Skil Corp. v. Korzen
| Decision Date | 21 January 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 38610,38610 |
| Citation | 204 N.E.2d 738,32 Ill.2d 249 |
| Parties | SKIL CORPORATION, Appellee, v. Bernard J. KORZEN, County Treasurer, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Edward J. Hladis, Theodore M. Swain, and Joseph V. Roddy, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellants.
Winston, Strawn, Smith & Patterson, Chicago (Edward J. Wendrow, and J. Arden Rearick, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The primary issue in this case in whether certain property now owned by the plaintiff, Skil Corporation, was exempt from taxation during the years 1954 through 1960. The property was acquired by the County of Cook by eminent domain proceedings instituted February 6, 1954, for the purpose of constructing that portion of Edens Expressway lying between Foster and Lawrence Avenues. It was owned by the County until 1960, when the County conveyed it to the plaintiff. The complaint alleged that the property was exempt from taxation during the years in question 'by reason of its ownership by the County of Cook, a body politic and corporate,' and prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants, the County of Cook and certain of its officials, from attempting to collect 'from or out of the' property, any taxes, interest or penalties for those years. The decree of the circuit court found that the property 'was exempt from taxation with respect to each of said calendar years by reason of its ownership by the County of Cook, a body politic and corporate,' and issued an injunction in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. The revenue is involved, and the defendants have appealed directly to this court.
Section 3 of Article IX of the Constitution, S.H.A. provides that 'The property of the state, counties, and other municipal corporations, * * * may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall be only by general law.' Under this authority the General Assembly has provided: 'All property described in this section to the extent herein limited, shall be exempt from taxation, that is to say: * * * (9) All market houses, public squares and other public grounds owned by a municipal corporation and used exclusively for public purposes; * * *.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 120, par. 500.) Amendments adopted in 1959 made no material change. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 120, par. 500.9). The term 'municipal corporation' includes counties. Perkins v. Board of County Commissioners of Cook County, 271 Ill. 449, 459, 111 N.E. 580.
Our decisions make it entirely clear that one who seeks to establish the tax exempt status of property under this statute has the burden of proving that the property was used exclusively for a public purpose. (City of Lawrenceville v. Maxwell, 6 Ill.2d 42, 48-49, 126 N.E.2d 671, 676). Proof of public ownership, unless accompanied by proof of exclusive use for a public purpose, does not establish exemption. In this case it is undisputed that the County owned the property from 1954 to 1960, and it was agreed upon oral argument that the property is now used by the plaintiff as a parking lot for its employees. But there is no proof whatsoever as to the use made of the property during the years in question.
In the trial court both the complaint and the decree...
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County Collector, Application of
...on use of the subject property for an exempt purpose, actual use of the property for that purpose is required. As the court said in Skil Corp. v. Korzen '(E)vidence that land was acquired for an exempt purpose does not eliminate the need for proof of actual use for that purpose. Intention i......
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Decatur Sports Foundation v. Department of Revenue
...purposes do not relieve such institution of the burden of proving that its property actually and factually is so used, (Skil Corp. v. Korzen, 32 Ill.2d 249 ); People ex rel. Pearsall v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 311 Ill. 11 ); and that the term 'exclusively means the primary purpose for w......
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People v. Walker
...course, airports to mention only a few. The courts have also defined counties as "municipal corporations." In Skil Corp. v. Korzen, 32 Ill.2d 249, 250, 204 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1965), the Supreme Court "The term 'municipal corporation' includes counties. Perkins v. Board of County Commissioners......
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Lutheran Church of Good Shepherd of Bourbonnais v. Dept. of Revenue, 3-00-0044.
...Institute of Technology v. Skinner, 49 Ill.2d 59, 64, 273 N.E.2d 371, 374 (1971) (hereinafter IIT), quoting Skil Corp. v. Korzen, 32 Ill.2d 249, 252, 204 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1965). Furthermore, the mere fact that the subject property adjoins land that is tax exempt is of no significance. See I......