Skinner v. Switzer
Decision Date | 07 March 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 09–9000.,09–9000. |
Citation | 562 U.S. 521,179 L.Ed.2d 233,131 S.Ct. 1289 |
Parties | Henry W. SKINNER, Petitioner, v. Lynn SWITZER, District Attorney for the 31st Judicial District of Texas. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Robert C. Owen, Austin, TX, appointed by this Court, for petitioner.
Gregory S. Coleman, Austin, TX, for respondent.
Robert C. Owen, Counsel of Record, Austin, TX, Douglas G. Robinson, Washington, D.C., Maria Cruz Melendez, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
Mark D. White, Sprouse Shrader Smith P.C., Amarillo, TX, Gregory S. Coleman, Counsel of Record, Edward C. Dawson, Richard B. Farrer, Yetter Coleman LLP, Austin, TX, for Respondent.
We granted review in this case to decide a question presented, but left unresolved, in District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2318–19, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009): May a convicted state prisoner seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence assert that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or is such a claim cognizable in federal court only when asserted in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ? The Courts of Appeals have returned diverse responses. Compare McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (C.A.2 2007) ( ); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 669 (C.A.7 2006) (same); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290–1291 (C.A.11 2002) (same), with Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (C.A.4 2002) ( ) and Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (C.A.5 2002)(per curiam) (same).
In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005), we comprehensively surveyed this Court's decisions on the respective provinces of § 1983 civil rights actions and § 2254 federal habeas petitions. Habeas is the exclusive remedy, we reaffirmed, for the prisoner who seeks "immediate or speedier release" from confinement. Id., at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242. Where the prisoner's claim would not "necessarily spell speedier release," however, suit may be brought under § 1983. Ibid . Adhering to our opinion in Dotson, we hold that a postconviction claim for DNA testing is properly pursued in a § 1983 action. Success in the suit gains for the prisoner only access to the DNA evidence, which may prove exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive. In no event will a judgment that simply orders DNA tests "necessarily impl[y] the unlawfulness of the State's custody." Id., at 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242. We note, however, that the Court's decision in Osborne severely limits the federal action a state prisoner may bring for DNA testing. Osborne rejected the extension of substantive due process to this area, 557 U.S., at ––––, 129 S.Ct., at 2322, and left slim room for the prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him procedural due process, see id., at ––––, 129 S.Ct., at 2321.
In 1995, a Texas jury convicted petitioner Henry Skinner and sentenced him to death for murdering his live-in girlfriend, Twila Busby, and her two sons. Busby was bludgeoned and choked with an axe handle and her sons were stabbed to death; the murders were committed in the house Busby shared with Skinner.
Skinner never denied his presence in the house when the killings occurred. He claimed, however, that he was incapacitated by large quantities of alcohol and codeine. The potent alcohol and drug mix, Skinner maintained at trial, rendered him physically unable to commit the brutal murders charged against him. Skinner identified, as a likely perpetrator, Busby's uncle, Robert Donnell (now deceased), an ex-convict with a history of physical and sexual abuse.1 On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed Skinner's conviction and sentence. Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 546 (1997). The CCA's opinion described the crime-scene evidence in detail:
Investigators also retained vaginal swabs taken from Busby.
In preparation for trial, "the State tested the blood on [Skinner's] clothing, blood and hair from a blanket that partially covered one of the victims, and hairs on one of the victim's back and cheeks." Skinner v. State, 122 S.W.3d 808, 810 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The State also tested fingerprint evidence. Some of this evidence—including bloody palm prints in the room where one victim was killed—implicated Skinner, but "fingerprints on a bag containing one of the knives" did not. Ibid. Items left untested included the knives found on the premises, the axe handle, vaginal swabs, fingernail clippings, and additional hair samples. See ibid.2
In the decade following his conviction, Skinner unsuccessfully sought state and federal postconviction relief. See Skinner v. Quarterman, 576 F.3d 214 (C.A.5 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 975, 130 S.Ct. 1689, 176 L.Ed.2d 187 (2010). He also pursued informal efforts to gain access to untested biological evidence the police had collected at the scene of the crime.3
In 2001, more than six years after Skinner's conviction, Texas enacted Article 64, a statute allowing prisoners to gain postconviction DNA testing in limited circumstances. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 64.01(a) (Vernon Supp.2010). To obtain DNA testing under Article 64, a prisoner must meet one of two threshold criteria. He may show that, at trial, testing either was "not available" or was "available, but not technologically capable of providing probative results." Art. 64.01(b)(1)(A). Alternatively, he may show that the evidence was not previously tested "through no fault" on his part, and that "the interests of justice" require a postconviction order for testing. Art. 64.01(b)(1)(B). To grant a motion for postconviction testing, a court must make further findings, prime among them, the movant " would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing," and "the [Article 64] request ... [was] not made to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice." Art. 64.03(a) (2).
