Sivels v. State
| Decision Date | 29 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S00-9908-CR-455.,49S00-9908-CR-455. |
| Citation | 741 N.E.2d 1197 |
| Parties | Collis Dean SIVELS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Victoria Ursulskis, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Christopher L. Lafuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Four juries have assembled in the murder prosecution of appellant Collis Sivels. The first was dismissed after the court granted a continuance. Two successive juries were unable to agree on a verdict. Sivels contends that the fourth prosecution, which resulted in his conviction, violated his due process rights under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, as well as precepts of fundamental fairness grounded in both constitutions.
In analyzing Sivels' claims, we examine the authority of a trial court to dismiss an information and end prosecution after prior attempts to convict a defendant resulted in hung juries.
On the evening of September 21, 1996, Sivels, Jeremy Adams and a third person were at a hotel bar near the Indianapolis International Airport. Michael Shanklin was also at the bar. Shanklin later spoke to Sivels and Adams in the parking lot near the hotel entrance, saying he wanted to get cocaine from someone who lived on the west side of Indianapolis.
Adams drove Shanklin, Sivels, and a fourth person to the home described by Shanklin. Once there, Shanklin "couldn't score" any drugs. (R. at 433.) Under Sivels' direction, Adams then drove the group to the apartment complex where Sherita Robinson lived. Sivels went to Robinson's apartment and the rest of the group fell asleep in the car.
Adams eventually went to Robinson's apartment looking for Sivels. Sivels left the apartment with Adams and suggested that they rob Shanklin. Adams agreed. He shoved Shanklin out of the front passenger seat of the car onto the parking lot pavement. Sivels beat Shanklin and then shot him in the stomach.
While Shanklin lay bleeding on the pavement, Adams reached into Shanklin's pocket and stole his wallet. Then Sivels shot Shanklin in the head. Sivels and Adams returned to the car and drove away. Shanklin remained on the ground and later died from the two gunshot wounds.
The State charged Sivels and Adams as co-defendants with murder, felony murder and robbery. Jury selection began on October 14, 1997. The selected jury was dismissed before it was sworn because Sivels' case was continued due to the fact that Adams' case was continued.
On June 2, 1998, a jury was selected and sworn. The jury found Sivels not guilty of felony murder or robbery. It was unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. The court dismissed the jury and set a new trial date. The State moved to try the defendants separately, and the court so ordered.
Sivels was the sole defendant in the next jury trial; it began on March 22, 1999. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. The court denied Sivels' request for bail and reset the matter for another jury trial. Sivels later filed a motion to dismiss based upon his contention that the multiple prosecutions violated his right to due process. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
The next trial began on June 29, 1999. On the same date, Adams pled guilty and subsequently testified for the State against Sivels. The jury found Sivels guilty of murder. He now appeals this final prosecution.
Sivels argues that retrial after two successive deadlocked jury trials violated his right to due process and fundamental fairness.1 (Appellant's Br. at 8.) Analysis of this claim requires that we first determine whether a trial court has authority to dismiss an information in order to put an end to successive prosecutions resulting from hung juries. If this authority exists, then we must next consider when due process and precepts of fundamental fairness require such a dismissal. This is an issue of first impression in Indiana.
Sivels asserts, as he did in the hearing on the motion to dismiss, that the trial court "had the inherent authority to take up [his] Motion to Dismiss the Information and rule favorably thereon." (Appellant's Br. at 24.) He supports this contention by citing Hawkins v. State, 125 Ind. 570, 573, 25 N.E. 818, 819 (1890), in which we said,
In addition to a court's inherent power, Sivels claims refuge in the federal Constitution's Due Process Clause2 and the Indiana Constitution's Due Course of Law Clause.3 He maintains that the clauses are interchangeable for purposes of legal analysis. (Appellant's Br. at 24, citing White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 908 n. 4 (Ind. 1986)(referring to a substantial line of cases treating the Due Process Clause and the Due Course Clause as interchangeable).)
The State responds by indicating that these federal and state provisions are analogous only in a civil law context.4 (Appellee's Br. at 4.) The State relies on the declaration in McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 975-76 (Ind.2000):
The State, therefore, urges that no authority exists for a trial court to "step into the shoes of the prosecutor and dismiss an indictment following a hung jury. . . ." (Appellee's Br. at 5.) It also asserts that such authority has not been "recognized by the highest courts of either the federal judiciary or our appellate judiciary." (Id.) Finally, the State suggests that there is no need to create this authority "under the guise of due process" because defendants are adequately protected against excessive prosecutions by the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Id.)5
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that it "ha[d] inherent jurisdiction to limit prosecutions, because at some point it gets to be unreasonable." (R. at S12.) We agree.
A survey of courts in several jurisdictions provides strong support for the proposition that a trial court has inherent authority to dismiss an information or indictment with prejudice where multiple mistrials caused by hung juries infringed on the defendant's right to fundamental fairness.
In State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647 P.2d 705, 708 (1982), the defendant also experienced two hung jury mistrials. The Supreme Court of Hawaii indicated, "trial courts have the power to dismiss . . . an indictment with prejudice and over objection of the prosecuting attorney." Id. at 711. The court clarified that the trial court's authority is limited "[w]ithin the bounds of duly exercised discretion. . . ." Id.
In People v. Thompson, 424 Mich. 118, 379 N.W.2d 49 (1985), a defendant was convicted of armed robbery and felony murder. The conviction was reversed and the case retried. A mistrial was declared due to a hung jury and upon retrial the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated, "[T]here may be cases in which repeated retrials after repeated jury deadlock might be so fundamentally unfair as to violate the due process guaranteed by [the state or federal constitutions]. . . ." Id. at 55.6
In State v. Sauve, 164 Vt. 134, 666 A.2d 1164, 1165 (1995), the State appealed the district court's dismissal of an information that was amended after a mistrial. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the decision and stated, "In reaching its determination regarding dismissal of a case following one or more hung juries, the trial court must generally defer to the prosecutor's decision to retry the case, but if fundamental fairness compels dismissal, the court is authorized to do so." Id. at 1166.
While different jurisdictions refer to different sources of the trial court's authority to dismiss after multiple mistrials, the majority of the appellate courts rely on precepts of fundamental fairness and notions of fair play and substantial justice.7 We agree with the many jurisdictions that hold trial courts have inherent power to dismiss an information with prejudice following mistrials attributable to repeated jury deadlocks, where necessary to uphold guarantees of fundamental fairness and substantial justice.
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