Skeeter v. City of Norfolk

• Decision Date: 21 September 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-131-N.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Theresa Mulqueen SKEETER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NORFOLK, et al., Defendants.

681 F. Supp. 1149

Theresa Mulqueen SKEETER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NORFOLK, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 87-131-N.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

September 21, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward A. Fiorella, Jr., Allen J. Gordon, Chesapeake, Va., for plaintiff.

Philip R. Trapani, City Atty., Harold P. Juren, Deputy City Atty., Andre A. Foreman, Molly T. Tami, Asst. City Attys., Dean T. Buckius, Vandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, Norfolk, Va., for defendants.

ORDER

CLARKE, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination case in which plaintiff has charged defendants with violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), 2000e-2(a)(1), and 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff also claims that her rights to due process were violated when she was terminated from her employment without a hearing of any kind. Plaintiff, Theresa Mulqueen Skeeter, states in her Complaint that she was discriminated against because of her race; white. Defendants in this action are the City of Norfolk and four individuals, all black, who were employees of the City and supervisors of plaintiff during her employment period. The individual defendants, Jerome Harrison, George Crawley, Clarence Cuffee and Catherine Kearney have been named both as individuals and in their official capacities. All defendants have made a Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court has heard the parties' oral arguments on the Motion. Therefore, this matter is ripe for disposition.

The Complaint follows plaintiff's period of employment chronologically. A summarization of plaintiff's allegations reveals the following claims. Plaintiff worked for the City of Norfolk from June 1982 until August 1986. Plaintiff began her employment as a senior clerk typist. She claims that she was promised a promotion, if her work proved satisfactory, in four months. Apparently, plaintiff never received this promotion. According to plaintiff, during the period of her employment she was required to perform numerous tasks outside her job description, while at one point "there were numerous other secretaries in the Department who were receiving equal or better salaries, doing a minimal amount of work and who had job description's exceeding those of the plaintiff." Complaint, paragraph 14. Despite performing these tasks satisfactorily and despite plaintiff's "superior ability", plaintiff failed to receive any advancement, promotion, or additional compensation during her employment with the City.

Plaintiff's problems with her supervisors apparently surfaced when she first objected to being assigned additional duties and she was "threatened by defendant Crawley and was informed that she would not receive any promotions because she did not `fit the mold' for a promotion." Complaint, paragraph 15. Plaintiff was then transferred by Crawley to the Park Place Multi-Service Center which had a less desirable location and less favorable working conditions. Plaintiff challenged this transfer by filing a grievance.

Plaintiff next complains that she was not allowed to take her annual leave, a condition that was apparently resolved by the granting of leave in Christmas of 1984. Plaintiff relates another incident where she was discriminatorily denied leave and unfairly disciplined for taking same. (This incident involved defendants Harrison and Cuffee.) Plaintiff claims that Harrison made false and malicious claims about her character and ability.

Allegedly in response to a grievance filed by plaintiff, Harrison transferred her to the Huntersville Center—an even less desirable working location. It was then that plaintiff claims defendants Harrison, Crawley and Cuffee "commenced a campaign of fabrication, falsehoods, and slander, making derogatory comments about Skeeter's character and ability." Complaint, paragraph 24.

With her second transfer, plaintiff came under the supervision of defendant Kearney. Plaintiff claims their initial excellent working relationship resulted from the fact that plaintiff "performed the majority of Kearney's major duties." Complaint, paragraph 26. Subsequently, however, Kearney was allegedly induced by Harrison and Cuffee to write unfavorable job reports and to cooperate in a plan to terminate plaintiff from her job without cause.

I. Race Discrimination

Plaintiff apparently attributes the allegedly disparate treatment she received from defendants to, and bases this action upon, race discrimination. Although her Complaint merely lists statutes without specifically alleging the corresponding facts or basis for stating violations thereof, a careful reading shows that plaintiff offers the following explanations for defendants' offending behavior:

13. The complainant was denied promotion or advancements because of her race and the desire of her Supervisors (Crawley and Harrison) to promote persons of the black race.

