Skamania Cnty. v. Patton
| Court | Court of Appeals of Washington |
| Parties | SKAMANIA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, Respondent/Cross Appellant, v. MITCHELL DEAN PATTON and STACI LEE PATTON, a married couple, Appellants/Cross Respondents. |
| Docket Number | 55075-0-II |
| Decision Date | 08 February 2022 |
SKAMANIA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, Respondent/Cross Appellant,
v.
MITCHELL DEAN PATTON and STACI LEE PATTON, a married couple, Appellants/Cross Respondents.
No. 55075-0-II
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2
February 8, 2022
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CRUSER, J.
Mitchell Patton dug two holes in a road approach leading up to Canyon Creek Road, a county road in Skamania County. Skamania County asked Patton to repair the damage, believing that it owned a right-of-way to the southwest of Canyon Creek Road where the road approach was located. Mr. Patton refused to fill in the holes because he believed that he dug the holes on his own land and that the County did not have any property interest in the land southwest of Canyon Creek Road. The County filled in the holes and filed suit against Mitchell and Staci Patton (Patton). The County alleged that Mr. Patton had created a nuisance when he dug the holes and requested that Patton pay for the repairs to the land. Patton cross-claimed, asserting quiet title, inverse condemnation, and due process claims.
The County moved for summary judgment on its nuisance claim, relying on a 1916 deed in which the previous owners of Patton's land conveyed the disputed land to the County for a road.
Patton argued that the 1916 deed contained a reverter clause that had already been triggered prior to the events set forth above, and as such the County no longer owned the property when Mr. Patton dug the holes.
The trial court concluded that the County owned the disputed land that was southwest of Canyon Creek Road where the holes were dug, determining the parties did not intend the land granted in the 1916 deed to revert to the previous owners. Despite concluding the County owned the disputed land, the court denied the County's motion for summary judgment because it concluded the County's nuisance claim failed.
The County amended its complaint to include intentional trespass, statutory trespass, and negligent trespass claims. The County then moved for summary judgment on all its claims and Patton's counterclaims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on each of its claims as well as on Patton's counterclaims.
Patton appeals the two summary judgment orders. Patton argues that the trial court erred when it (1) concluded the 1916 deed did not contain a reverter clause, (2) dismissed the due process claim, (3) found in favor of the County on all three trespass claims, and (4) did not deny the County's second motion for summary judgment as untimely.
We hold that (1) the 1916 deed conveyed the disputed land to the County in fee simple absolute, (2) Patton's due process claim is without merit, (3) the County proved all three of its trespass claims, and (4) the trial court did not err when it determined that the County's second
motion for summary judgment was timely.[1] We also hold that the County is entitled to attorney fees on its statutory trespass claim as allowed under RCW 4.24.630(1) and on the due process claim because the Patton's appeal of the due process claim was frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court and award attorney fees to the County in accordance with this opinion.
FACTS
I. 1916 TO 2014
In 1916, Phillip and Alyce Buslach signed a "Waiver of Claim for Damages and Consent to Locate Road." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 664. In that document, the Buslachs:
consent[ed] that . . . road [State Road No. 8] be established as described in the petition herein and as examined and surveyed, and forever relinquish to Skamania County Washington, a Right-of-Way Sixty feet in width over and across . . . [Patton's Parcel].[2] Said Right of Way [sic] hereby sought to be secured as surveyed[, ] shown and indicated by the Records of said Road in the office of the Engineer in and for said county. It is agreed by Skamania County that all the present Road lying and being outside of the lines of the present highway shall revert to the present owners of the land. . . .
Giving and granting unto said Skamania County, Washington, the said, Right-of-Way, with full power and authority to examine, survey, lay out and establish said Road as proposed, and to perpetually maintain the same as a County Road.
Id. (emphasis added).
In 1937, the State had drawn up construction plans for the road that eventually became Canyon Creek Road. The Buslachs transferred additional land within Patton's Parcel to the State of Washington for the road. The 1937 construction plan shows there was an existing right-of-way located within Patton's Parcel southwest of Canyon Creek Road, where the road approach is now located.
