EAST, District Judge.
The parties to this action seek to review and perpetually enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) from issuing its Certificate of Convenience and Public Necessity and otherwise effectuate its Decisions and Orders of March 23rd, 1956 as affirmed on August 13, 1956, in the proceedings entitled "Maskelyne Transfer and Storage, Inc.,—Extension—Motor-For-Rail Service, Docket MC 20080, Sub. 1."
Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of this three-judge court1 is invoked under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 1398, 2321-2325, 2284 and Section 17(9) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 17(9); Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, Section 1009, Title 5 U.S.C.A.
Parties.
The plaintiff Sites Freightlines, Inc., (Sites) a corporation of the State of Oregon, and Inland Motor Freight, Inc., (Inland) is a corporation of the State of Washington with its principal offices located at Spokane, Washington, and Consolidated Freightways, Inc., (Consolidated), is a corporation of the State of Washington, with its principal offices in Portland, Oregon, and each of the said plaintiffs are common carriers by Motor vehicle under certificates issued by Commission.
The intervening defendant Commission is a party to this action pursuant to Section 2323, Title 28 U.S.C. Intervening defendant Maskelyne Transfer and Storage, Inc. (Maskelyne) is a corporation of the State of Washington and as a common carrier operates in interstate commerce in the states of Washington, Idaho and Oregon and intrastate commerce in the State of Washington.
Intervening defendant Union Pacific Railroad Co. (U. P.) is a corporation and a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce and intrastate commerce in and through the state of Washington and several other states in the union.
Each of said defendants were allowed to intervene in this matter pursuant to Section 2323, Title 28 U.S.C.
Procedure Before the Commission.
Maskelyne
"—made application to the (Interstate Commerce) Commission for authority to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle of general commodities, with certain exceptions not here important, (1) between Walla Walla, Washington, and Pomeroy, Washington, over U. S. Highway 410, serving certain named intermediate and off-route points, and (2) between Walla Walla, Washington, and Pendleton, Oregon, over a designated route, serving certain named intermediate points." all subject to conditions which in effect limit its service as auxiliary to, or supplemental of, the rail service of U. P.
"The application was supported by the Union Pacific Railroad Company and was opposed by these plaintiffs.
"Two of the plaintiffs can operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle over all of the routes covered by the application. The third, Sites, is authorized only to operate over a portion of the applied-for routes.
"The applicant, the Union Pacific, and each of these plaintiffs presented evidence at the hearing in support of their respective positions. No shipper or receiver of freight testified.
"The Joint Board recommended that the requested authority be granted subject to substantially the same conditions included in the application.
"Plaintiffs, here, filed exceptions to the Joint Board's recommended order, Division 1, of the Commission in acting upon the exceptions on March 23, 1956, issued an order providing for granting of the application, subject to the following conditions:
"1. The service performed by applicant shall be limited to service which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, rail service of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, hereinafter called the railroad;
"2. No service shall be rendered to or from any point not a station on the rail lines of the railroad.
"3. Shipments transported shall be limited to those which are received from, or delivered to, the railroad under a through bill of lading covering, in addition to a motor carrier movement by applicant, a prior or subsequent movement by rail;
"4. All contractual arrangements between applicant and the railroad shall be reported to the Commission and shall be subject to revision by it if and as it may be found necessary in order that such arrangement shall be fair and equitable to the parties; and
"5. Such further conditions, as the Commission, in the future may find it necessary to impose to restrict applicant's operation to service which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, the rail service of the railroad."
"Division 1 also found that the applicant was fit, willing and able to perform the proposed services.
"Plaintiffs then filed a petition for reconsideration, which was denied August 13th, 1956."
Relief Sought by Plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs seek in this action a decree adjudging the Commission's Orders, dated March 23, 1956 and August 13, 1956, to be beyond the lawful authority of the Commission and to be wholly unlawful and void. Upon motion of the plaintiffs, and by an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order per East, Judge, dated September 12, 1956, the aforesaid two Orders of the Commission were stayed pending hearing for an Interlocutory Injunction. By an agreement of all parties the aforesaid Temporary Restraining Order stands in effect pendente lite.
The Issues.
All of the defendants have made issue on the merits and the controverted contentions of the plaintiffs are:
"1. That the service proposed by the applicant is not that of a `common carrier by motor vehicle'2 and therefore a certificate authorizing the proposed service cannot properly issue; and
"2. That there is no evidence of record upon which the Commission could properly predicate a finding that public convenience and necessity require the proposed operation,3 and
"3. That there is no evidence of record upon which the Commission could properly predicate a finding that the applicant is fit, willing and able to conduct the proposed operation.4
"4. That the Commission's Orders are contrary to the National Transportation Policy."5
On the Merits.
In resolving the issues presented it is not our function to review the Commission for mere error, nor were we authorized to review its Findings even though, if original finders of fact we might have reached a different conclusion on the evidence. It is settled law that if the Commission has:
1. Acted within the scope of its statutory authority,
2. Has not arbitrarily or capriciously abused its discretion and has proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of due process,
3. Has acted upon adequate findings, and
4. Whether in the record considered as a whole there is substantial evidence and a rational basis to support those Findings,
then the Orders of the Commission are entitled to finality and may not be set aside, modified or disturbed by this Court.6
Issue No. 1:
We find that from
"—the inception of its regulation of motor carriers, the Commission has authorized substituted motor-for-rail service, viewing it as a separate and distinct type of motor carrier operation. In the first important motor-for-rail case, Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc.—Control— Barker, 1 M.C.C. 101 (1936), 5 M. C.C. 9, 5 M.C.C. 49 (1937), the Commission said (1 M.C.C. at 111):
"`* * * The motor vehicle can undoubtedly be used as a very valuable auxiliary or adjunct to railroad service, particularly less-than-carload service, and many opportunities for such use here have been pointed out of record and are clear. Such coordination of rail and motor vehicle operations should be encouraged. The result will be a new form of service which should prove of much public advantage. Nor do we believe that the creation of this new form of service will "unduly restrain competition." On the contrary, it should have the opposite effect.'
"In Kansas City Southern Transport Co., Inc., Common Carrier Application, 10 M.C.C. 221 (1938) and 28 M.C.C. 5 (1941), the general question of the extent to which substituted motor-for-rail service should be authorized was considered. There the Commission approved the issuance of a certificate as a common carrier by motor vehicle to a railroad-controlled motor carrier and said (10 M.C.C. at 235);
"`* * * Moreover, it is clear that the coordinated rail-motor service will be a new form of service, utilizing both forms of transportation to advantage, and differing from the service given by the railway alone or by competing motor carriers alone * * *
"`Further, that the Commission has consistently recognized that the motor vehicle can be used to supplement rail service in the interest of affording better service to the public, and that Congress intentionally left the door open so that coordinated rail-motor service could be used with Commission approval.7 This interpretation of the congressional intent has been judicially affirmed and is no longer subject to serious question. For example, in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 65 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed. 205, the Court said:
"`When Congress directed that the act should be administered to preserve the inherent advantages of each mode of transportation, it is abundantly clear that it was not intended to bar railroads from the operation of off-the-rail motor vehicles. * * * (326 U.S. at page 66, 65 S.Ct. at page 1493)
"`* * * The alternative to the
...