15. That because of her objection to additional duties without any reward or promotion, the complainant was ... in retaliation for her questioning the actions of Crawley.

16. He informed Skeeter that there was not any future for her in that department as a "white female."

* * * * * *

18. This was an example of the clear abuse of one's authority and an inconsistent application of personnel practices of Harrison, a black, against the complainant, a white, based solely upon the complainant's race and to "strike" out at complainant becasue sic she was far more able with substantially more ability than Harrison, and that she had embarrassed Harrison by her lack of knowledge in performing his duties.

* * * * * *

20. Harrison had consistently, up until that time, permitted black employees to take leave without any notice....

21. Application of a reprimand ... was solely to punish the complainant because of her race, background, and ability, which made a mockery of many of the black employees in that Department.... In each of these cases the dilatory employee was black. It was apparent that the defendants, Crawley, Cuffee, and Harrison had two (2) sets of standards and regulations, one for whites and another for blacks.

* * * * * *

24. The only difference between plaintiff and other employees was Skeeter's superior ability and her race.

Plaintiff quotes Edgar Hoggard in paragraph 16 of her Complaint as saying there was no future for her as a "white female." Hoggard is not a defendant in this action. Plaintiff also claims sex discrimination in two of her three underlying EEOC charges. However, her Complaint in this action appears to present only a race discrimination claim. There are no facts alleged that refer to or support a contention of discrimination based on sex. In fact, the only mention in the Complaint of plaintiff's sex is made when quoting an individual not a party to this lawsuit, as discussed above. Additionally, plaintiff makes reference to her superior ability being motivation for alleged discriminatory actions of the various defendants. However, discrimination based on superior job skills and ability does not support a claim under any of the statutes upon which plaintiff relies. Therefore, this Court will treat plaintiff's statutory claims as ones based on race discrimination.

Defendants have proffered a number of arguments in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. Most notably, defendants claim that plaintiff is a member of the black race. Defendants rely primarily on the fact that in a previous action against the City of Suffolk, plaintiff represented herself as black, and claimed to be the victim of racial discrimination. Defendants include as exhibits with their Motion for Summary Judgment a copy of the EEOC charge form, signed by plaintiff, in which she designated her race as black. They also include an EEOC instruction booklet which contains the following information under the heading "Race/Ethnic Identification":

The concept of race as used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission does not denote clear-cut scientific definitions of anthropological origins. For the purposes of this report, an employee may be included in the group to which he or she appears to belong, identifies with, or is regarded in the community as belonging. However, no person should be counted in more than one race/ethnic category.

Defendants argue that since plaintiff identified herself as a member of the black race and claimed, in a lawsuit, that she had been discriminated against on that basis, she is now precluded from claiming that she is white. Additionally, each of the individual defendants has submitted an affidavit which states, "It was my belief that Ms. Skeeter was a member of the black race." Each affiant also explains why he or she believed that plaintiff was black.

In response, plaintiff argues that the court in the earlier suit made a finding that plaintiff was white and directed a verdict for the City of Suffolk. Plaintiff, therefore, claims that defendants are "collaterally estopped from maintaining that Ms. Skeeter's race is contrary to the Court's previous ruling." Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition at 3.

However, in the Fourth Circuit's unpublished opinion No. 83-2089 (an exhibit in the instant case), the court affirmed the lower court's directed verdict. While acknowledging that there was "some question as to whether Skeeter is even a member of a protected minority," the court affirmed the lower court's ruling because Skeeter had, by her own admission, failed to meet the minimum requirements for the contested job while the person who had been hired was fully qualified. Apparently, no determination of Ms. Skeeter's race was necessary in the prior action.

In the current action, the pleadings do seem to raise a fact question with regard to plaintiff's race. However, this Court finds that the issue that is relevant to plaintiff's claims is not whether she is actually black or white but whether plaintiff was discriminated against because she is white. Defendants claim that the individual defendants (whose...