Sisney v. Reisch

• Decision Date: 26 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–3003.,10–3003.
• Citation: Sisney v. Reisch, 674 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2012)
• Parties: Charles E. SISNEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Tim REISCH, Secretary of Corrections for South Dakota; Douglas L. Weber, Chief Warden for the Department of Corrections of South Dakota; Dennis Block, Associate Warden for the South Dakota State Penitentiary; and Jennifer Wagner, a/k/a Jennifer Lane, Cultural Activities Coordinator for the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

674 F.3d 839

Charles E. SISNEY, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.Tim REISCH, Secretary of Corrections for South Dakota; Douglas L. Weber, ChiefWarden for the Department of Corrections of South Dakota; Dennis Block, Associate Warden for the South Dakota State Penitentiary; and Jennifer Wagner, a/k/a Jennifer Lane, Cultural Activities Coordinator for the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 10–3003.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 20, 2011.Filed: March 19, 2012.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 26, 2012.*

Richard L. Johnson, argued and on the brief, Sioux Falls, SD, for appellant.

James Ellis Moore, argued and on the brief, William G. Beck, Cheri S. Raymond, Michele Ann Munson, on the brief, Sioux Falls, SD, for appellee.

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, and WEBBER, ¹District Judge.WEBBER, District Judge.

Charles E. Sisney is incarcerated in the South Dakota State Penitentiary(“SDSP”), where he practices the Jewish faith.In 2003, Sisney filed suit claiming certain SDSP Officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by denying his requests to erect and eat his meals within a succah ² in the SDSP recreation yard.³Sisney sued the Officials in their individual capacities and he sought to recover monetary damages.The district court⁴ granted summary judgment to the Officials.Sisney v. Reisch,533 F.Supp.2d 952(D.S.D.2008).First, the district court ruled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), barred Sisney from recovering compensatory damages because his suit contained no allegation of physical injury.Next, the district court ruled that the Officials were entitled to qualified immunity.Neither of these rulings was at issue in the interlocutory appeal we previously heard in this case.Van Wyhe v. Reisch,581 F.3d 639(8th Cir.2009).Sisney now appeals both rulings.We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.We affirm.

I.

In 2003, Sisney wished to celebrate the Jewish holiday feast of Sukkot by erecting a succah in the SDSP recreation yard.“Sukkot is a Jewish religious festival of thanksgiving celebrated originally as an autumn harvest festival that is commemorative of the temporary shelters of the Jews during their wandering in the wilderness.”Van Wyhe,581 F.3d at 656 n. 7(internal quotations and citations omitted).A succah is a small three-sided tent or booth that is used as a residence or eating place during observance of Sukkot.Id. at 645.Because Sisney did not own a succah, he sought to use one that had been donated by Jewish inmates incarcerated at a different South Dakota state prison facility.The donated succah consisted of a metal frame and poles that were covered on three sides by a canvas tarp.This succah was a temporary structure and was large enough to accommodate only one person.

SDSP regulations required inmates to obtain official approval of religious activity requests by submitting a form entitled “Project Application.”In a project application submitted on June 17, 2003, Sisney requested permission to erect the donated succah in the SDSP prison yard and to eat his meals inside that succah.In the alternative, Sisney requested that he be allowed extra time in the recreation yard at sundown to recite a special benediction.Sisney asserts he included this alternative request because he had been informed, prior to submitting the project application, that his succah request would be denied.Sisney submitted project applications containing similar succah requests on August 9, 2004, on September 12, 2005, and in 2006.

Each of Sisney's applications was denied, on grounds that SDSP policy prohibited inmate-to-inmate property transfers and that the proposals presented safety and security issues.Sisney then filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging each denial was a violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights.As noted, Sisney sued the Officials in their individual capacities seeking monetary damages.