Invoking Article 64, Skinner twice moved in state court, first in 2001 and again in 2007, for DNA testing of yet untested biological evidence. See supra, at 1295, n. 3. Both motions were denied. Affirming the denial of Skinner's first motion, the CCA held that he had failed to demonstrate a "reasonable probability ... that he would not have been ... convicted if the DNA test results were exculpatory." Skinner v. State, 122 S.W.3d, at 813.
Skinner's second motion was bolstered by discovery he had obtained in the interim.4 The CCA again affirmed the denial of relief under Article 64, this time on the ground that Skinner failed to meet the "no fault" requirement. See Skinner v. State, 293 S.W.3d 196, 200 (2009).5 During postconviction proceedings, the CCA noted, trial counsel testified that he had not "ask[ed] for testing because he was afraid the DNA would turn out to be [Skinner's]." Id., at 202. That decision, the CCA concluded, constituted "a reasonable trial strategy" that the court had no cause to second-guess. Id ., at 209.
Skinner next filed the instant federal action for injunctive relief under § 1983, naming as defendant respondent Lynn Switzer, the District Attorney whose office prosecuted Skinner and has custody of the evidence Skinner would like to have DNA tested. Skinner's federal-court complaint alleged that Texas violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by refusing to provide for the DNA testing he requested. Complaint ¶ 33, App. 20–21. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. App. 24–41. Under the governing Circuit precedent, Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, the Magistrate Judge observed, postconviction requests for DNA evidence are cognizable only in habeas corpus, not under § 1983. App. 39. Adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, the District Court dismissed Skinner's suit. Id., at 44–45.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 363 Fed.Appx. 302 (2010)(per curiam), reiterating that "an action by a prisoner for post-conviction DNA testing is not cognizable under § 1983 and must instead be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus," id., at 303. On Skinner's petition,6 we granted certiorari, 560 U.S. 924, 130 S.Ct. 3323, 176 L.Ed.2d 1219 (2010), and now reverse the Fifth Circuit's judgment.
Because this case was resolved on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the question below was "not whether [Skinner] will ultimately prevail" on his procedural due process claim, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Whaley v. Lopez
...Ct. 1194, "have ranked within the traditional core of habeas corpus and outside the province of Section 1983." Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1300, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011); see also Amaker, 179 F.3d at 51 (holding that a claim that the defendant was denied his right to meaningful cou......
-
In re Facebook, Inc.
...dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted."); Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521, 530, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) ("[U]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a pr......
-
Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Grane Healthcare Co.
...1 ¶¶ 4-10). At the pleadings stage, the EEOC was not required to "pin [its] claim for relief to a precise legal theory." Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). Consequently, the EEOC is not precluded from arguing that the Defendants may be held liable as "joint employers." In Gra......
-
Moore v. Circosta, 1:20CV911
...same or a related question was earlier aired between the parties in state court.’ " Id. at 320 (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) ). Rather, "any tensions between the two proceedings should be managed through the doctrines of preclusion, c......
-
The Sign of the Three—Text Rules: SCOTUS Today
...courts from adjudicating cases brought by state-court losing parties challenging state-court judgments. However, in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 532 (2011), the Court held that even though a “state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts,” a “statute or rule governing......
-
Prisoners' Rights
...not apply. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 (2011) (Heck bar on judgements in § 1983 claims that “necessarily imply the invalidity of [defendant’s] conviction” did not apply to re......
-
PROTECTING THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT DETAINEES: USING COVID-19 TO CREATE A NEW ANALOGY.
..."a judgment at odds with [the prisoner's] conviction or with the State's calculation of time to be served."). (69) Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (70) Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 468-69 (8th Cir. 2014). (71) Id. at 469-70......
-
II. Elements of the Section 1983 Claim, Functional Role of Section 1983, Pleading, and Jurisdiction
...217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).[34] . Id. at 287.[35] . Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996); accord Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011); B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2013); Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Ass'n v. City of Chi., 693 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012);......
-
Chapter §13.01 U.S. District Courts
...is no requirement for Lifetime to "prove its case at the pleading stage." Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1339 (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011)). Our precedent requires that a complaint place the alleged infringer "on notice of what activity ......