Skipper v. Sc Dept. of Corrections

• Citation: 633 S.E.2d 910
• Decision Date: 31 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 4141.,4141.
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Parties: Ronald De'Ray SKIPPER, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.

633 S.E.2d 910

Ronald De'Ray SKIPPER, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.

No. 4141.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted June 1, 2006.

Decided July 31, 2006.

Christopher L. Murphy and James A. Stuckey, Jr., both of Charleston, for Appellant.

Ronald De'Ray Skipper, of Bishopville, pro se.

BEATTY, J.

The South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) appeals the circuit court's order finding Ronald De'Ray Skipper was denied both a liberty interest in prison employment and due process with regard to SCDC's drug-testing policy. SCDC contends there is no liberty interest in prison employment and that Skipper was afforded due process prior to his disciplinary conviction for drug possession. We reverse.¹

FACTS

Skipper, an inmate at Evans Correctional Institution,² was employed at the facility through SCDC and the privately run Prison Industries Enterprises. Prison Industries is a voluntary program which serves the SCDC by employing and training inmates. Inmates choosing to participate in the program receive the prevailing wage of the local area for the particular job they perform with deductions taken for taxes, victim compensation, and room and board.

On January 18, 2001, Skipper was randomly selected for testing under the SCDC drug-testing policy, and he tested positive for marijuana. On January 31, 2001, Skipper was re-tested and his urine was again positive for marijuana. Immediately following this test, a follow-up test was performed and it confirmed the positive result.

On February 7, 2001, a disciplinary hearing was held before prison officials, and Skipper was found guilty of possession of marijuana. This disciplinary conviction resulted in Skipper losing fifteen days of canteen privileges. Additionally, as per Prison Industries' policy, Skipper was terminated from his job because of this disciplinary conviction. On September 21, 2001, Skipper was transferred from Evans Correctional Institution to Lee Correctional Institution, a facility which does not utilize the Prison Industries program.

Skipper appealed his disciplinary conviction through a two-step inmate grievance procedure. His appeal was reviewed and denied by the institutional grievance coordinator and the warden. After exhausting his inmate grievance appeals, Skipper appealed to the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD). The ALJ dismissed Skipper's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground the SCDC "did not infringe a liberty interest when it punished Skipper with canteen restrictions for violating a prison disciplinary rule."

Skipper then appealed to the circuit court, and the court remanded the matter back to the ALJD to consider whether the possible effect of the challenged disciplinary conviction on Skipper's parole chances implicated a protected liberty interest. The ALJ again dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction stating "the mere possibility of an effect on parole eligibility is too tenuous to constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest." The ALJ further found "no liberty interest is implicated when an inmate is faced with lesser penalties such as the loss of television, canteen, or telephone privileges."

Skipper again appealed to the circuit court, and the court ruled in his favor. The court found as a matter of law that Skipper's loss of employment implicated a liberty interest, and SCDC's refusal to send Skipper's urine for further testing interfered with his right to due process. SCDC appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Mootness

In its brief, SCDC asserts the circuit court erred in finding: (1) SCDC's refusal to provide Skipper with Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS) confirmation of his drug test result interfered with Skipper's right to due process in his disciplinary conviction; and (2) Skipper had a liberty interest in prison employment which potentially afforded a basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Although we will address these arguments, we find it necessary as a threshold matter to analyze whether the issue regarding Skipper's prison employment is moot.

In its May 23, 2003 order, the circuit court, in finding violations of a liberty interest and due process rights, stated only that Skipper was entitled to "some relief." SCDC filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and included a request that, in the alternative, the circuit court clarify what relief should be awarded to Skipper. In response, the circuit court issued a Form 4 order denying the motion. The court failed to address the issue of specific relief.

During the course of his appeal, Skipper was transferred to the Lee Correctional Institution, a facility which does not provide the privilege of employment with Prison Industries Enterprises. Given the authority to determine an inmate's location rests with SCDC, this court may not order his return to Evans Correctional Facility or to another correctional facility which offers Skipper's desired employment. Consequently, as will be discussed, we find any issue regarding potential employment relief for Skipper is moot.

Generally, this court does not have the authority to dictate to the SCDC where an inmate should be housed. In South Carolina, the authority to determine where an inmate is housed is vested in the Department of Corrections. See S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-30(A) (Supp.2005) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted of an offense against the State must be in the custody of the Department of Corrections, and the department shall designate the place of confinement where the sentence must be served."); see also S.C. Const. art. XII, § 2 ("The General Assembly shall establish institutions for the confinement of all persons convicted of such crimes as may be designated by law, and shall provide for the custody, maintenance, health, welfare, education, and rehabilitation of the inmates.").

Absent an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate, or an arbitrary, capricious, or biased decision by the prison, the court has no authority to interfere with inmate housing decisions. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)(holding that thirty days of solitary confinement when compared with inmate's overall prison environment, was not the "type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest"); Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 381, 527 S.E.2d 742, 756 (2000) (finding judicial review of inmate disputes is limited to "determine whether `the challenged conditions or degree of confinement are within the sentence imposed and are not otherwise violative of the Constitution,' or whether prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or from personal bias" (quoting Brown v. Evatt, 322 S.C. 189, 194, 470 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1996))); Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 764, 259 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1979) (holding transfer within prison system or downgrading of custody status is not subject to judicial review as long as prison officials do not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or from personal bias or prejudice).

Because Skipper has not specifically challenged his transfer to the Lee Correctional Institution and our authority with respect to internal inmate decisions is limited, we are placed in a position of not being able to grant effectual relief. Given we are unable to grant this relief, we find the issue is moot. See Collins Music Co. v. IGT, 365 S.C. 544, 549, 619 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct.App.2005)(noting a matter becomes moot when some event occurs making it impossible to grant effectual relief).

II. Liberty Interest in Prison Employment and Due Process

SCDC argues the circuit court erred in finding that Skipper had a liberty interest in prison employment which potentially afforded him a basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree.

Even though this court is without authority to grant Skipper relief in terms of ordering a transfer to a facility offering the Prison Industries program, we address the merits of this issue in the interest of thoroughness given Skipper's liberty interest argument may be broadly construed as also including a challenge to his transfer to a facility that does not offer the employment program.

"[A]dministrative matters entitled to review by the ALJD `typically arise in two ways: (1) when an inmate is disciplined and punishment is imposed and (2) when an inmate believes prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status.'" Sullivan v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., 355 S.C. 437, 441, 586 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2003) (quoting Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 369, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000)). We also recognize that a condition of confinement could implicate a state-created liberty interest, thus requiring minimal due process. See Sullivan, 355 S.C. at 442, 586 S.E.2d at 126 ("[S]tates may create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause, but . . . `these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995))).

"Courts traditionally have adopted a `hands off' doctrine regarding judicial involvement in prison disciplinary procedures and other internal prison matters, although they must intercede when infringements complained of by an inmate reach constitutional dimensions." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757. In other words, an inmate's complaint must encompass an infringement of a liberty interest that imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate to trigger due process guarantees and judicial review.

The Prison Industries program, like a work release program, is statutorily created. See S.C.Code Ann. § 24-3-430(A) (Supp. 2005) ("The Director of the Department of Corrections may...