Skinner v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 30 November 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 40558,40558 |
| Citation | 38 Ill.2d 455,231 N.E.2d 588 |
| Parties | Louise A. SKINNER, Appellant, v. John Vincent ANDERSON et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Steinbrecher & Narusis, Crystal Lake (Bernard V. Narusis, Crystal Lake, of counsel), for appellant.
Kell & Conerty, Woodstock (Vette E. Kell and Donald W. Truckenbrod, Woodstock, of counsel), for appellees.
The issues in this case concern the construction and the validity of section 29 of the Limitations Act, which was added to that Act by amendment in 1963. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 83, par. 24f.) The new section purports to immunize architects and contractors from liability upon causes of action that do not accrue within four years after the architects or contractors performed their services. On the authority of this section the circuit court of McHenry County dismissed a complaint against an architect, and the plaintiff has appealed directly to this court.
Summarized, the complaint alleges: John Anderson, hereafter defendant, is a licensed architect who was hired in 1956 by Frank L. Alford to design and supervise the construction of his residence in the village of Lakewood. An ordinance of the village, as well as nationally recognized safety standards, require that ventilation be provided for rooms housing air conditioning machinery. The defendant failed to provide ventilation, and because the air conditioning machinery room lacked ventilation, leaking refrigerant gas entered the adjoining boiler room, corroded the burners of the gas-fired boiler and caused the escape of toxic quantities of carbon monoxide and phosgene gases which, on September 19, 1965, caused the deaths of Robert Skinner, Jr., and his daughter, Nancy, and serious injury to his wife, Louise.
Louise Skinner is the daughter of Frank L. Alford, and is the plaintiff in this case. As administratrix of the estates of Robert and Nancy Skinner, and on her own behalf, she brought this action jointly and severally against A. Ture Ekberg, the building contractor, Sherman Plumbing and Heating Inc., a service repairman, and the defendant. She seeks to recover damages resulting from her personal injuries and the wrongful deaths of her husband and daughter, and to recover their burial expenses. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint because the injury and the deaths did not occur within four years after he had performed his serivces. On the authority of section 29 of the Limitations Act, the motion was granted. The trial judge has certified that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 50(2).
Section 29 provides: Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 83, par. 24f.
The plaintiff contends that section 29, properly construed, does not apply to the wrongful death actions or to the actions to recover the funeral expenses of her husband and child. Section 12, of the Limitations Act provides: 'The following actions can only be commenced within the periods hereinafter prescribed, except when a different limitation is prescribed by statute:' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 83, par. 13.) Then follow the remaining sections of the Act, including section 29. Another statute, section 2 of the Injuries Act, provides that wrongful death actions shall be commenced within two years after death occurs (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 70, par. 2), and it is argued that by its terms the Limitations Act does not apply to such actions. We do not discuss the merits of the contentions raised as to construction of the statute, because even if section 29 did not apply to the other causes of action asserted in the complaint, its validity would still have to be considered in connection with the plaintiff's action for her own injuries.
Although section 29 was added to 'An Act in regard to limitations,' the added section is not concerned with limitations in the ordinary sense. A statute of limitations normally governs the time within which a legal proceeding must be instituted after the cause of action accrues. There are instances in which a statute of limitations may bar an action before the party against whom the statute runs is aware that he has a right to sue. (See e.g., Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 26, par. 2--725.) The provision in the case at bar, however, goes further, and bars a cause of action before it arises. But the plaintiff in this case has not argued that section 29 violates section 13 of article IV of the constitution, S.H.A, and we do not pursue the matter.
The plaintiff contends that section 29 violates section 19 of article II of the constitution of Illinois which provides: 'Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; * * *.' She also contends that it violates sections 2 and 14 of article II of the constitution of Illinois, as well as section...
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