Skamfer v. Germain

• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before EICH; EICH
• Citation: Skamfer v. Germain, 463 N.W.2d 881, 158 Wis.2d 730 (Wis. App. 1990)
• Decision Date: 04 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-0288,90-0288
• Parties: NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. Matthew SKAMFER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Jamie GERMAIN, Terrence Schnapp, Patricia Goodrich, David McClurg, Connie Roewer, Dr. Gregory Van Ryborek, and Dave Pollock, Defendants-Respondents.

Page 881

463 N.W.2d 881

158 Wis.2d 730

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES.

Matthew SKAMFER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Jamie GERMAIN, Terrence Schnapp, Patricia Goodrich David McClurg, Connie Roewer, Dr. Gregory Van Ryborek, and Dave Pollock, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 90-0288.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Oct. 4, 1990. ^d

Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County: JAMES C. BOLL, Judge.

Circuit Court, Dane County.

AFFIRMED.

Before EICH, C.J., and DYKMAN and SUNDBY, JJ.

EICH, Chief Judge.

Matthew Skamfer, a patient at the Mendota Mental Health Institute, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his action against several Mendota employees. We will refer to the defendants collectively as "Mendota." He raises four issues: (1) whether cold temperatures in his room violated his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment or his statutory right under sec. 51.61(1)(m), Stats., to a "humane environment"; (2) whether his fourteenth amendment due process rights were violated when a Playboy magazine centerfold was removed from his room; (3) whether he was improperly punished for filing a grievance; and (4) whether the defendants--if they are found to be negligent--are entitled to immunity. We resolve all issues against Skamfer and affirm the judgment.

The facts, contained in affidavits and other proofs accompanying Mendota's summary judgment motion--and which were uncontested by Skamfer--reveal that Skamfer was committed to Mendota after he had been charged with a crime and found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. He was housed in the forensic unit which was experiencing difficulties with its heating system. The system is complex making regulation of the temperature difficult. The patients' bedrooms are heated by radiant floor heat--hot water piped up under the terrazzo floors which heats the floor and warms the room. When the system is turned on, the floors warm slowly. When the system is turned off, the floors cool slowly. The day rooms are heated both by radiant floor heat and forced air.

In late 1988, the forced air heating in the day rooms was not functioning because air conditioning was being installed in the forced air system. The construction made it unusually difficult to determine the correct thermostat setting for the radiant heat. Both staff and patients, including Skamfer, complained of the cold. Mendota officials alerted the institute's engineers to the problem and they corrected it as quickly as they could. The officials also responded to Skamfer's complaints promptly in writing, informing him that they were working on the problem.

On November 23, 1988, Skamfer was transferred from the forensic unit to the management unit because of violent and assaultive behavior. The management unit is the most restrictive unit at MMHI and the patients in the unit are those who need a controlled environment. The patients are quite restricted in the personal property they may keep in their rooms and the magazine centerfold hanging on Skamfer's wall was removed by unit employees.

Skamfer's action against Mendota complained of the cold temperatures and the "confiscation" of his centerfold picture. He also asserted that Mendota staff "retaliated" against him for filing a grievance about the confiscation of his magazine centerfold when they "lowered" his patient status to a more restrictive level resulting, in Skamfer's words, in "less cigarettes, reading materials, etc."

Skamfer moved for summary judgment on all claims pursuant to sec. 802.08, Stats. No affidavits or other proofs support the specifics of his motion, however. ¹ Mendota also moved for summary judgment dismissing the action and filed several affidavits and other proofs in support of its motion, which, as we have said, the trial court granted.

Summary judgment is governed by sec. 802.08, Stats., and it follows a well-known "methodology." The purpose of the remedy is to determine whether a dispute can be resolved without trial, and the applicable procedures require us first to examine the pleadings to determine whether the complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted. State Bank of LaCrosse v. Elsen, 128 Wis.2d 508, 511, 383 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1986). Skamfer's complaint alleges the cold temperatures in the living units and, generally, the effect they had on him. He recounts the confiscation of his centerfold and, with respect to his "retaliation" claim, states that Dave Pollock, the nursing supervisor for his unit, "lower[ed] my level from a straight level 2 to a 0-1-2 level" in order to "circumvent the documentation" that was required by MMHI rules to remove Skamfer's centerfold from the wall. He maintains that "as a result of my using the grievance process, my level is worse off."

