Skinner v. Lewis

• Court: Oregon Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WOLVERTON, J.
• Citation: Skinner v. Lewis, 40 Or. 571, 67 P. 951 (Or. 1902)
• Decision Date: 03 March 1902
• Parties: SKINNER v. LEWIS et al.

67 P. 951

40 Or. 571

SKINNER v. LEWIS et al.

Supreme Court of Oregon

March 3, 1902

Appeal from circuit court, Polk county; R.P. Boise, Judge.

Proceedings to revoke the probate of the will and codicil of R.L Skinner, deceased. From a decree refusing to revoke the probate, Rebecca A. Skinner, executrix of the estate of a deceased son of the testator, appeals. Affirmed.

W.H. Holmes, for appellant.

Geo. G Bingham and A.O. Condit, for respondents.

WOLVERTON J.

What purports to be the last will and testament of R.L. Skinner deceased, and his codicil thereto, were admitted to probate in common form, March 10, 1899, by the county court of Polk county, Or. Subsequently Hiram Alonzo Skinner, a son of the deceased, petitioned the county court to revoke the probate of both instruments and to set them aside. It may be here stated that Hiram Alonzo Skinner has since died, and his widow, Rebecca A. Skinner, has been appointed his executrix and substituted in this proceeding. The grounds now urged upon which the relief is based are want of testamentary capacity and insufficient attestation. Some questions of practice arising upon the pleadings and the manner in which the appeal was taken from the county court were presented; but, in view of the conclusion we have come to upon the merits, it is not essential that we take further note of them, deeming it more satisfactory that the merits be reached, and made the basis of a final disposition, than that the case should be made to turn upon some question merely preliminary and not decisive of the ultimate controversy. Of course, if it is absolutely essential that preliminary questions be disposed of before the merits can be considered in logical order, it would be our duty to treat of them; but otherwise they are not matters necessary to a determination of the controversy.

We will first examine as to the testamentary capacity of the decedent at the time the will was made. The contention has a two-fold aspect, in that (1) it is insisted that the decedent's mind had become so weakened and impaired by old age, physical infirmities, and other misfortunes that he was incapacitated from transacting business, and consequently from making a testamentary disposition of his effects; and (2) it is maintained that his mind was affected by an insane delusion, whereby he was influenced and superinduced to bestow his property upon others than his son, and hence that the will was not the conscious act of the testator. The contention is the same as to the codicil. At the time of the execution of the will the testator was making his home with Caleb Hughes, in West Salem. His health being impaired, he was confined almost exclusively to his room, but able, however, to dress himself and go to his meals. He had previously spoken to Mr. Bingham, his attorney, and discussed somewhat in detail the matter of a redisposition of his property by will. We say redisposition, because he had some years prior made his will, as we may infer from the testimony, disposing of the bulk of his estate to the son of the petitioner, Hiram Alonzo Skinner, who died several years previous to the execution of the present will. Upon the death of the beneficiary of his first will, the testator at once began to discuss with his neighbors and his attorney the advisability of making another. On the immediate occasion he sent for Mr. Bingham to draw the writing, who, responding to his request, found the testator in his room dressed; and, in anticipation of its final preparation, he had written out with his own hand upon slips of note paper memoranda of the several bequests and devises he desired to make. These were put in proper form by Mr. Bingham; and while so engaged the old gentleman discussed with him the details, and gave intelligent and satisfactory reasons for the particular disposition he was making of his effects as he went along. He knew the objects of his bounty and the relationship he bore to them; comprehended the property he had at his disposal, and directed the manner of its disposition and distribution in detail; and, in the opinion of the witness, was possessed of testamentary capacity. This was manifest, not only from the definite formulation of the different bequests, but from his general demeanor, the aptness and acuteness of his mental faculties, and from the circumstance of his transacting some business with another person touching the sale of wood to him while the will was being drawn. Many other witnesses were called, being neighbors and persons of intimate acquaintance; and the general consensus of their testimony is that while the old man was peculiar in some respects, yet that up to very shortly prior to his death he transacted his own business, and continued to exhibit that peculiar shrewdness which was characteristic of him throughout his life. A number of the contestant's witnesses signified quite clearly that in their opinion he was not competent to transact business or to dispose of his property by will; but, in almost every instance where their attention was called to particular transactions, their narratives indicate the rational demeanor of the testator. It was also shown that on two or three occasions he wandered about aimlessly, apparently in a dazed condition of mind; but these were of short duration, and probably caused by some temporary physical ailment, which passed away as he recovered therefrom. The codicil was executed under like circumstances and conditions, and, while the decedent had grown perceptibly weaker, his mental vigor was retained, so that he was able to direct and clearly discuss the several changes he was desirous of making in his will, for all of which he gave intelligent reasons, as he passed from one to the other when the writing was being prepared. Without further discussion in detail of the evidence, it being quite voluminous, suffice it to say that from a careful reading and consideration in all of its details we are satisfied that the testator was fully capacitated to dispose of his property by will, and to execute the codicil which followed, within the decisions of this court. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 7 Or. 42; Clark's Heirs v. Ellis, 9 Or. 128; Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 Or. 127, 18 P. 6.

