Sivalingam v. Newton
| Decision Date | 05 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2020-0352,Nos. 2020-0216,s. 2020-0216 |
| Parties | Tejasinha SIVALINGAM v. Frances NEWTON & a. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
The Law Offices of Martin & Hipple, PLLC, of Concord (Stephen T. Martin on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell, P.C., of Concord (Charles P. Bauer and Anne E. Jenness on the brief and orally), for defendants Frances Newton and Leigh Sharps.
Mitchell Municipal Group P.A., of Laconia (Laura Spector-Morgan on the brief and orally), for defendant Town of Ashland Board of Selectmen.
The plaintiff, Tejasinha Sivalingam, sued Frances Newton and Leigh Sharps (Selectwomen) and the Town of Ashland Board of Selectmen (Board), seeking the Selectwomen's dismissal from and injunctive relief against the Board. The plaintiff alleged that, after the Board discussed in nonpublic session a complaint that he had submitted, information relating to that complaint was wrongfully disclosed in public session. The Superior Court (MacLeod, J.) granted the Selectwomen summary judgment, concluding that they had not improperly disclosed any information, but denied their motions for judgment on the pleadings and attorney's fees. The court also denied the Board's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, determining that the Board was required to notify the plaintiff of the nonpublic session. Relying upon Superior Court Rule 46(c), the court then severed the adjudicated claim against the Selectwomen from the plaintiff's pending claim against the Board. In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiff appeals the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Selectwomen; the Selectwomen cross-appeal, arguing that the court erred by denying their motions for judgment on the pleadings and attorney's fees; and the Board, on an interlocutory basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 8, appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the superior court's decision denying the Selectwomen attorney's fees. However, we reverse its decisions denying the Selectwomen's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Board's motion to dismiss.
The following facts are undisputed or supported by the record. The plaintiff was a selectman on the Board from March 2017 until January 2018. The Selectwomen served on the Board at all relevant times. On May 12, 2018, the plaintiff submitted to the Board a "Citizen Inquiry" form, a method developed by the Board to address public grievances, in which he complained that, during his tenure on the Board, the Selectwomen treated him with "derision" following an interview that he conducted with a candidate for the Ashland zoning board. His complaint requested "a public apology on television" from the Selectwomen and that the Board "vote to formally censure" them.
On June 4, 2018, the Board unanimously voted to enter nonpublic session to discuss matters which "would likely affect adversely the reputation of any person" if discussed in public. See RSA 91-A:3, II(c) (2013). The minutes of the nonpublic session reveal that the Board discussed "[h]ow to deal with complaints from [the plaintiff and] others" and decided that, moving forward, it would "not address personal attacks in public." Determining that the divulgence of the nonpublic session minutes and decisions reached in nonpublic session would likely "[a]ffect adversely the reputation of any person other than a" Board member, the Board unanimously voted to seal the minutes of the nonpublic session.1 See RSA 91-A:3, III (Supp. 2020). After reentering public session, the town administrator read the plaintiff's Citizen Inquiry form and a portion of a response from the Town of Ashland's legal counsel, and Selectwoman Newton noted that the Board had decided to no longer address criticisms of the Board in public.
On June 18, 2018, in public session, a majority of the Board agreed to eliminate the Citizen Inquiry form. According to the plaintiff, between June 11, 2018 and July 3, 2018, he submitted another Citizen Inquiry form and various Right-to-Know Law requests seeking information as to what transpired during the nonpublic session at the June 4 meeting. See RSA ch. 91-A (2013 & Supp. 2020). On August 6, 2018, in response to the plaintiff's requests, the Board unanimously voted to unseal the minutes from the June 4 nonpublic session.
The plaintiff thereafter filed suit against the Selectwomen and the Board. He sought the dismissal of the Selectwomen from the Board, arguing that they violated their oaths of office by causing information to be divulged at the June 4 meeting that the Board had previously voted to withhold and that "adversely affected [his] relationships with members of the community." See RSA 42:1-a, II(a) (2012). He also requested, in part, that the trial court enjoin the Board from entering nonpublic session to discuss a person without providing notice of its intent to do so. See RSA 91-A:3, II(c). After submitting a response, the Selectwomen filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the information disclosed during the June 4 public session was not harmful to the plaintiff's reputation. Before the trial court ruled on that motion, the Selectwomen filed a motion for summary judgment. Attached to the motion for summary judgment were affidavits from the Selectwomen and Kathleen DeWolfe, who was a selectwoman in June 2018, averring that at the June 4 meeting they believed that the plaintiff's Citizen Inquiry form, a portion of the town counsel's response, and the Board's decision to change the Citizen Inquiry process could be disclosed in public session. See RSA 91-A:3, III.
The trial court denied the Selectwomen's motion for judgment on the pleadings, but granted summary judgment in their favor, reasoning that they did not improperly divulge any information and therefore did not violate their oaths of office. The Selectwomen filed a motion for attorney's fees, which the trial court denied. Separately, the Board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the trial court denied. These appeals followed.
We begin by addressing the Selectwomen's argument that the trial court erred by denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings. In general, a motion seeking judgment based solely on the pleadings is in the nature of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. LaChance v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., 156 N.H. 88, 93, 931 A.2d 571 (2007). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we assume the truth of the facts alleged by the plaintiff and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. We need not, however, assume the truth of statements in the plaintiff's pleadings that are conclusions of law. Clark v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 171 N.H. 639, 645, 201 A.3d 652 (2019). We then engage in a threshold inquiry that tests the facts in the complaint against the applicable law. Id. In conducting this inquiry, we may consider documents attached to the plaintiff's pleadings, documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties, official public records, or documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint. Automated Transactions v. Am. Bankers Ass'n, 172 N.H. 528, 532, 216 A.3d 71 (2019). If the alleged facts do not constitute a basis for legal relief, we will reverse the denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings. See LaChance, 156 N.H. at 93, 931 A.2d 571.
The Selectwomen argue that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that the disclosed information would adversely affect his reputation as required to state a claim under RSA 42:1-a, II(a). We agree.
Resolving the Selectwomen's argument requires that we interpret RSA 42:1-a ’s language. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Clark, 171 N.H. at 650, 201 A.3d 652. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. at 650-51, 201 A.3d 652. We first look to the language of the statute itself and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 651, 201 A.3d 652. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute itself for additional evidence of legislative intent. Id.
We begin with the language of the statute. As relevant here, RSA 42:1 (2012) provides that any town officer who violates his or her oath of office "shall be ... dismissed from the office involved." RSA 42:1-a allows the superior court to entertain petitions to dismiss a town officer for violating the oath. RSA 42:1-a, I (2012). The statute further provides, in relevant part:
Accordingly, to state a claim under RSA 42:1-a, II(a) in this case, the plaintiff was required to plead that: (1) the Selectwomen divulged information to the public which they learned by virtue of their official positions or in the course of their official duties;2 (2) the Board "properly voted to withhold that information from the public by a vote of 2/3, as required...
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