Skinner v. Quarterman
| Decision Date | 21 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:09cv130 |
| Parties | JESSE P. SKINNER, #599362 v. NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
TO RECUSE AND FOR RECONSIDERATION OF OR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Jesse P. Skinner, an inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ-CID"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Judith K. Guthrie for findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations for the disposition of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on August 10, 2009. He complained of a number of conditions of his confinement at the Eastham Unit of TDCJ-CID, denial of access to courts, denial of equal access to the restrooms associated with the unit's classrooms, and failure to redress complaints. He sought damages, declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
Over the succeeding two years, the parties conducted a lengthy and hard-fought battle over Plaintiff's claims. Without detailing every step in the litigation, in pertinent part the Defendants filed an answer asserting various defenses including that of qualified immunity; the parties engaged in protracted and tenacious motions practice that included Defendants' motion to require Plaintiff to address with particularity their claims of qualified immunity in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) reply and thePlaintiff's filing of his Third Amended Complaint in response thereto,1 which became the ultimate, operative complaint in the action; a further battle of motions over amending the Magistrate Judge's Scheduling Order to permit Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment ("MSJ") later in time than originally directed; and Defendants' actual MSJ, which Plaintiff vociferously opposed with three separate filings in response. Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation (the "R&R") (docket entry #120) analyzing Plaintiff's claims and the arguments of the parties on summary judgment in great detail and recommending that each claim be dismissed with prejudice on its merits. She further recommended that because there was no finding of a constitutional violation on the merits of Plaintiff's claims, that Defendants' defense of qualified immunity should also be granted. That R&R issued on August 9, 2011, and included the notice to Plaintiff that he may file and serve any objections within 14 days of receipt of the R&R. No objections having been filed or received by the Court within the ensuing month, or double the time for objections, the undersigned District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge's R&R, granted the Defendants' MSJ, dismissed Plaintiff's action with prejudice as frivolous and denied the remaining motions that had not been not individually ruled upon. See Docket Entries #121 and 122.
On September 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration (docket entry #123), in which he asserts that he did not receive a copy of the Magistrate Judge's R&R, was therefore not afforded the opportunity to file objections to it, and that his right to de novo review by the undersigned was therefore abrogated. On that basis alone, he seeks reconsideration of the Final Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) or 60(d)(3). As discussed below, the Defendantsargued, and Plaintiff ultimately appears to have agreed, that his motion should be construed as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). However, that simply appears to have teed up Plaintiff's subsequent Motion for Relief from Judgment, below. On September 20, 2011, Plaintiff then filed a post-judgment Motion to Recuse (docket entry #124), in which he asks the undersigned District Judge and the assigned Magistrate Judge to "recuse themselves because they cannot be an impartial arbiter of this case." Motion to Recuse at 1. Then, on October 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment (docket entry #128), in which he acknowledges the procedural difference between the filing of a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) and one pursuant to Rule 60(b). He therefore filed this third post-judgment motion in an effort to "cover his bases" and seek relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b) in the alternative to Rule 59(e).
Defendants have filed responses in opposition to each of Plaintiff's motions. See Docket Entries #126, 127 and 130, respectively. In turn, Plaintiff has filed replies to each response. See Docket Entries #129, 131 and 132, respectively. Thus, fully briefed, the Court will examine each motion.
I. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
First, the Court will review Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse; then the Court will review both of Plaintiff's motions for relief from judgment together.
Plaintiff asks that both the undersigned District Judge and the assigned Magistrate Judge recuse themselves from any further involvement in his lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Specifically, he complains that he did not receive a copy of (1) docket entry #91, an order amending the Scheduling Order in this case, which extended the time for any party to file a dispositive motion;and (2) the Magistrate Judge's R&R at docket entry #120, prior to the undersigned adopting the R&R and entering final judgment in this case. He apparently ascribes his non-receipt of the documents to the action or inaction of the same judges themselves. See, e.g., id. at 4, ¶ 8 (). Further, he filed a motion for an extension of time in which to respond to Defendants's MSJ (docket entry #99), a motion for reconsideration (docket entry #104) of the order amending the Scheduling Order, and a motion to conduct discovery (docket entry #111) after he had already responded to Defendants' MSJ. In his opinion, these motions went unanswered. For these reasons, he asserts that the impartiality of the judges involved in this case is "br[ought] into question." Motion to Recuse at 2-3.
Section 455 states in pertinent part:
See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) & (b)(1).
"[I]f the issue of a judge recusing [himself or] herself arises [ ] through a motion to recuse under § 455 . . ., the judge has the option to either transfer the matter to another judge for decision or determine it herself." See Maldonado v. Ashcroft, 108 Fed. Appx. 221, 222 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 458 n. 7 (5th Cir.1996)), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1133, 125 S. Ct. 2946, 162 L. Ed. 2d 875 (2005). In this case, the undersigned District Judge will rule on Petitioner's motion to recuse himself as well as the Magistrate Judge. "[N]o authority'suggests any negative inference that can be drawn from the fact that the judge to whom a motion to recuse is directed rules on the motion' instead of referring it to another judge." Doddy, 101 F.3d at 458 n.7 (quoting In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d 958, 963 n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888, 101 S. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1980)).
First, Plaintiff's contention that one or both judges took deliberate action, or at least through wilful inaction allowed events to occur, resulting in his non-receipt of the orders or documents described above is baseless and without merit. Notably, he has proffered absolutely nothing, other than the alleged non-receipt itself, to support any contention of deliberate action out of bias or prejudice. In that light, his allegations are nothing more than conclusory speculation at best and possibly simply amount to an attempt at judicial forum-shopping in pursuit of a more favorable outcome. That is no basis for recusal. Crawford v. United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 245 Fed. Appx. 369, 383 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
In fact, the judges themselves have little to do with the routine mailing of documents issued in the course of a case. Instead, that is a ministerial function of the Clerk of Court. In the ordinary course of business, a docket clerk will mail a document received from chambers to the prisoner-litigant. In the case of a key order or document setting a timed deadline for the prisoner-litigant, the clerk will ordinarily also include an acknowledgment card to be filled out with the date of receipt and returned to the Court. The purpose of that acknowledgment card is for the Court's use in calculating the deadline, if an executed card is returned. Nonetheless, the docket clerks and judges of this Court are well aware that acknowledgment cards are not uniformly returned. Sometimes they are returned timely; sometimes they are returned substantially later than a document is received in the mailroom of the prison or by the prisoner himself; sometimes a prisoner refuses to fill out andreturn the acknowledgment card. In this particular instance, Plaintiff has pointed out that he has returned acknowledgment cards on some occasions, receipt of which is entered on the docket. However, there are also a number of instances in which orders or other documents were issued and sent to Plaintiff for which the clerk received no such acknowledgment. There is no requirement on the Court to send multiple copies of each document issued simply to obtain an acknowledgment.
In the case of Plaintiff's alleged non-receipt of the amended Scheduling Order, Plaintiff moved for an out-of-time reconsideration of the order. See Docket Entry #96. In...
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