We follow a liberal policy when judging the sufficiency of pro se pleadings by prisoners. State ex rel. Terry v. Traeger, 60 Wis.2d 490, 496, 211 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1973). Certainly we should do no less with respect to pro se litigants who are involuntary residents of mental health facilities and who are challenging the conditions of their confinement. Considering Skamfer's complaint in this light, we conclude that it states a claim.

More is required of one seeking summary judgment, however. The allegations in the complaint provide an insufficient basis for granting judgment. There must be, in addition, affidavits or other proofs which establish a prima facie case for relief. Staples v. Young, 142 Wis.2d 194, 205, 418 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Ct.App.1987), rev'd in part, 149 Wis.2d 80, 438 N.W.2d 567 (1980). "[T]he allegations of the pleadings may not be considered as evidence or other proof on ... disposition of the motion." Kavon Enterprises v. American Universal Ins. Co., 74 Wis.2d 53, 57, 245 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1976), quoting Peninsular Carpets, Inc. v. Bradley Homes, Inc., 58 Wis.2d 405, 410, 206 N.W.2d 408, 410 (1973). And "[i]f the [moving party] does not make out a prima facie case for summary judgment [in its affidavits] we need proceed no further" and the motion should be denied. Kraemer Bros. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis.2d 555, 566-67, 278 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1979). See also Jones v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 80 Wis.2d 321, 327, 259 N.W.2d 70, 72 (1977) (if movant's affidavits do not contain sufficient material evidentiary facts, prima facie case for summary judgment has not been established).

Because Skamfer's motion is unsupported by anything other than his complaint and a single affidavit, he has failed to establish a prima facie case for relief and the trial court properly denied his motion.

We consider Skamfer's arguments, however, insofar as they relate to the granting of Mendota's motion. He argues first that the cold temperatures in his room violated his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. An eighth amendment violation occurs when conditions of confinement deprive an inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868 (7th Cir.1981). In order to prevail on such a claim, Skamfer "must prove deliberate indifference [by Mendota staff] evidenced by actual intent or reckless disregard.... Recklessness is ... highly unreasonable conduct or a gross departure from ordinary care in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir.1985). "[S]imple inattention or inadvertence may not form the basis for an eighth amendment claim." Id. (citations omitted).

Mendota does not dispute the fact that, during the time in question and due to circumstances beyond its control, the unit to which Skamfer was confined did in fact lack adequate heat. However, Mendota's affidavits establish that its employees responded promptly to Skamfer's complaint, turning up the heat and offering him more blankets so that he would be comfortable. Beyond that, they establish that, in general, Mendota staff responded promptly and competently to a situation largely beyond the institution's control. Skamfer, as we have noted, offered no evidence to the contrary.

We think a recent decision of the seventh circuit is instructive: "The inmates argue that they have a right ... to be free from extreme hot and cold temperatures. That is, of course, true. But the constitution does not give the inmates the right to be free from all discomfort." Shelby County Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 795 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir.1986). The conditions alleged in Skamfer's complaint do not constitute a gross departure from ordinary care; no eighth amendment claim is stated.

Skamfer also claims that his "right to a humane ... environment", guaranteed him by sec. 51.61(l)(m), Stats., was violated because his room was cold and his complaints about the cold ignored. He cites no authority to support this assertion.

We do not believe nor do we find any authority indicating that sec. 51.61(l)(m), Stats., was intended to include temporary problems with a hospital's heating system, especially when the hospital staff was alerted to the problem, took available corrective measures, and shortly returned the heating system to proper operation.

The statute provides that patients who are detained or committed for mental illness shall have the right to a humane physical environment within the hospital facilities and that the facilities should be designed to afford them with comfort and safety, to promote dignity and ensure privacy. We agree with Mendota that sec. 51.61, Stats., does not confer upon patients the right to be free from temporary problems and unforeseen--and reasonably promptly corrected--difficulties associated with the operation of a large facility such as Mendota. We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court properly granted Mendota's motion for summary judgment on this issue.

...