiff of a constitutional right acts ‘under color of state law' of hate crimes.”

The Plaintiff alleges that: “1) the Town policy maker should be held responsible, through actual or constructive knowledge, for enforcing a policy that caused the Plaintiff's claimed injury; 2) the Town must have an official policy which could subject it to [42 U.S.C.] Section 1983 liability; [and] 3) Plaintiff can demonstrate that the Defendants' actions were taken with the requisite degree of culpability, and show a direct causal link between the action and the deprivation of federal rights.”

Plaintiff contends that she applied for caregiver jobs in various towns in Massachusetts and was denied employment due to the actions of the Defendants. One of her potential employers informed the Plaintiff that criminal records appeared on her background checks and the Plaintiff could not be hired. The Plaintiff alleges her CORI report contains false information, including felonies, car theft, mortgage fraud, false arrests and false arraignment and attributes this to Jones committing perjury nine times on signed affidavits, the improper authorization of an illegal search warrant by a clerk, coercion of other officers to falsify reports, arrests, and various charges against the Plaintiff, including threatening her ex-husband. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Jones conspired with Defendant Ryan, who was involved in separate civil proceedings involving the Plaintiff, and alleged that Defendant Ryan coerced Assistant Attorney General John Donnelly to take part in the conspiracy. The Plaintiff also claims damages for the Defendants' creation of false criminal records where Defendants exhibited “negligent and disregards of Plaintiff's federal rights, they caused false information to be registered at CJIS and CORI, their conduct are extreme and outrageous, their misconduct are beyond all bounds of decency.” The Plaintiff did not allege any supporting facts or factual basis for her claims.

Standard of Review

12(b)(1) Standard

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss an action based on lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. “‘The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating the existence of federal jurisdiction.'” Thakkar v. United States, 389 F.Supp.3d 160, 171 (D.Mass. 2019), citing Fabrica de Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., 682 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). “‘In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must ‘credit the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.'” Thakkar, 389 F.Supp. at 171, citing Sanchez ex rel. D.R.-S. v. United States, 671 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). “The ‘court may also ‘consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as the depositions and exhibits submitted.'” Thakkar, 389 F.Supp. at 171, citing Merlonghi v. U.S., 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

12(b)(6) Standard

A defendant may move to dismiss, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, the standard “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the Pro Se Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's pro se status “militates in favor of a liberal reading” of his pleading. See Rodi v. S.New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1^st Cir.2004). See also Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1^st Cir.1997) (“The policy behind affording pro se plaintiff's liberal interpretation is that if they present sufficient facts, the court may intuit the correct cause of action, even if it was imperfectly pled”). However, Plaintiff's pro se status does not absolve him of having to comply with this Court's procedural and substantive law. Burnham v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 348 F.Supp.3d 109, 111-12 (D.Mass. 2018) (citing Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1^st Cir. 1997)).

Although a pro se plaintiff's complaint is subject to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the complaint may not consist entirely of “conclusory allegations that merely parrot the relevant legal standard,” Young v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 231 (1st Cir. 2013). See also Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980) (explaining that the liberal standard applied to the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim”).

Discussion

Res Judicata

The doctrine of res judicata is applicable where the following elements exist: “(1) the earlier suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits, (2) the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits are sufficiently identical or related, and (3) the parties in the two suits are sufficiently identical or closely related.” Airframe Sys. v. Raytheon Co., 601 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2010)

The Plaintiff's claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint^[2], which set forth the same claims, was filed January 5, 2017, in Plymouth Superior Court and resulted in a final judgment on May 12, 2017, when the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. In the Town's civil contempt action against the Plaintiff in 2021, also in Plymouth Superior Court, Plaintiff filed a counterclaim against the Town on October 6, 2021. The allegations in the counterclaim are the same as previously filed in the 2017 Complaint and in this action and the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her 2021 Counterclaim with prejudice.^[3]

“Once there has been an adjudication on the merits, federal law stipulates that all claims which are part of the same cause of action are extinguished, whether or not asserted in the original action.” Andrews-Clarke v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 157 F.Supp.2d 93, 100 (D.Mass. 2001) (citing Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 924 F.2d 1161, 1164 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991)). All three elements of the doctrine of res judicata have been satisfied. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Complaint is barred and will be dismissed.

Injunction

Defendant seeks to enjoin Plaintiffs from continued litigation in this court and has requested attorneys' fees and costs for having to defend against this “frivolous” action. “A district court has the power to enjoin litigants who abuse the court system by filing groundless and vexatious litigation.” Stefanik v. Town of Huntington 536 F.Supp.2d 106, 114 (D.Mass. 2008) (citing Elbery v Louison, 201 F.3d 427, 1999 WL 1295871, at *2 (1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (table decision)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (providing that courts may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid...