Skinner v. Prather
| Citation | 18 P.2d 154,136 Kan. 879 |
| Decision Date | 28 January 1933 |
| Docket Number | 31178. |
| Parties | SKINNER v. PRATHER, Warden. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Discrimination in application resulting from exercise of reasonable judicial discretion does not necessarily or generally render law unconstitutional (Const. U.S. Amend. 14).
Habitual Criminal Act held not void as denying equal protection to accused, notwithstanding omission of trial judges to make findings of prior convictions in other cases (Rev. St. Supp 1931, 21--107a; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).
1. The exercise of reasonable judicial discretion which results in a discrimination in the application of a law to those of the same class does not necessarily or generally render the law unconstitutional as depriving one of the equal protection of the law.
2. The omission or failure of trial judges to make findings of prior conviction or convictions of other defendants under the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act (R. S. Supp. 1931 21--107a) does not in and of itself, and without a showing of the discrimination being illegal by reason its being willful arbitrary, designed, deliberate, intentional, or by concerted action, deprive one in whose case such finding was made of the equal protection of the law or render the law unconstitutional as being in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Original proceeding by William Skinner for writ of habeas corpus directed to Kirk Prather, Warden of the Kansas State Penitentiary.
Writ denied.
John C Foulks, of Ness City, and Chas. H. Stewart, Jr., of Topeka, for petitioner.
Roland Boynton, Atty. Gen., and Walter T. Griffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This is an original proceeding wherein the petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the state penitentiary to discharge him from confinement therein because chapter 191 of the Session Laws of 1927 (R. S. Supp. 1931, 21--107a), known as the "Habitual Criminal Act," is unconstitutional, in that the additional penalties authorized thereby to be imposed for second and third offenses are assessed by district judges of this state with discrimination upon those of the same class, thus denying the petitioner and others the equal protection of the law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
It is alleged that the petitioner, William Skinner, was convicted in the district court of Linn county, Kan., of grand larceny of money, and was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Habitual Criminal Act and that aside from the application of that act his maximum sentence would have expired on November 5, 1932. He further alleges that: "It is the general practice of the judges of the District Courts of the State of Kansas to use their own judgment as to whether or not a person convicted of crime shall be sentenced under chapter 191 of the Session Laws of 1927 or under the older statute, in cases where the judge knows from the admissions of the convicted persons or other competent evidence that such persons have been previously convicted of felonies and served terms in penal institutions and as a result of these discriminatory acts a large percent of the habitual criminals are serving short sentences in the penal institutions of the State of Kansas, while a much smaller percent are serving the added penalties fixed by Chapter 191 of the Session Laws of 1927."
It will be observed that the form and substance of the act in question is not attacked by the petitioner, but only the discriminatory application of it to offenders of the same class, and this discriminatory enforcement of the act by district judges is what has deprived him of the equal protection of the law. Petitioner calls attention to the all-inclusive nature of the act wherein it states that: "Every person convicted a second time of felony, the punishment of which is confinement in the penitentiary, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than double the time of the first conviction; and if convicted a third time of felony, he shall be confined in the penitentiary during his life."
Petitioner also calls attention to the imperative duty of the courts to assess the additional penalties because of the use of the word "shall," thus every person so convicted shall be confined, etc. The interpretation and meaning of these two words and the construction of the sentence above quoted as given by counsel for the petitioner must be conceded, but there is a distinct modification of this all-inclusive and imperative provision in the next sentence of the section, which is as follows: "Judgment in such cases shall not be given for the increased penalty, unless the court shall find, from the record and other competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for felony committed by the prisoner, in or out of this state."
It is apparent that the first very positive rule is distinctly rendered by the subsequent sentence inapplicable to any and all cases unless the court shall find the fact of a former conviction. There is no complaint that such fact was not found in this case, but that in other cases of the same class where that fact existed, the courts failed and neglected to make such findings, and assessed the punishments without the added penalty. The allegations of the petition are that the judges of the courts omit and fail to make such findings when they know of such previous convictions from the admissions of the defendants or other competent evidence. As proof of such allegations, the petitioner has introduced numerous affidavits of other prisoners showing knowledge on the part of the trial judges and county attorneys of former convictions of defendants and the omission of the courts to make such findings, also an affidavit of an officer of the state giving extracts taken from numerous statements required by R. S. 62--1523 to be furnished by the trial judge and the county attorney in each case, showing certain prisoners to have been habitual criminals where no such findings had been made. These statements are not intended to be based upon knowledge subsequently acquired, but are to be made out and signed at...
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State v. Latham
...has a very great latitude in prescribing and fixing punishment for crime (State v. Woodman, 127 Kan. 166, 272 P. 132; In re Skinner, 136 Kan. 879, 18 P.2d 154; 12 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 562, p. 254). In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, it was stated t......
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State v. Hicks
...that there was discrimination in the enforcement of the Habitual Criminal Act: Sanders v. Waters, 10 Cir., 199 F.2d 317; Skinner v. Prather, 136 Kan. 879, 18 P.2d 154; People v. Johnson, 412 Ill. 109, 105 N.E.2d 766; People v. Israel, 91 Cal.App.2d 773, 206 P.2d 62. See also, State v. Water......
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Addington v. State, 44278
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