By 1994, the State had built the road that would become Canyon Creek Road and transferred to the County all the rights and interest it had in the real property located on the Patton's Parcel.
II. Underlying Incident
In 2015, Mr. Patton was displeased that a neighbor was using the road approach located within Patton's Parcel to access Canyon Creek Road. Ms. Patton asked the County to research who had the right to use the road approach. The County informed Ms. Patton over e-mail, in person, and in a letter that the County owned the right-of-way where the road approach was located. The County provided Patton with deeds, surveys, and maps to support the County's conclusion that it owned the right-of-way.
In 2016, Mr. Patton dug two holes, using a backhoe, within the road approach to prevent others from using the road approach and installed" 'no trespassing'" signs. Id. at 419. The County asked Patton to repair the damage, claiming that a recent survey demonstrated that the road approach was completely located within the land that was transferred to the County in 1916. Approximately three weeks later the damage had not been repaired, so the County repaired the damage itself. The County requested that Patton reimburse the County for the repairs. Patton refused to pay for the repairs.
III. Proceedings Below
A. Claims and Counterclaims
The County filed suit against Patton, alleging that Mr. Patton created a nuisance when he dug holes within the road approach and installed" 'No Trespassing'" signs. Id. at 4. The County requested that the court permanently enjoin and restrain Patton from damaging or otherwise interfering with the County's right-of-way. The County also asked to be reimbursed for the costs of the repairs to the right-of-way and for a warrant for abatement.
In response, Patton asserted that the County did not have any legal rights to the property where Mr. Patton dug the holes. Patton brought counterclaims of quiet title, inverse condemnation, and due process.
B. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
The County and Patton filed cross motions for summary judgment on the County's nuisance claim. Patton argued that any interest the County may have had in the disputed land was lost by the time Mr. Patton dug the holes because the 1916 deed contained the following clause:" 'It is agreed by Skamania County that all the present Road lying and being outside of the lines of the present highway shall revert to the present owners of the land.'" Id. at 76. Patton contended that the clause was a reverter clause and that the deed provided for a conditional grant of the land. Patton argued that under the reverter clause, the County lost its interest in the land when the land granted in the deed was not used for a highway. According to Patton, because the land southwest of Canyon Creek Road, including the road approach, was not within the lines for Canyon Creek Road, it was not being used for a highway, therefore, ownership of the land southwest of Canyon Creek Road belonged to the owner of Patton's Parcel, Mr. Patton.
The County argued that the Buslachs, prior to 1916, conveyed a separate tract of land to the County in fee simple absolute for an earlier road. Then, in 1916, the Buslachs conveyed additional land for State Road No. 8, also in fee simple absolute. The County maintained that the" 'shall revert'" language in the 1916 deed was not a conditional grant or a reverter clause. Id. at 748. Rather, it was a promise by the County to give back to the Buslachs the land the Buslachs granted to the County prior to 1916, if the County did not need that land for State Road No. 8.
The trial court determined that the County owned the right-of-way, explaining:
In reading the 1916 deed and reverter clause as a whole, it is clear that the parties intended that the purpose was to release Skamania's interest in those portions of the "road then in existence" that were outside of the new 60 feet right of way granted for the creation of State Road No. 8.
Id. at 255.
The court concluded that any of the land designated for State Road No. 8 was not the land the 1916 deed referenced as reverting to the property owners. The court explained that Patton's reading of the "reverter clause" conflicted with the document as a whole because the 1916 deed transferred a 60-foot-wide right-of-way to the County. Id.
Despite determining that the County owned the right-of-way, the court concluded that the County could not bring a nuisance claim because the County had already abated the nuisance. The court denied the County's motion for summary judgment.
C. The County's Amended Complaint
The County moved to amend its complaint, which the court granted, to include claims of intentional trespass, statutory trespass, and negligent trespass. The County then moved for summary judgment on its three trespass claims and Patton's counterclaims.
The court found in favor of the County on all three trespass claims, and it dismissed all of Patton's counterclaims. The court explained that it dismissed Patton's due process claim because it had concluded the land in dispute was the County's land and Patton could not identify an underlying property right...
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