The Officials moved for summary judgment, based on both the merits and the defense of qualified immunity.The district court first ruled that because Sisney's claims contained no allegation of physical injury, § 1997e(e) of the PLRA barred him from recovering compensatory damages.Sisney,533 F.Supp.2d at 986.Next, the district court ruled that while an inmate alleging First Amendment violations could recover punitive damages consistent with § 1997e(e), there was no basis in the record for awarding such damages to Sisney.Id. at 986–87.Sisney was therefore limited to recovering nominal damages.Finally, the district court ruled that the Officials were entitled to qualified immunity, because Sisney had failed to cite “any case law that is similar enough to the denial of the use of a Sukkot Booth to find that a reasonable official would have understood such a denial violated Sisney's First Amendment rights to exercise his religion.”Id. at 989.Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Officials.Id.

Sisney now raises two points on appeal: (1) whether § 1997e(e) of the PLRA bars him from recovering compensatory damages; and (2) whether the Officials are entitled to qualified immunity.

II.

A.Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA

In his first point on appeal, Sisney appeals the district court's entry of summary judgment on his pleas for compensatory damages.⁵The district court ruled that because Sisney's free exercise claims contained no allegation of physical injury, § 1997e(e) of the PLRA barred him from recovering compensatory damages.Sisney,533 F.Supp.2d at 986.Section 1997e(e) states as follows:

(e) Limitation on recovery.No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).In Royal v. Kautzky,we held that this statute applies to “all federal actions brought by prisoners,” including actions alleging violation of the First Amendment.375 F.3d 720, 723(8th Cir.2004).As a result, in Royalwe held that § 1997e(e) prohibited the incarcerated plaintiff from recovering compensatory damages on his First Amendment claim, because that claim contained no allegation of physical injury.Id.Sisney's suit presents the same situation, and it is therefore clear the district court did not err.

Sisney urges us to reconsider Royal's interpretation of § 1997e(e), relying heavily upon the dissenting opinion in that case.See375 F.3d at 726–31(Heaney, J., dissenting).Sisney argues that § 1997e(e)'s statutory text and legislative history compel the conclusion that Congress never intended the statute to apply to legitimate constitutional claims.Sisney also points out that the circuit courts are split in their interpretation of 1997e(e).CompareRoyal,375 F.3d 720, 723(“We join the majority, concluding Congress did not intend section 1997e(e) to limit recovery only to a select group of federal actions brought by prisoners.Instead, we read section 1997e(e) as limiting recovery for mental or emotional injury in all federal actions brought by prisoners.”), with Rowe v. Shake,196 F.3d 778, 781–82(7th Cir.1999)(“A prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have sustained.”), and Canell v. Lightner,143 F.3d 1210, 1213(9th Cir.1998)( “The deprivation of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judicial relief wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or any mental or emotional injury he may have incurred.Therefore, § 1997e(e) does not apply to First Amendment Claims regardless of the form of relief sought.”).

“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.”Owsley v. Luebbers,281 F.3d 687, 690(8th Cir.2002).Therefore, “[e]ven if we found [these arguments] persuasive, we are without the authority to overrule the decisions of a prior panel of this circuit.”United States v. Craddock,593 F.3d 699, 702(8th Cir.2010).Sisney himself recognizes this barrier and candidly acknowledges he is raising the issue to preserve it for en banc review.

B.Qualified Immunity

In his second point, Sisney appeals the district court's entry of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.“We review a district court's qualified immunity determination on summary judgment de novo.”Davis v. Hall,375 F.3d 703, 711(8th Cir.2004).

Sisney filed his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the Officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by denying him use of a succah.Sisney sued the Officials in their individual capacities and sought to recover monetary damages.Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, causes a deprivation of the rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.42 U.S.C. § 1983.In a § 1983 individual-capacity claim, the plaintiff seeks to hold a government official personally liable for actions taken under the color of law.Clay v. Conlee,815 F.2d 1164, 1169(8th Cir.1987).

A government official sued in his individual capacity may raise the defense of qualified immunity.Id.Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”Stepnes v. Ritschel,663 F.3d 952, 960(8th Cir.2011)(quotingPearson v. Callahan,555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565(2009)).We decide whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity by conducting a two-prong inquiry, examining “(1)‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... make out a violation of a...