Skinner v. Square D Co.

• Citation: 445 Mich. 153,516 N.W.2d 475
• Decision Date: 17 May 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 94875,No. 11,11
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,001 Doris L. SKINNER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Chester W. Skinner, Deceased, Doris L. Skinner, and Jeffrey W. Skinner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SQUARE D COMPANY, a Michigan Corporation for Profit, and Square D Company, an Illinois Corporation for Profit, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 475

516 N.W.2d 475

445 Mich. 153, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,001

Doris L. SKINNER, as Personal Representative of the Estate

of Chester W. Skinner, Deceased, Doris L. Skinner, and Jeffrey W. Skinner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SQUARE D COMPANY, a Michigan Corporation for Profit, and Square D Company, an Illinois Corporation for

Profit, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 94875.

Calendar No. 11.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 2, 1993.

Decided May 17, 1994.

[445 Mich. 156] Nolan, Reincke, Thomsen & Villas, P.C. by Lawrence P. Nolan, Eaton Rapids, for plaintiffs.

Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman by Barbara Hughes Erard and Theresa M. Serra, Detroit, for defendants.

O'Leary, O'Leary, Jacobs, Mattson & Perry, P.C. by John P. Jacobs, Southfield, for amicus curiae, Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc.

OPINION

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, representatives for the decedent Chester W. Skinner, appeal from the Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 195 Mich.App. 664, 491 N.W.2d 648 (1992). This Court granted plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal, limited to the following questions:

(1) whether the trial court erroneously determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that as a matter of law defendants' switch could not have caused decedent's death, thus entitling defendants to a grant of summary disposition, and (2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' case without ruling on their claims regarding defendants' failure to insulate the switch's handle and defendants' failure to warn. [443 Mich. 884, 508 N.W.2d 493 (1993).]

We find that the plaintiffs failed to offer evidence from which reasonable minds could infer that the alleged defect caused the decedent's death. Because the defendant's summary disposition motion was properly supported, and the plaintiffs' evidentiary response was not adequate, we hold that the trial court correctly granted the defendant's motion. For the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, we also hold that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for failure to insulate and failure to warn.

I

We borrow from the Court of Appeals accurate summary of the relevant facts in this case:

Plaintiffs brought this products liability action against defendant, Square D Company, following the death of plaintiffs' decedent, Chester W. Skinner. Mr. Skinner was electrocuted by his own homemade tumbling machine on which he had installed a switch manufactured by defendant.

* * * * * *

[Mr. Skinner] was in the business of cleaning and finishing metal parts. To this end, [he] routinely used a homemade tumbling machine that he had designed and built himself. Essentially, the machine consisted of a large metal drum mounted on a frame. Rough metal parts were placed inside the drum along with a quantity of abrasive detergent. An electric motor then rotated the drum in one direction to wash the parts. After allowing the drum to rotate for a period of time, the operator would reverse the direction of the tumbler and the finished parts would be ejected from the drum.

Because of the way Mr. Skinner had designed the machine, reversing the direction of the drum's rotation was a dangerous task. The motor that turned the drum was controlled by a switch manufactured by defendant. Mr. Skinner had connected the Square D switch to the motor by using three wires with insulated "alligator clips" on the ends. In order to reverse the direction of the machine, the operator was required to disconnect two of the alligator clips from the motor by hand and reverse them. For obvious reasons, it was important for the operator to make sure that the Square D switch was in the "off" position before disconnecting the wires from the motor.

On February 21, 1986, Mr. Skinner was in his shop, working in the room with the tumbling machines. Mrs. Skinner and two other women, Beulah McBride and Violet Whiting, were in another room, racking parts. Suddenly, the women heard Mr. Skinner cry out. They ran into the room where Mr. Skinner was, and found him standing with his hands above his head, each hand grasping an alligator clip. Electric current was passing through Mr. Skinner's body. Aware of what was happening, Mr. Skinner cried out to the women, "don't touch me!" He then freed his left hand from the alligator clip and reached for the Square D switch. Mr. Skinner threw the switch into the "off" position, twisted, and fell over dead. [195 Mich.App. at 665-666, 491 N.W.2d 648.]

