Skene v. Carayanis
| Decision Date | 08 January 1926 |
| Citation | 131 A. 497,103 Conn. 708 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | SKENE v. CARAYANIS ET AL. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Newell Jennings Judge.
Action by Dorothy W. Skene against Nicholas G. Carayanis and others to recover damages, alleged to have been caused the plaintiff by a conspiracy on the part of the defendants to defraud her of a real estate commission, brought to the superior court in Fairfield county, and tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, to recover $2,294 from the defendants William J. O'Brien, Hyman Wolfson, and Max Wolfson, from which they appealed. No error.
Robert R. Rosan, of Bridgeport, and Charles E Moore, of Stamford, for appellants William J. O'Brien Hyman Wolfson, and Max Wolfson.
Joseph L. Melvin and Frank P. Barrett, both of Stamford, for appellee.
The defendants' appeal is based upon the denial of their motion to set the verdict aside, and also upon errors they alleged to have been committed on the trial. The determination of the plaintiff's right to recover, as a matter of law, upon the facts which she may rightfully claim to be supported by substantial evidence in the case, in reliance upon which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion, will go far to decide all the issues raised by the appeal. These facts may be summarized as follows:
The plaintiff is a real estate broker. The owners of a certain building, whom we shall call the Carayanis brothers, listed it with her for sale, for a time giving her the exclusive agency, and later continuing it in her hands for sale under a general agency. During the period of her exclusive agency, the plaintiff interested the defendant William J. O'Brien in the purchase of the property, and, not being able to negotiate the sale before that agency expired, she continued her efforts thereafter. Finally, she secured from him an offer to pay $90,000 in cash above existing incumbrances. This offer she promptly submitted to the Carayanis brothers and they signified they would accept it. The plaintiff, as soon thereafter as she could, got in touch with O'Brien, and arranged an appointment with him to meet her, in order to sign a contract of purchase. This appointment he did not keep, and, when the plaintiff saw him soon after, he indicated to her that he was no longer interested in the purchase of the property. At this conversation the plaintiff told him she believed it could be bought for $85,000 above the amount of the existing mortgages. The plaintiff was not able to fix the precise dates of her interviews with O'Brien after the making of his offer of $90,000, but, at about the time of her meetings with him, the defendant Hyman Wolfson approached O'Brien and advised him that he could purchase the building for $85,000 above existing incumbrances, and O'Brien gave him $1,000 to be used by him to bind the bargain, if he found he could get it for the price named. Wolfson then made to the Carayanis brothers an offer to buy the building at that price. They told him of the offer received from O'Brien through the plaintiff, and were assured that the purchaser Wolfson was representing was not O'Brien. Wolfson also told them that, if the sale was made, they would incur no liability for a commission. The Carayanis brothers accepted the offer of purchase, and Hyman Wolfson brought the defendant Max Wolfson to them, and told them that he was the purchaser. They then executed a contract to sell the building to Max Wolfson at the price agreed upon, believing him to be the real purchaser, and he paid them $1,000, money furnished him by O'Brien. Max Wolfson never intended to purchase the property for himself, and the next day he assigned his rights under the contract to O'Brien. Later the Carayanis brothers carried out their obligations under the contract by conveying the property to O'Brien. The Carayanis brothers acted throughout in good faith, and reduced their price to $85,000 above incumbrances in their contract with Max Wolfson, because thereby they were able to avoid payment of any brokerage commission.
O'Brien's reasons for abandoning the negotiations which were being carried on by the plaintiff and entering upon those instigated by Hyman Wolfson, and the latter's reason for interesting himself in the matter, are evident. The latter was to be compensated by O'Brien for his services in the matter; but, even with that compensation added, the property really cost O'Brien considerably less than the $90,000 above incumbrances, which he had offered through the plaintiff. One cannot doubt, too, that the Wolfsons were aware throughout of the situation with reference to the negotiations between the plaintiff and O'Brien. As already noted, the plaintiff is unable to fix the exact day of the appointment she made with O'Brien for the execution of a contract, but there is evidence from which it could reasonably be concluded that the plan to have Wolfson offer $85,000 was made about the same day. If this conclusion is brought into relationship with the fact that O'Brien indicated to the plaintiff at their next meeting that he was no longer interested in the premises, there is ample basis for an inference that O'Brien abandoned his negotiations through the plaintiff in reliance upon the plan he had made with Wolfson to get the building at a less cost. The fact that O'Brien took the assignment of the contract, made between Carayanis brothers and Max Wolfson, the day after it was executed, certainly strongly indicates that he was also a party to, or adopted as his own, the false representations as to the real purchaser by which the sale was brought about. The facts clearly point to the conclusion that those representations were made under such circumstances as to constitute a fraud upon the Carayanis brothers which would have justified their repudiation of the contract and refusal to convey the premises to Max Wolfson, or to O'Brien, a party to the fraud. Morrow v. Ursini, 96 Conn. 219, 113 A. 388; Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn. 338, 53 A. 729, 1124. On the other hand, the plaintiff does not, and hardly in reason could, claim that O'Brien's offer of $90,000 above incumbrances, and the indication on the part of the Carayanis brothers that they would accept it, amounted to anything more than a tentative approach to an agreement for the sale of the property, upon terms later to be specifically fixed, and hence the plaintiff could not be held to have carried her negotiations so far that she had then actually earned her commission.
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Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen
...and "unjustifiable interference with any [person's] right to pursue his [or her] lawful business or occupation." Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 714, 131 A. 497 (1926). In these latter cases, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation o......
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...intentionally interposed to prevent the formation of a contract which but for such interference would have been formed. Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497. See cases collected in Annotation, 99 A.L.R. 18. While this principle has been held not broad enough in its application to a......
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...resulted in a breach of contract to the detriment of the plaintiff. Wyeman v. Deady, 79 Conn. 414, 65 A. 129 [1906]; Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497 [1926].' Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 674, 37 A.2d 355 (1944).... 'Full, fair and free competition is necessary to the ec......
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Coleman v. Whisnant
... ... prevent the formation of a contract which but for such ... interference would have been formed. Skene v ... Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497. See cases ... collected in Annotation, 99 A.L.R. 18. While this principle ... has been held not ... ...