Sisca v. Maritime
| Decision Date | 09 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-22911-BLOOM/Louis |
| Parties | ANTONIO SISCA, Plaintiff, v. HAL MARITIME, LTD. et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants Hal Maritime, Ltd. ("Hal") and Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd.'s ("Princess") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Compel Arbitration, ECF No. [4] ("Defendants' Motion") and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, ECF No. [16] ("Plaintiff's Motion") (collectively, "Motions"). The Court has considered the Motions, all supporting and opposing submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff initially filed his Complaint in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida against Defendants on June 22, 2020, ECF No. [1-2]. Defendants removed the case to this Court on July 14, 2020, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 202 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1441. ECF No. [1] at 5.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff, an Italian national, was a seaman on the M/V Vendaam (the "Vessel") and was employed by Hal as a "cast member" aboard the Vessel. ECF No. [1-2] at ¶¶ 5-6. His employment contract with Hal commenced on July 26, 2019 and expired on April 22, 2020. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 14, 23. On March 14, 2020, the United States announced a no sail order for cruise ships due to the COVID-19 pandemic, id. at ¶16. However, Hal refused to disembark Plaintiff and repatriate him to Italy until April 23, 2020. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19.
On April 23, 2020, the Vessel began deploying lifeboats to transfer European crewmembers to Princess' Regal Princess vessel to repatriate to Europe. Id. at ¶ 24. Due to high winds and rough sea conditions, the lifeboats violently rolled from side to side while sea water from the crashing waves sloshed inside the lifeboats. Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff asserts that while in transit to the Regal Princess from the Vessel on April 23, 2020, he slipped twice and violently fell on his lower back. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff reported his injuries to the Regal Princess' doctors, yet he was only given pain medication. Id. at ¶ 27. Over the ensuing days while on a transatlantic voyage, Plaintiff's pain progressively worsened, and he was kept aboard the Regal Princess even though physicians recommended that he be seen by an orthopedic spine specialist. Id. at ¶¶ 28-34. According to Plaintiff, by the time the Regal Princess arrived in Europe on May 5, 2020, he had become paraplegic. Id. at ¶ 36. Upon arrival in Italy on May 9, 2020, he was admitted for emergency spinal surgery and diagnosed with cauda equina syndrome. Id. at ¶ 40. He underwent back surgery on May 10, 2020, and post-operatively he remains wheelchair-bound in a paraplegic state and is unable to control his bladder or bowel movements. Id. at ¶¶ 42-43.
The Complaint alleges six counts, three against each Defendant. Specifically, as to Hal, Plaintiff brings claims for Jones Act negligence (Count I); Jones Act negligence for failure to provide prompt and adequate medical treatment (Count II); and failure to provide prompt and adequate maintenance and cure (Count III). As to Princess, Plaintiff asserts claims for failure to provide prompt and adequate maintenance and cure (Count IV); unseaworthiness (Count V), andnegligence (Count VI).
Defendants now move to compel arbitration of the instant claims in accordance with the terms of the Seagoing Employment Agreement, May 2019 version, ECF Nos. [1-3] and [1-5] ("Employment Agreement"). In particular, the Employment Agreement provides that disputes are to be arbitrated in Italy, Plaintiff's country of citizenship, under the laws of the British Virgin Islands:
Arbitration: Any disputes whatsoever relating to or in any way arising out of this Agreement or your service on board a ship, including but not limited to wage disputes, property damage, personal injury, death or any other claim, shall be governed exclusively by the laws specified in the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement or government-mandated contract. In the absence of any such Agreement or specification, such disputes shall be governed in all respects by the Laws of the British Virgin Islands. You hereby agree, on behalf of yourself and your successors, assigns, heirs, dependents or representative, that any disputes shall be arbitrated, if at all, exclusively according to the terms specified in any applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement or government-mandated contract. In the absence of such Agreement, terms or contract, all such disputes no matter how described, pleaded or styled, shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 1958), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 1970 U.S.T. LEXIS 115, exclusively in your country of citizenship or, if your home country is not a party to the Convention, then in Seattle, Washington.
ECF No. [1-5] at Art. 18B (emphasis omitted).1
According to Defendants, the Complaint's allegations "clearly fall within the agreement toarbitrate made between the parties." ECF No. [4] at 3. They make four general arguments. First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit "has clearly established that crewmember cases should be compelled to arbitration" under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention"); second, federal law favors arbitration; third, the four jurisdictional prerequisites to compel arbitration under the Convention are satisfied; and fourth, courts within this district compel arbitration under similar circumstances. Id. at 4-7. Defendants seek an order dismissing the instant action and compelling arbitration in Italy.
Plaintiff responds that the arbitration agreement does not apply because he sustained his injuries one day after the Employment Agreement expired by its own terms. ECF No. [15] at 2. Additionally, even were that not so, the Employment Agreement's terms and conditions are not triggered because Plaintiff's claims arose when he was not "in active service sailing on a ship in an officer or crewmember capacity" but rather while he was on "leave" and/or "in transit to or from" a ship. Id. (quoting ECF No. [1-5], Art. 1A).2 In Plaintiff's view, there was no written agreement to arbitrate under the facts of this case, and thus, the jurisdictional prerequisites under the Convention are not met. Id. at 10-13. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that the arbitration clause did not survive expiration of the Employment Agreement. ECF No. [25] at 5. Plaintiff further argues that Defendants' Motion as to Princess must be denied because Princess was not a signatory to theEmployment Agreement and no other written agreement exists between Plaintiff and Princess. ECF No. [16] at 2-3, 13-16; ECF No [25] at 8-10. Plaintiff contends, relatedly, that remand to state court of all claims raised in the Complaint is appropriate because the Court lacks federal jurisdiction over this matter. See ECF Nos. [16] and [25].
Defendants reply that "Plaintiff is losing sight of the forest for the trees" because the arbitration agreement language is "more expansive and broader than other provisions" contained in the Employment Agreement, and it survives expiration of the Employment Agreement. ECF No. [23] at 2. Accordingly, they submit that the jurisdictional prerequisites under the Convention are satisfied. Defendants add that Plaintiff "is trying to have it two ways" in that he claims he was not employed at the time of his injuries, but he nonetheless asserts causes of action that are available only to seamen. Id. at 4-6. Defendants maintain that claims against Princess arise out of the Employment Agreement and are subject to arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at 7-9; see also ECF No. [24].
The Motions, accordingly, are ripe for consideration.
The Convention requires courts of signatory nations, such as the United States, to give effect to private arbitration agreements and to enforce arbitral awards made in signatory nations. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I(1), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Sierra v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int'l, N.V., 631 F. App'x 714, 715-16 (11th Cir. 2015). The United States enforces its agreement to the Convention's terms through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.
In ruling on a motion to enforce an arbitration agreement under the Convention, a district court conducts a "very limited inquiry." Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2002)). As a threshold matter, "[u]nder both the FAA and the Convention 'the first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate' it." Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1213 n.9 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)). In other words, "the parties will not be required to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so." Id. at 1214 (quoting Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1419 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Beyond that threshold consideration, an arbitration agreement is governed by the Convention if four jurisdictional prerequisites are met: (1) the agreement is "in writing within the meaning of the Convention;" (2) "the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention" (3) "the agreement arises out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered commercial;" and (4) one of the parties to the agreement...
To continue reading
Request your trial