Skladzien v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bayonne

• Decision Date: 10 July 1934
• Docket Number: No. 219.,219.
• Citation: 173 A. 600
• Parties: SKLADZIEN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF BAYONNE et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

173 A. 600

SKLADZIEN

v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF BAYONNE et al.

No. 219.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 10, 1934.

Proceedings by Peter W. Skladzien for writ of certiorari to be directed to the Board of Education of the City of Bayonne and the State Board of Education to review a resolution of the city board terminating prosecutor's services as medical inspector, which resolution was affirmed by the State Board of Education.

Decision of State Board of Education affirmed, and writ dismissed.

Argued January term, 1934, before BROGAN, C. J., and TRENCHARD and HBHER, JJ.

Charles Rubenstein, of Bayonne, for prosecutor.

Alfred Brenner, of Bayonne, for defendants.

PER CURIAM.

The writ of certiorari allowed in this case brings up for review a resolution of the board of education of the City of Bayonne terminating the services of the prosecutor, Dr. Peter Skladzien, as medical inspector in the schools of that city. The record in the case shows that the prosecutor was, on August 3, 1931, by resolution of the board of education, reappointed medical inspector for a term of three years. He had been in the service of the board prior thereto in a like capacity for a five-year term; the date of the former appointment being June 3, 1926.

Certain rules and regulations, concerning the affairs of school administration, had been in effect since 1931, upon which, in part, the prosecutor relies for his reinstatement to office. Among them we find the following: "91. The chief medical inspector and medical inspectors shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of one year and thereafter in case of reappointment for a term of three years in the discretion of the Board. * * * "

The board of education, for the year 1932, adopted the same rules as the preceding board, which included rule 91, supra, and the 1933 board of education did likewise. This rule (91) is of importance in this case and remained among the regulations, word for word, as above stated, at the time of the adoption of the resolution, here challenged. It was amended on April 6, 1933, so as to fix the term of medical inspectors for one year instead of three. However, on March 16, 1933, the resolution here under consideration was adopted which terminated the services of the prosecutor as medical inspector. It will be observed that the prosecutor served under this board, i. e., the 1933 board of education, from February 1, 1933, until March 16, 1933.

The prosecutor appealed to the commissioner of education for a reversal of the action of the board, but he upheld the validity of the resolution. A further appeal was taken to the state board of education which affirmed the decision of the commissioner of education.

Three reasons are here assigned by the prosecutor for a reversal of the resolution in question, the chief of which is that the resolution illegally terminated the three-year appointment of the prosecutor as medical inspector. In support of this point, it is argued that the board of education, for the year 1931, was within its rights in appointing the prosecutor for a three-year term by virtue of the provisions of section 229 of the' School Law, which may be found under chapter 84 of the Laws of 1931, P. L. 1931, p. 143 (Comp. St. Supp. § 185—229). That section provides as follows: "229. Every board of education shall employ a competent physician to be known as the medical inspector, and may also employ a nurse, and fix their salaries and terms of office. Every board of education shall adopt rules for the government of the medical inspector and nurse, which rules shall be submitted to the State Board of Education for approval."

The position of the prosecutor is perfectly plain. He says, first, that the statute (section 229, supra) authorized an appointment for a fixed term; second, the rules (rule 91, supra) permitted a reappointment for three years; and, third, that he was reappointed for a three-year term, and consequently could not be molested (except for some delinquency, which is not the case here) until his term expired, relying on Bradshaw v. Camden, 39 N. J. Law, 416, and Bohan v. Weehawken Tp., 65 N. J. Law, 490, 47 A. 446. We do not think that the doctrine laid down in these and other cases of like import is controlling or even pertinent here. The former case concerned the make-up of the fire department of the city of Camden; the latter the creation of a police department of the township of Weehawken. In these cases the legislation in question granted the right of...