The alleged delusion which, it is insisted, induced the particular and peculiar disposition complained of, is that his son's wife had designs upon his property, and proposed possessing herself of it, and that, if he should devise the same to his son Hiram Alonzo, she would in some manner acquire it, and that it would be thus diverted from his family. If this was a delusion, he had been possessed of it for a long time, because his former will gave the bulk of his property to trustees for the benefit of his grandson, thus depriving the son and his wife of ultimate ownership; and his present will is cast upon the same idea. He has also, so far as disclosed by the testimony, been consistent in his desire to so dispose of his property that in the main it would not finally come into the hands of his son's wife. The son was remembered in the will by a life estate in a portion of the realty, and was to receive the rents and profits, after the payments of certain expenses, arising out of the remainder, and the daughter-in-law was remembered by a share in the final distribution, so it is apparent that the testator was not biased by any feelings of animosity toward them. He believed, no doubt, that his son could not long survive him, even thinking that he (the testator) might survive him; and in this he was justified, as subsequent events have demonstrated, for the wife is now prosecuting this proceeding, she being substituted for her deceased husband. Some of the witnesses indicate that the decedent was imbued with the idea that the daughter-in-law would resort to extreme measures in order to possess herself of the property, if it should be divided or bequeathed to his son. If this be so, it was not shown that it was a delusion. It may, for aught that appears, have had its foundation in fact. We do not mean to say that the daughter-in-law was possessed of any such purpose, because there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record to bear out the statement. On the contrary, the proven admissions of the decedent show her treatment of him to have always been kind, indulgent and considerate. But what we mean is that his information may have been such as to superinduce the belief, and thus the state of his mind may have been the result thereof, and not of sheer delusion. Some of the witnesses relate that, when he was asked to give reasons for thinking that his daughter-in-law intended to possess herself of the property, he answered that the neighbors told him so. Further than this the matter was not pursued. Now if he believed his neighbors, and acted upon neighborhood gossip, he was not possessed of a delusion; but the idea with which he was imbued had its basis in fact, and hence the will could not have been superinduced by an insane delusion. Potter v. Jones, 20 Or. 239, 25 P. 769, 12 L.R.A. 161. It is not altogether unnatural or unreasonable that he should desire to keep the property, or the bulk of it, in his family, rather than to have it pass beyond the line of consanguinity; and, while the will and codicil contain some seemingly peculiar provisions, they may be said to be peculiar to the testator, as known by his neighbors in his normal condition. It was suggested that the testator's mind was affected with other delusions; but if they existed at all, which is doubtful, they were such as in no way affected with other delusions; but if they existed at all, which is doubtful, they were such as in no way affected the disposition of his property.

The validity of both the will and codicil is also...