Sizyuk v. Purdue Univ.

• Decision Date: 15 February 2023
• Docket Number: 4:20-CV-75-TLS
• Parties: TATYANA SIZYUK, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNIVERSITY, and SEUNGJIN KIM and MAMORU ISHII, in their personal capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

1

TATYANA SIZYUK, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNIVERSITY, and SEUNGJIN KIM and MAMORU ISHII, in their personal capacities, Defendants.

No. 4:20-CV-75-TLS

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

February 15, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN JUDGE

This lawsuit stems from the decision by Defendant Purdue University not to award tenure to the Plaintiff-former Purdue Professor Tatyana Sizyuk, a decision she contends was based on intentional discrimination and in retaliation for her protected activity. The Plaintiff brings a Title VII discrimination claim against Defendants Purdue University and the Board of Trustees of Purdue University (“Purdue”), alleging that Purdue denied her tenure application because of her race, color, sex, and/or national origin (Count I); a Title VII retaliation claim against Purdue for denying her tenure application in retaliation for her protected activity (Count II); and individual claims against Defendants Dr. Seungjin Kim and Dr Mamoru Ishii under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her constitutional right to equal protection by denying her tenure based on her race and/or gender (Count III). Am Compl., ECF No. 27. This matter is now before the Court on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 58, 61, 62. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment on the Title VII retaliation claim against Purdue and the § 1983 claim against Dr. Kim. Remaining for trial are the Title VII discrimination claim against Purdue and the § 1983 claim against Dr. Ishii.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant may discharge this burden by “either: (1) showing that there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.” Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In response, the non-movant “must make a sufficient showing on every element of [her] case on which [she] bears the burden of proof; if [she] fails to do so, there is no issue for trial.” Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., 940 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citation omitted). The court's role “is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. The court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Facts that are outcome determinative under the applicable law are material for summary judgment purposes. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Material Facts are taken from Purdue's Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 61-2], which are adopted by Dr. Kim, see ECF No. 62-1, p. 2; Dr. Ishii's Statement of Material Facts [ECF No. 63, § 1]; and the Plaintiff's Statements of Additional Material Facts [ECF Nos. 66-1, 67-1, 68-1].^[1] Whether the subject of a party's objection or on the Court's own review, the Court disregards substantive arguments and characterization of evidence in the fact statements and considers the facts only as supported by the cited evidence of record. However, the Court addresses the parties' evidentiary objections. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); Steffek v. Client Servs., Inc., 948 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 2020).

The Court overrules Purdue's hearsay objection to the following paragraphs containing testimony of prior out-of-court statements by Dr. Ishii: Plaintiff's (Purdue) ¶¶ 109-10, 112, 114116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124-31, 136, 137. Under the cat's paw theory of liability asserted by the Plaintiff, which is based on Dr. Ishii's bias proximately causing Purdue to deny her tenure application, Dr. Ishii's statements are not hearsay as statements of a party opponent. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2); see also Gardner v. Ill. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., No. 04-3112, 2007 WL 897196, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2007) (concluding that statements of the individual who had significant influence over hiring decisions were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)). The Court also overrules the objections of speculation and/or lack of foundation to statements by Dr. Ishii about past employment decisions at Purdue in Plaintiff's (Purdue) ¶¶ 109, 114-17, 119, 128, 129, 136-38/(Ishii) ¶ 45. In each instance, the testimony is offered not to show the truth of why Purdue made the employment decision but rather, for purposes of the Plaintiff's cat's paw theory related to her own tenure application, Dr. Ishii's alleged discriminatory bias and willingness to influence employment decisions.

