Sivak v. State

• Decision Date: 19 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 16120,16120
• Citation: Sivak v. State, 721 P.2d 218, 111 Idaho 118 (Idaho App. 1986)
• Parties: Lacey SIVAK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 218

721 P.2d 218

111 Idaho 118

Lacey SIVAK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 16120.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 19, 1986.

Lacey Sivak, pro se.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Lacey Sivak, an inmate at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, appeals from an order of the district court which affirmed a magistrate's order quashing Sivak's petition for the return of personal property confiscated by the Idaho Department of Corrections. We affirm for the reasons stated below.

The record reveals the following facts. Sivak was sentenced to death after he was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder. In early January 1984, two weeks prior to his scheduled execution date, Sivak was moved from his death row cell to a "death watch" cell to await his execution. When he was moved to the death watch cell, his personal property was inventoried and stored by the Department of Corrections. The warden advised Sivak that his property would be returned when the department was notified of the Idaho Supreme Court's automatic stay of execution. Following issuance of the stay, Sivak was returned to his former cell but not all of his personal property was restored to him. The department retained some of Sivak's property in conformance with a new departmental rule which prohibited inmates of particular classifications (e.g., death row) from possessing certain property. See Department of Corrections, Policy and Procedure Manual § 320; MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-127 (1979). In a cover memorandum which accompanied the new rule, the warden indicated that formerly authorized property could remain in the inmate's possession until (1) any change in the inmate's custody classification, or (2) a "lock-down as a result of disturbances."

On February 24, 1984, Sivak, pro se, filed an application for writ of "habeas corpus," seeking return of his property. A hearing was held before a magistrate. The department asserted Sivak's move from death row to "death watch" represented a change in Sivak's custody classification and, consequently, permitted the department to retain the property in conformance with the new property rule. The magistrate disagreed and found Sivak's custody classification had not changed. The magistrate ordered that Sivak "be restored to the property he was in possession of prior to his being placed in death watch."

Approximately two months later, Sivak again petitioned the magistrate, this time for an order compelling the department to comply with the directive to return his property. The magistrate ordered the department to report its compliance with his prior decision. In its compliance report, the department asserted it had "fulfilled its obligations under the Order" except for such property as Sivak was no longer authorized to possess. ¹ The department argued that since being removed from death watch status, Sivak has lost his "grandfather right" to possess unauthorized property. The department maintained that Sivak subsequently violated various departmental rules on at least four occasions after the magistrate issued his order to return Sivak's property. Sivak was "restricted to his cell" for a number of days as a consequence of violating the departmental rules. The department asserts that any of these "cell restrictions" would justify the imposition of the new property rule. The magistrate determined that the department was "in substantial compliance with the Court's Order" and quashed Sivak's writ of habeas corpus. Sivak then appealed to the district court. After reviewing the record, the district court held "that the evidence in the case supports the decision of the Magistrate."

On appeal to this Court, Sivak continues to seek the return of his property. ² If the property is not to be returned, Sivak requests that it be released to his family. The state contends that this Court has no jurisdiction over this action because Sivak's petition for "habeas corpus" is a remedy for unlawful confinement--not for the return of detained property.

We begin by examining the state's threshold argument concerning jurisdiction. Although we agree with the state's assertion that a writ of habeas corpus is not the remedy for the return of property, we hold this Court and the lower courts possess jurisdiction to determine the property rights of inmates. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Both the magistrate and the district court ruled on the merits of Sivak's claim despite the habeas corpus title. We are not persuaded that the erroneously titled action requires us to refrain from examining the merits of this appeal.

We note that inmates "do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison." There can be no unwarranted deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, but the retained rights are "subject to restrictions and limitations." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545, 99 S.Ct. at 1877; Balla v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 595 F.Supp. 1558 (D.Idaho 1984). "The fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution limits these retained constitutional rights." Bell, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S.Ct. at 1877. "Of necessity, rules far different from those imposed on society at large must prevail within prison walls." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2543, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Prison policies and practices "should be accorded wide-ranging deference" where needed to preserve internal order and the safety of inmates and corrections personnel. Bell, ...