Skeels v. United States, Civ. A. No. 2031.

Decision Date07 July 1947
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 2031.
PartiesSKEELS v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

Booth, Lockard & Jack and Whitfield Jack, all of Shreveport, for plaintiff.

Malcolm E. Lafargue, U. S. Atty., and Wm. J. Fleniken, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Shreveport, for defendant.

DAWKINS, District Judge.

This is a suit by the administrator of the estate of Jasper D. Skeels for the use and benefit of his widow, Mrs. Gladys Skeels Uthoff, and his mother, Mrs. Zell Ann Wilie Skeels, under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Tit. IV, sec. 402 et seq., Pub.Law No. 601, 79th Congress, Chapter 753, Second Session., 28 U.S.C.A. § 921 et seq.

The pertinent articles of the complaint are as follows:

"At about 11:40 o'clock A.M. on the morning of July 24, 1945, Jasper Gillie Skeels and several other persons were in a boat, fishing, in the Gulf of Mexico, about six miles out from the shoreline of Freeport, Texas. High overhead, several airplanes, property of the government of the United States, then and there operated by and under the physical control of agents and employees of the government of the United States, to-wit: personnel of the United States Army. Some of the airplanes were towing targets. Some of the airplanes were firing guns. A piece of iron pipe 14 inches long and 1½ inches in diameter, fell either from said airplanes or said targets, striking Jasper Gillie Skeels on the head and immediately killing him.

"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, and petitioner especially pleads same.

"Petitioner does not know what caused the heavy object to fall, and alleges that knowledge thereof is peculiarly within the possession of the defendant, its agents and employees.

"Petitioner alleges that the defendant, its agents and employees aforesaid, were guilty of negligence, which negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injury to, and death of, Jasper Gillie Skeels, in the following particulars:

"(a) Engaging in, and permitting maneuvers and the firing of guns and the towing of aerial targets over a place that was not restricted to the public, to-wit: The place where decedent was killed.

"(b) In causing or permitting the iron pipe to become unfastened or separated from whatever it was attached to.

"(c) In causing or permitting the iron pipe to fall at the time, place and circumstances under which it did fall.

"(d) In throwing from said airplane or towed targets the said iron pipe, under the circumstances aforesaid."

Counsel for the Government have moved to dismiss the complaint for the reasons, as alleged, it disclosed no ground for relief because (1) it affirmatively shows that whatever injury was caused resulted from combat activities of the armed forces while the nation was at war; and (2) no negligence is shown.

(1) The law relied upon is a part of what was known as the LaFollette Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812. Its purpose was to relieve Congress of the duty of considering hundreds of bills introduced annually for the reimbursement of persons for torts committed by governmental agencies or agents. Section 410(a) confers upon the judges of the United States District Courts the duty to hear and determine without the aid of juries "any claim against the United States, for money only, * * * on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." (Emphasis by the writer.)

Section 421, under the heading of Exceptions declares that "The provisions of this title shall not apply to— * * * (j) any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the...

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14 cases
  • IN RE" AGENT ORANGE" PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • February 16, 1984
    ...Tort Claims § 262, at 13-107, states that the term implies "actual hostilities and physical violence." Similarly, Skeels v. United States, 72 F.Supp. 372, 374 (W.D.La.1947), states that "`combat activities' * * * means the actual engaging in the exercise of physical Consistent with the well......
  • In re Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • September 8, 2010
    ...only physical violence, but activities both necessary to and in direct connection with actual hostilities."), with Skeels v. United States, 72 F.Supp. 372, 374 (W.D.La.1947) ("[T]he actual engaging in the exercise of physical force."); see also Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,......
  • Shimari v. Caci Premier Technology, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • March 19, 2009
    ...restricted to `combat activities,' which as indicated means the actual engaging in the exercise of physical force. Skeels v. United States, 72 F.Supp. 372, 374 (W.D.La.1947) (emphasis supplied). This Court is inclined to adopt the more limited definition because it comports with the common ......
  • Minns v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • August 8, 1997
    ...the term "[c]ombat activities has been defined to mean `the actual engaging in the exercise of physical force.'" Skeels v. United States, 72 F.Supp. 372, 374 (W.D.La. 1947). In light of the applicability of the Feres doctrine and the discretionary function exception to the pending case, thi......
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