Skinner v. Skinner, 19360
| Decision Date | 20 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 19360,19360 |
| Citation | 186 S.E.2d 523,257 S.C. 544 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Eugene G. SKINNER, Appellant, v. Martha C. SKINNER, Respondent. |
Paul N. Uricchio, Jr., Charleston, for appellant.
Henry B. Smythe, of Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, Charleston, for respondent.
This action was instituted by the appellant, Eugene G. Skinner, against the respondent, his wife, for a divorce and confirmation of a property settlement and agreement as to child support and alimony. A final decree was entered by the presiding judge of the Ninth Circuit granting the relief sought by the husband. Subsequently, under a motion filed by the wife, the presiding judge vacated and set aside his first decree and, upon materially different factual findings, entered a second decree in which the alimony and child support payments were substantially increased. This appeal by the husband challenges the authority of the presiding judge, under the motion before him, to vacate and set aside his first decree.
The parties to this action were married on January 26, 1947 and have three children. After extended marital difficulties, the parties separated on December 25, 1964 and, admittedly, have continuously lived separate and apart since that time. Thereafter, on October 9, 1967, they entered into a written property settlement agreement which also contained provisions of the payment by the husband of $250.00 per month, as alimony, and $300.00 per month support for the three children. One of the children has since become emancipated and support for only two of them is presently involved. The above agreement was apparently the basis for the husband's contributions to the wife for alimony and child support until the institution of the present action.
Subsequently, the husband instituted this action on May 14, 1969, for a divorce on the ground that the parties had been continuously separated for more than three years without cohabitation, and also sought confirmation of the foregoing property settlement and agreement as to alimony and support for the minor children. The answer of the wife asked that the above agreement be set aside upon the ground that she had signed it under duress, and that the court award a reasonable amount for alimony and child support independently of the property settlement and agreement. A cross-action was also filed by her for a divorce from the husband on the ground of desertion.
After hearing exceptions to the report of the master, to whom the issues were referred, the presiding judge entered a decree, dated October 22, 1970, in which he upheld the property settlement and agreement for child support and alimony; awarded a divorce upon the ground that the parties had been continuously separated for three years without cohabitation, Section 20--101, 1970 Supplement to 1962 Code of Laws; denied the wife's claim for divorce on the ground of desertion; and directed the husband to pay the sum of $750.00, as counsel fees, to the wife's attorney. Upon a finding that 'the record does not reflect any change of circumstances since the signing of the agreement' and that the wife's misconduct caused the separation of the parties, the husband, in accordance with the approved agreement for support and alimony, was directed to pay to the wife the sum of $250.00 per month, as alimony; and the further monthly sum of $200.00, $100.00 each, for the support of the two children, whose custody was awarded to the wife.
Since the trial judge found that the disruption of the marital relations was due to the misconduct of the wife, she was not entitled to an award for alimony, Brown v. brown, 239 S.C. 444, 123 S.E.2d 772, except upon the basis of the approved property settlement and agreement as to support, in which the husband agreed to pay alimony in the amount of $250.00 per month. The award of alimony was therefore based solely upon the provious agreement of the husband. It was also found that there had been no change in conditions to warrant increasing the amount agreed upon for child support.
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Wells Fargo Bank, NA, v. Smith
...is required when the trial court's ruling exceeds the limits and scope of the particular motion before it. Skinner v. Skinner, 257 S.C. 544, 549–50, 186 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1972). After a brief non-evidentiary motion hearing, the Master requested Smith submit authority to support his assertion......
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CITY OF NORTH MYRTLE v. Lewis-Davis
...is required when the trial court's ruling exceeds the limits and scope of the particular motion before it. Skinner v. Skinner, 257 S.C. 544, 550, 186 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1972). Because we decide Judge John granted Respondents relief on a ground they did not raise or argue, it was error for him......
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Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Smith
...is required when the trial court's ruling exceeds the limits and scope of the particular motion before it. Skinner v. Skinner, 257 S.C. 544, 549-50, 186 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1972). After a brief non-evidentiary motion hearing, the Master requested Smith submit authority to support his assertion......
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Henderson v. Gould, Inc.
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