Skipper v. Clark

• Decision Date: 03 December 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-00041-GNS
• Citation: 150 F.Supp.3d 820
• Parties: Sierra N. Skipper, Individually and as Administratix of the Estate of Margaret Leah Skipper, by and through Estate of Margaret Leah Skipper; and S.R.S., Plaintiffs v. Thomas Clark, Individually and in his Official Capacity as former Casey County Coroner, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

150 F.Supp.3d 820

Sierra N. Skipper, Individually and as Administratix of the Estate of Margaret Leah Skipper, by and through Estate of Margaret Leah Skipper; and S.R.S., Plaintiffs

v.Thomas Clark, Individually and in his Official Capacity as former Casey County Coroner, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-00041-GNS

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division.

Signed December 3, 2015

Cameron C. Griffith, Theodore H. Lavit, Theodore H. Lavit & Associates, Lebanon, KY, for Plaintiffs.

Aaron D. Smith, English, Lucas, Priest & Owsley LLP, Bowling Green, KY, Daniel L. Morgan, McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC, Lexington, KY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Greg N. Stivers, Judge, United States District Court

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Thomas Clark (“Clark”) (DN 9) as well as the Motion to Amend/Correct the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs (DN 13). The motions have been fully briefed by the parties and are ripe for decision. For the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend/Correct the Complaint is DENIED as futile, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . The remaining state law claims are REMANDED to Casey Circuit Court.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CLAIMS

This action arises out of the events following the death of Margaret Leah Skipper (“Decedent”) in Casey County, Kentucky, on March 18, 2014. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 1, DN 12). Casey County Deputy Sheriff Freeman Luttrell (“Luttrell”) responded to a call from Michael Johnson, with whom Decedent resided, that there had been a domestic dispute. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 1, DN 12). Upon arrival, Luttrell and EMTs found Decedent unresponsive with a single gunshot wound to the right side of her head. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 1, DN 12).

Clark, in his official capacity as Casey County Coroner, was called to the scene in order to perform an investigation of Decedent's death. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 1-2, DN 9). Clark concluded in his “Coroner Investigation Report” that Decedent's death was caused by a self-inflicted “contact gunshot wound to the right side of the head.” (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 2, DN 12). Decedent's daughters, Plaintiffs Sierra N. Skipper and S.R.S., requested an autopsy and further examination be conducted, but Clark allegedly did not pursue any further investigation. (Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 2).

On March 18, 2015, Plaintiffs filed this action in Casey Circuit Court alleging that Clark failed to conduct a post-mortem examination in compliance with KRS 72.025, et seq., which requires that a post-mortem examination be conducted by a certified coroner when the circumstances surrounding a death appear to be caused by homicide, violence, or suicide. (Compl. ¶¶ 7–25, DN 1–1). Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Clark had failed to comply with training requirements enumerated in KRS 72.415 and that his failure to follow the statutory protocol for post-mortem examinations violated Decedent's due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, Plaintiffs alleged that Clark's conduct was actionable as negligence per se under KRS 446.070. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-29). Finally, the Complaint asserts that “the conduct of the defendant, Coroner Clark, was so beyond the bounds of professionalism, morality, and decency that it [rose] to the level of outrageous conduct” for which Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Compl. ¶¶ 30-31).

After being served, Clark moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Subsequently, Plaintiffs sought leave pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to amend and correct the Complaint in order to avoid dismissal by asserting all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on behalf of all plaintiffs “rather than limiting said claims to the Estate of Margaret Leah Skipper,” by adding a substantive due process claim, by adding “language concerning [Plaintiffs'] claim under KRS 446.070 which would encompass negligent conduct as well as intentional conduct pending further discovery in this matter,” and by resolving a typographical error. (Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Amend/Correct Compl. 2, DN 13).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint is subject to dismissal if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accepting “as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences therein. Gazette v. City of Pontiac , 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Westlake v. Lucas , 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir.1976) ). The nonmoving party, however, must plead more than bare legal conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996). In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “[the] complaint must contain (1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative level.’ ” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC , 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). While the pleadings do not need to contain detailed factual allegations, the nonmoving party must allege facts that when “accepted as true ... ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against Clark in both his official and individual capacities. Both types of claims are addressed separately below.

1. Official-Capacity Claims

“Official-capacity suits ... ‘generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ” Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Thus, Plaintiffs' official-capacity claims against Clark are actually claims against Casey County. See Lambert v. Hartman , 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir.2008) (“[Plaintiff] Lambert sued the Clerk in his official capacity, which is the equivalent of suing the Clerk's employer, the County.”). Furthermore, “[t]he law is clear that liability of supervisory personnel must be based on more than merely the right to control employees.” Hays v. Jefferson Cty. , 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir.1982). Instead, Section 1983 claims against a municipality require the Court to analyze “(1) whether Plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation.” Smith v. Osbourne , No. 4:10–CV–P22–M, 2010 WL 1337017, at *1 (W.D.Ky. Mar. 30, 2010) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) ).

A county cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between its policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell , 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the [county] from acts of employees of the [county], and thereby make clear that [county] liability is limited to action for which the [county] is actually responsible.’ ” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik , 485 U.S. 112, 138, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 479–80, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) ) (emphasis on original). A plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [county] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't , 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir.1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom , 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir.1987) ). Moreover, in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983 the policy or custom must be “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Searcy v. City of Dayton , 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (citation omitted)).

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendant Clark acted pursuant to a county policy or custom by failing to conduct further investigation into Decedent's death. While Plaintiffs contend that further discovery will elicit material facts, the pleading standards of Rule 8 are not intended to “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In the instant case, the Complaint in no way demonstrates that Clark's conduct was a result of a policy or custom of Casey County. Because the Complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against Casey County and it fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the official-capacity claim against Clark will be dismissed.

Plaintiffs' state law claims brought against Clark in his official capacity as county coroner must also fail. Kentucky has adopted the Graham court's analysis that official capacity suits are the functional equivalent of claims against the county, and it is well established that the county is entitled to sovereign immunity as to state law claims. See Flick v. Estate of Wittich , 396 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Ky.2013) ; Yanero v. Davis , 65 S.W.3d 510, 519 (Ky.2001). Thus, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Clark in his official capacity under KRS 446.070 and IIED must be dismissed.

2. Individual Capacity Claims under Federal Law

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Clark's actions in failing to conduct a post-mortem examination violated their civil rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth...