Siterlet v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 86-1062.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1062.,86-1062.
• Citation: 823 F.2d 918
• Parties: Edward A. SITERLET, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

823 F.2d 918

Edward A. SITERLET, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 86-1062.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued January 19, 1987.

February 20, 1987.

Michael Hluchaniuk, Asst. U.S. Atty., Bay City, Mich., Janet L. Parker, argued, for defendant-appellee.

Delysle L. Henry, Aplena, Mich., James Roy Williams, argued, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

Before KEITH, KRUPANSKY and GUY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal arises from a final decision of the Honorable James Churchill of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Northern Division, denying appellant's application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. Appellant, Edward Siterlet, first filed an application for social security disability benefits on April 30, 1980, which was denied initially, upon reconsideration, and by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) after a hearing on January 16, 1982. Appellant's request for review with the Appeals Council was denied on June 10, 1982, and he failed to pursue his right to judicial review, rendering the Secretary's decision final. On October 12, 1982, appellant filed the present application, alleging a disability onset date of December, 1978. However, appellant does appear to challenge his initial determination of non-disability, and the ALJ specifically found that since that prior decision involved the same parties, facts and issues for the period through January 16, 1982, that prior finding was res judicata through that date. Therefore, appellant's current claim is confined to establishing disability between the dates of January 17, 1982 and March 31, 1983, the date his insured status expired. Since we find substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision that appellant is not disabled, the district court decision is affirmed.

Appellant's present application alleges disability due to a pinched sciatic nerve, degenerative disc disease, lumbosacral sprain and strain, arthritis, and high blood pressure. The application was denied in initial and reconsidered determinations. Administrative Law Judge Robert Hall issued a decision denying the application on September 5, 1984. The ALJ indicated that appellant was suffering from a back impairment due to strain and injuries occurring during his thirty years working as a carpenter. However, his back problems and other complaints, including those of severe pain, were found not to preclude him from performing sedentary work for which he was determined to have sufficient transferable skills.

Two medical reports submitted by appellant relating to his current claim are dated during the relevant period. Both reports are from Dr. Nordgaard and are dated April 2, 1982. Dr. Nordgaard indicated in those reports that he had last seen claimant in December, 1979. Thus, these reports relate only to the period for which appellant had already been found not disabled. The balance of the medical evidence of record post dates the expiration of his insured status. The ALJ gave considerable credence to the report of Dr. Victor Mateskon, dated April 6, 1983. Appellant was diagnosed as having mild chronic disc disease at L 4-5 and L 5-S 1 with right sciatic radiation of pain, mild chronic degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine and recurrent low back strain. It was Dr. Mateskon's opinion that the exact degree of appellant's functional capacity and disability was difficult to assess because there was "little objective organic pathology demonstrable." However, he did say that claimant would be disabled from doing "heavy" manual labor and even light work if it involved lifting over 25 pounds on a frequent basis or frequent bending, stooping, twisting, pushing or pulling activities involving use of the back. With these limitations, appellant would be restricted from light work activities; however, the restrictions are not inconsistent with his ability to do sedentary work.

The rest of the medical evidence indicates that plaintiff may have been disabled as of late 1983. In November, 1983, Dr. Modzinski reported that plaintiff was depressed and unmotivated. His prognosis was poor. A physical capabilities evaluation by Dr. Modzinski indicated that plaintiff was incapable of sitting for more than one hour and could not stand or walk at all. In addition, he was also unable to grasp, push, pull, or do fine manipulation.

In December, 1983, Dr. Maxim concluded plaintiff was totally disabled and stated that "his back condition would preclude him from even being capable of very favored sedentary work." He categorized the condition as permanent and progressive in nature.

In March, 1984, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Crawford for the Disability Determination Service. Dr. Crawford diagnosed severe neurotic depression and dependent personality disorder. He concluded that plaintiff's prognosis was poor as he did not have the will power or the strength of character to do something about his problems. He felt it was highly improbable that plaintiff would ever be able to return to functional employment. Dr. Crawford also completed a physical capabilities study in which he indicated plaintiff could grasp, push, pull and do fine manipulation, but that he could not sit, stand or walk for a period of even one hour.

The last post-March, 1983 evidence consists of a report from Bob Snow of Certified Rehabilitation Services dated April 9, 1984. His conclusion after evaluating plaintiff was that he "seriously questioned whether any vocational rehabilitation effort could be developed which would satisfactorily overcome the variety of complaints and objections which plaintiff expresses and finds documentation for in the various medical reports."

The ALJ found that appellant suffered from a severe back impairment as well as a combination of non-severe ailments, including exogenous obesity, mild depression, hypertension, degenerative arthritis of the right hip and other arthritic changes, and diabetes. The ALJ further found that appellant's allegations of pain were not of the severity that had been alleged and that appellant could perform sedentary work. The ALJ also found that appellant had transferable work skills and concluded that appellant was not disabled pursuant to Rule 201.11 of Table No. 1, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.

Appellant alleges the following on appeal:

1) the ALJ failed to give substantial weight to the opinion of the "treating" physician, Dr. Modzinski;

2) the ALJ improperly discounted evidence of debilitating pain; and

3) the ALJ erred in finding claimant to have "transferable skills" and that the vocational expert failed to properly identify jobs existing in significant numbers which claimant was capable of performing.

Our review of the Secretary's decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. A reviewing court "may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.1984). The Secretary is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and the Secretary's findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Even if the court might arrive at a different conclusion, the decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Lane v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 612, 616 (6th Cir.1967). In the case at bar, while we recognize the presence of some conflicting evidence in the record, we nevertheless find substantial evidence to support the Secretary's determination that appellant failed to establish disability prior to the expiration of his insured status.

Appellant argues that the ALJ failed to give substantial weight to the opinion of Dr. Modzinski. Appellant makes much of the fact that Dr. Modzinski was his treating physician and that he placed such significant limitations on his activities as to allow him to be considered totally disabled. He further argues that since Dr. Modzinski's conclusions are supported by those of Drs. Maxim and Crawford, these combined medical opinions should have resulted in a finding of disability under the Act. Appellant fails to mention, however, that Dr. Modzinski first saw him on November 23, 1983, almost eight months after expiration of his insured status. Appellant suffers from one or more degenerative disorders. Thus, Dr. Modzinski's report is minimally...