Sirias v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 15 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:14-cv-23-FtM-29CM |
| Parties | RAMON SERRUD SIRIAS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court upon a petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Ramon Serrud Sirias ("Petitioner") who is presently confined at the Walton Correctional Institution in DeFuniak Springs, Florida (Doc. 1, filed January 8, 2014). Petitioner, proceeding pro se, attacks a conviction entered by the Circuit Court in Lee County, Florida for lewd and lascivious battery. Id. Respondent filed a response to the petition (Doc. 29). Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 42).
Petitioner raises nineteen separate claims for relief in his petition. Upon due consideration of the pleadings and the state-court record, the Court concludes that each claim must either be denied or dismissed as unexhausted. Because the Court may resolve the Petition on the basis of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) ().
On January 25, 2006, Petitioner was charged with one count of lewd or lascivious battery in violation of Florida Statute § 800.04(4)(b). After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty as charged and sentenced to fifteen years in prison (Ex. 1, Vol. I at 78, 91-96).2 Petitioner's conviction and sentence were per curiam affirmed (Ex. 6); Sirias v. State, 17 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
On August 19, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules ofCriminal Procedure ("Rule 3.850 motion") in which he raised seventeen claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (Ex. 8). The post-conviction court denied each claim (Ex. 9). Florida's Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed (Ex. 11); Sirias v. State, 84 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
Contemporaneously with the Rule 3.850 motion, Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify his trial judge from presiding over the Rule 3.850 proceeding (Ex. 13). The judge denied the motion as legally insufficient. Id. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of prohibition in Florida's Second District Court of Appeal, again seeking to disqualify his trial judge from presiding over his Rule 3.850 proceeding (Ex. 14). The appellate court denied the petition with prejudice (Ex. 16); Sirias v. State, 52 So. 3d 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Petitioner filed a second Rule 3.850 motion on May 29, 2012 which was denied as successive and untimely (Ex. 17). Florida's Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed (Ex. 18); Sirias v. State, 119 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).
Petitioner signed the instant petition on December 18, 2013 (Doc. 1).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Notably, a state court's violation of state law is not sufficient to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000)). That said, the Supreme Court has also explained that "the lack of a Supreme Court decision on nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that there is no clearly established federal law, since 'a general standard' from [the Supreme Court's] cases can supply such law." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). State courts "must reasonably apply the rules 'squarely established' by Court's holdings to the facts of each case. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).
Even if there is clearly established federal law on point, habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," that federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonablemanner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)). Moreover, "it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by Court." Knowles, 556 U.S. at 122.
Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) () (dictum); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013) (same).
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This is a "doubly deferential" standard of review that gives both the state court and the petitioner's attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)).
The focus of inquiry under Strickland's performance prong is "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Indeed, the petitioner bears the heavy burden to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable[.]" Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the timeof counsel's conduct," applying a "highly deferential" level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Petitioner's burden to demonstrate prejudice is high. Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). Prejudice "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. That is, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. At 694. A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
The AEDPA precludes federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances, from granting habeas relief unless a petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. Specifically, the AEDPA provides, in pertinent part:
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