Purdue and Dr. Ishii object based on speculation to numerous deposition statements regarding Dr. Ishii's or others' subjective state of mind. “[A] plaintiff seeking to thwart summary judgment must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Federal Rule of Evidence 602, both of which require that testimony be based on personal knowledge.” Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2014). Although personal knowledge can include reasonable inferences, “it does not include speculating as to an employer's state of mind, or other intuitions, hunches, or rumors.” Id. (citing Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003)); see, e.g., Afridi v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 18-CV-8205, 2022 WL 16696265, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2022) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 602); Gardner, 2007 WL 897196, at *7. The Court overrules the speculation objection to the following paragraphs because the testimony is based on personal experience within the School of Nuclear Engineering: Plaintiff's (Ishii) ¶ 6; (Purdue) ¶ 111;(Purdue) ¶ 123/(Ishii) ¶ 30; (Purdue) ¶¶ 130-131; (Purdue) ¶ 133/(Ishii) ¶ 40; (Purdue) ¶ 138/(Ishii) ¶ 45; (Purdue) ¶ 139/(Ishii) ¶ 46; (Ishii) ¶ 65; (Purdue) ¶ 159/(Ishii) ¶ 66; (Ishii) ¶ 70; (Purdue) ¶ 192/(Ishii) ¶ 99; (Ishii) ¶ 102. However, the Court sustains the objection to the following paragraphs: Plaintiff's (Purdue) ¶ 116/(Ishii) ¶ 23 (Dr. Wharry testified about what Dr. Ishii “seemed” to say); (Purdue) ¶ 120/(Ishii) ¶ 27 (Dr. Garner's testimony shows the statement is speculation); (Purdue) ¶ 134/(Ishii) ¶ 41 (speculation by Dr. Wharry about who Dr. Kim views as influential in the department); (Purdue) ¶ 140/(Ishii) ¶ 47 (Dr. Brooks gives no facts to support personal knowledge of Dr. Ishii's influence on employment decisions); (Purdue) ¶ 143/(Ishii) ¶ 50 (second statement as Dr. Taleyarkhan testified based solely on rumor); (Purdue)¶ 148/(Ishii) ¶ 55 (Dr. Garner's testimony based on what he heard from others).

Next, the Court sustains the objections to certain paragraphs as not supported by the cited evidence: Plaintiff's (Purdue) ¶¶ 113, 135, 144 opening clause, 152, 165-69, 170 to the extent the Plaintiff did not attach pages 64 and 65 of Dr. Kim's deposition, 171, 183, 191, 193, 206, last clause of 213, 214, 221; and Plaintiff's (Ishii) ¶¶ 20, 42, 51 opening clause, 59, 72-76, 77 to the extent the Plaintiff did not attach pages 64 and 65 of Dr. Kim's deposition, 78, 90, 98, 100, 113, last clause of 120, 121, 128.

The Court sustains the objections based on lack of foundation and relevance to the cited portions of Ms. Randler's declaration regarding Dr. Ishii's influence in the department, how women were treated in the department, and tenure decisions: Plaintiff's (Purdue) ¶¶ 141-43, 210, 211/(Ishii) ¶¶ 48-50, 117, 118. The Court also sustains the objections based on lack of foundation to Plaintiff's (Purdue) ¶ 194/(Ishii) ¶ 101 because Dr. Hassanein was not on the Plaintiff's tenure committee. Finally, Plaintiff's (Purdue) ¶¶ 144-47 and ¶¶ 203-05/(Ishii) ¶¶ 5154 and ¶¶ 110-12 repeat facts already presented earlier in (Purdue) ¶¶ 114-17/(Ishii) ¶¶ 21-24.

MATERIAL FACTS

A. The Plaintiff's Work History Prior to Applying for Tenure

The Plaintiff, Dr. Tatyana Sizyuk, is a Caucasian female born in Belarus who previously worked in the computer programming field in Minsk, Belarus. Pl. Ex. 17, Resp. 2; Ex. A, 6:187:15. Immigrating to the United States in 2002, she began work at the Argonne National Laboratory in 2003, where she worked exclusively in Dr. Ahmed Hassanein's research group, developing and expanding software initially developed by Dr. Hassanein called “HEIGHTS.” Ex. A, 6:11-20, 9:17-10:22, 11:14-17; Am. Compl. ¶ 12. In 2007, Dr. Hassanein took a position at Purdue University, and the Plaintiff became an Associate Research Scientist as part of Dr. Hassanein's group in October 2007. Ex. A, 12:14-13:5; Purdue Ans. ¶ 13, ECF No. 30; Kim Ans. ¶ 13, ECF No. 31. Dr. Jeffrey N. Brooks, who was on the hiring committee, stated, “At the time [the Plaintiff] was viewed as a highly qualified applicant, and that judgement has been amply borne out.” Pl. Ex. 4, ¶ 3. At Purdue, Dr. Hassanein's group formed the Center for Materials Under eXtreme Environment, or “CMUXE,” where the Plaintiff continued the same work she performed at Argonne. Ex. A, 13:11-14:19, 19:15-20. In 2009, Dr. Hassanein became the Head of the School of Nuclear Engineering. Ishii Ex. 3, 21:14-17.

In 2013, the Plaintiff met Dr. Tralle from Poland when he came to Purdue to tour CMUXE, and she decided to pursue her Ph.D through his university. Ishii...