Sizemore v. Kulongoski
Decision Date | 24 November 1995 |
Citation | 322 Or. 229,905 P.2d 1146 |
Parties | Bill SIZEMORE, Petitioner, v. Theodore R. KULONGOSKI, Attorney General, State of Oregon, Respondent, and Alice Dale and Robert Crumpton, Intervenors. SC S42548. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Gregory W. Byrne, of Byrne & Barrow, Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner.
Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.
Lynn-Marie Crider, Salem, argued the cause and filed the memorandum for intervenor Alice Dale.
Paul B. Gamson, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney, Portland, filed the memorandum for intervenor Robert Crumpton.
This is an original proceeding in which petitioner seeks review of a ballot title certified by the Attorney General. 1 Petitioner is entitled to bring this proceeding because he is an elector who timely submitted written comments about the Attorney General's draft ballot title. We review the Attorney General's ballot title for substantial compliance with ORS 250.035. ORS 250.085(5); see, e.g., Hand v. Roberts, 309 Or. 430, 433, 788 P.2d 446 (1990) ( ).
This is the first ballot title proceeding under the 1995 legislative amendments to ORS chapter 250 (initiative and referendum), which apply to initiative petitions filed on or after July 7, 1995. Or.Laws 1995, ch. 534. 2 For the reasons that follow, we modify the Attorney General's certified ballot title.
The proposed initiative measure provides:
The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for the proposed initiative measure:
Petitioner argues that the Attorney General's certified ballot title does not substantially comply with ORS 250.035, because the caption does not reasonably identify the subject matter of the measure and because the "yes" and "no" result statements are not simple and understandable. Petitioner does not challenge the Attorney General's summary. The caption
Petitioner argues that the words, "public employees need not pay," wrongly imply that the measure's focus is on what employees are permitted to do, when, in fact, its focus is on prohibiting certain conduct by unions. The Attorney General responds that, in a very similar measure and in virtually the same context, this court certified a caption using the phrase "need not." See Crumpton v. Kulongoski, 319 Or. 82, 87, 873 P.2d 314 (1994) (). 3 We note, however, that in Crumpton, the "need not" wording was not challenged.
The proposed initiative measure provides in part that "No public employee * * * shall be required or coerced to join or otherwise be connected to, or contribute fair share, or pay dues, fees, assessments or other moneys to a public employee union for any reason." Those provisions focus on whether a public employee must pay money to a union in return for the union's representational efforts. The Attorney General's "need not" language summarizes those provisions accurately.
Petitioner also argues that the wording "public employees need not pay union money for any reason" might mislead voters into believing that public employees who receive services through a union, such as training or health insurance, would not need to pay for them. The Attorney General responds that that wording tracks the initiative measure itself. We agree. We conclude that the Attorney General's caption reasonably identifies the subject matter of the proposed initiative measure and, therefore, that it substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2)(a).
The result statements
Petitioner argues that the Attorney General's "yes" result statement is not "simple and understandable," ORS 250.035(2)(b), because the wording, "forbids requiring public employees to pay union," fails to identify precisely what it is that a public employee is not required to pay. We reject that argument, because the summary indicates that the measure relates to payments of "representation costs." Given that context, we conclude that ORS 250.035(2)(b) does not require a reference to representation costs in the "yes" result statement.
Petitioner also argues that the phrase, "forbids requiring," is confusing, but fails to explain why that is so. We decline to search for reasons on our own. But see Greene v. Kulongoski, 322 Or. 169, 177, 903 P.2d 366 (1995) ( ). We conclude that the Attorney General's "yes" result statement is a simple and understandable statement that describes the result if the proposed initiative measure is approved and, therefore, that it substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2)(b).
Regarding the Attorney General's certified "no" result statement, the Attorney General concedes, and we agree, that it incorrectly suggests that present law requires non-member public employees to share union representation costs. Current Oregon law does not require public employees who are not...
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