Plaintiffs claim that the Square D switch was defectively designed because it had a large "phantom zone" that sometimes made the switch appear to be "off" when it was actually "on." Plaintiffs assert that this defect proximately caused Mr. Skinner's death.

The defendant responds that, even assuming the switch is defective, the plaintiffs' evidence does not show that Mr. Skinner was misled by the switch when he was fatally electrocuted. ¹ Following numerous depositions and written discovery requests, the defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), ² effectively claiming that because plaintiffs are unable to establish a genuine issue of causation, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The trial court granted the defendant's motion, ruling that the "Plaintiff has produced no evidence to show a specific fact issue to support his theory that the switch somehow caused Plaintiff's decedent's death." The Court of Appeals affirmed, over the dissent of Judge Michael J. Kelly. The majority found that "at no time did plaintiffs advance a plausible theory regarding how the defective switch caused the accident." 195 Mich.App. at 668, 491 N.W.2d 648. The Court further concluded that there were insufficient facts to proceed on plaintiffs' separate claims of failure to insulate and failure to warn. ³

II

It is well settled under Michigan law that a prima facie case for products liability requires proof of a causal connection between an established defect and injury. Mulholland v. DEC Int'l, 432 Mich. 395, 415, 443 N.W.2d 340 (1989). While the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the plaintiff is not required to produce evidence that positively eliminates every other potential cause. Rather, the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient if it "establishes a logical sequence of cause and effect, notwithstanding the existence of other plausible theories, although other plausible theories may also have evidentiary support." Id.

As indicated, the defendant in the instant products liability suit argued that the plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of causation, entitling it to summary judgment.

The Michigan Court Rules provide a precise description of the respective burdens that litigants must bear when a motion for summary judgment is filed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Specifically, MCR 2.116(G)(4) ⁴ mandates that the party seeking summary judgment must specify the issues for which it claims there is no genuine factual dispute. Provided the moving party's motion is properly supported, MCR 2.116(G)(4) dictates that the opposing party must then respond with affidavits or other evidentiary materials that show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, the rule provides that "judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him or her." MCR 2.116(G)(4). In a similar fashion, this Court has explained the burden of the nonmovant as follows:

Once a party is challenged as to the existence of the facts upon which he purports to build his case, the sum and substance of the summary judgment proceeding is that general allegations and notice pleading are not enough. Matters upon information and belief and alleged common knowledge are not enough. That party must come forward with at least some evidentiary proof, some statement of specific fact upon which to base his case. If he fails, the motion for summary judgment is properly granted. [Durant v. Stahlin, 375 Mich. 628, 640, 135 N.W.2d 392 (1965) (emphasis added).] ⁵

III

A trial court tests the factual support of a plaintiff's claim when it rules upon a motion for summary disposition filed under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co., 435 Mich. 408, 414, 459 N.W.2d 288 (1990). The court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence submitted or filed in the action. ⁶ The court is not permitted to assess credibility, or to determine facts on a motion for summary judgment. Zamler v. Smith, 375 Mich. 675, 678-679, 135 N.W.2d 349 (1965). Instead, the court's task is to review the record evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, and decide whether a genuine issue of any material fact exists to warrant a trial. ⁷

To determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, the test is "whether the kind of record which might be developed, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, would leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stark, 437 Mich. 175, 184-185, 468 N.W.2d 498 (1991).

Like the trial court's inquiry, when an appellate court reviews a motion for summary disposition, it makes all legitimate inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moll v. Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich. 1, 27-28, n. 36, 506 N.W.2d 816 (1993).

Applying these rules, we find that the defendant fulfilled its burden under MCR 2.116(G)(4) when it effectively indicated in its motion that there was no genuine dispute regarding causation. In addition, we conclude that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their duty because, for the reasons set forth below, their proofs did not establish a genuine issue of causation.

IV

So as to avoid any possible confusion, we make plain that the specific causation issue before the Court in this case is one of cause in fact,...