Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.

Citation351 N.E.2d 405,40 Ill.App.3d 99
Decision Date21 June 1976
Docket NumberREED-PRENTICE,No. 61220,61220
PartiesRita Rae SKINNER, a minor, by Virginia Skinner, her mother and next friend, Plaintiff, v.DIVISION PACKAGE MACHINERY CO., a Foreign Corporation, Defendant.DIVISION PACKAGE MACHINERY CO., a Foreign Corporation, Third- Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HINCKLEY PLASTIC, INC., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Gerard E. Grashorn, Chicago (Edward J. Wendrow, Stephen C. Bruner, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, of counsel), for third party plaintiff-appellant.

William H. Arpaia, Chicago (Joseph B. Lederleitner, Pretzel, Stouffer, Nolan & Rooney, Chicago, of counsel), for third party defendant-appellee.

GOLDBERG, Presiding Justice:

Rita Rae Skinner (plaintiff) had been employed by Hinckley Plastic, Inc. (Employer). She was injured in a mishap involving an injection molding machine owned by the Employer and originally manufactured by Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., a corporation (Manufacturer). Plaintiff brought action against the Manufacturer on a strict tort liability theory. The Manufacturer in turn filed an amended third-party complaint seeking contribution from the Employer. The trial court granted the motion of the Employer to strike and dismiss the amended third-party complaint of the Manufacturer. The Manufacturer has appealed.

Since the issues are formed in connection with propriety of the dismissal of the amended third-party complaint, we will accept all properly pleaded facts therein as true. (Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 552, 554, 328 N.E.2d 538.) Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the Manufacturer had fabricated the press in question which had been purchased or leased by the employer. The press was being used for the purpose for which it was intended. Plaintiff was injured on August 3, 1972, while attempting to assist another employee correct a malfunction in the machine. When manufactured and sold, the machine was defective and unreasonably dangerous when put to the use for which it was intended. The complaint then specified 12 separate alleged instances in which the machine was defective, improperly designed and lacking in safety devices. It alleged that these defects, or one or more of them, existed when the machine was manufactured and delivered into the stream of commerce and when acquired by the Employer and that plaintiff's injuries were a direct and proximate result of one or more of the specified defects.

The answer of the Manufacturer to the complaint generally denied the allegations of fact except for an admission that the machine had been manufactured and sold by it during 1951 and an admission of the employment of plaintiff. The answer also contained additional defenses of consistent misuse of the machine and assumption of risk by plaintiff.

The Manufacturer then filed an amended third-party complaint against the Employer. It alleged that in 1951 Manufacturer had fabricated and sold the specific machine involved for approximately $15,000 to a different company. Between that date and August 3, 1972, (date of the occurrence herein) this machine had been sold and resold as used equipment to at least three successive purchasers. The Employer had last purchased the machine in March 1972 for approximately $750. The Employer had then installed the machine and commenced to use it for manufacturing plastic products.

The third-party complaint further alleged that the Employer had hired plaintiff as a machine operator about June 8, 1972. On August 3, 1972, while this machine was being operated by a different employee, the safety gate became disengaged from the rails. A different employee of Employer was attempting to replace the gate with the assistance of plaintiff when the mold closed and struck plaintiff's arm. It was further alleged that if the machine was unreasonably dangerous when it left the Manufacturer's control and if it was unreasonably dangerous when plaintiff was injured, this latter condition was substantially and proximately caused by the negligent acts and omissions of the intervening owners of said machine and of the Employer. It also alleged that the Employer negligently purchased and put in operation a used machine which had been poorly maintained, was in a state of bad repair and had been modified, rewired and rebuilt so that it was no longer in the same condition as when it left the Manufacturer's possession and these changes caused the machine to be unreasonably dangerous when plaintiff was injured.

The Manufacturer also alleged other specified negligent acts or omissions by the Employer, such as following the machine to be operated when it knew, or should have known, that the machine was rewired so that safety devices initially installed thereon by the Manufacturer had become inoperative; knowingly allowing the machine to be operated without the adequate guards originally furnished therewith and other specified acts and omissions.

The Manufacturer then further alleged that if it was guilty in any manner, its acts combined with the various acts of the Employer as alleged resulted in plaintiff's injuries which, in such case, were caused by a combination of the conduct of both parties so that they were co-tort-feasors. The Manufacturer concluded that it was entitled to recover from the Employer 'by way of contribution, such amount as would be commensurate with the degree of misconduct attributable to the (Employer) * * *.'

The Employer filed a motion to strike the amended third-party complaint on the ground that the acts of negligence alleged in plaintiff's complaint dealt entirely with defective manufacture of the machine and that the Manufacturer had charged the Employer with seven specific acts of negligence in the maintenance and operation of the machine. It alleged that fault-weighin concepts could not be applied as a basis for indemnity in strict liability cases and that the negligence of a manufacturer in the active creation of a defect in the process of manufacture could not be classified as passive negligence. It alleged that where all of the charges in plaintiff's complaint consisted of active negligence, it follows that the Manufacturer would not be entitled to indemnity against any third-party defendant since where the negligence of a tort-feasor is active, he may not obtain indemnity whether the negligence of a third-party defendant is active or passive. It set forth that the Manufacturer claimed that the Employer was a co-tort-feasor and thus sought contribution but that the law in Illinois provides no cintribution between co-tort-feasors.

In due course, the able and learned trial judge filed an opinion and judgment order in which he concluded that there is no decision in Illinois allowing contribution under the facts pleaded in the third-party complaint. The trial court expressed sympathy with the position of the Manufacturer as third-party plaintiff and a desire to permit relief by way of contribution 'if it had the power to do so' as done in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. (1972), 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288. The trial court concluded, however, with the statement that if the Manufacturer is to be granted relief, this must necessarily emanate 'from the reviewing Courts of this state * * *.' The trial...

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8 cases
  • Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • December 12, 1977
  • Heinrich v. Peabody Intern. Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 13, 1985
    ......First District, Fifth Division. . Dec. 13, 1985. . Page 1380 .         [139 ... among tortfeasors to be the law in Illinois in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 ......
  • Dukes v. J.I. Case Co.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 10, 1985
    ...... that in his opinion, the designer of a piece of machinery may not delegate to the purchaser or ultimate user, the ... between an employer and a manufacturer in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 ......
  • Benza v. Shulman Air Freight, 62875
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 7, 1977
    ...permitting contribution between defendants in a products liability action. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co. (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 99, 104, 351 N.E.2d 405, now pending before the supreme court pursuant to leave granted to The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed. Mc......
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