Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Chaplin, (2006)

• Court: Skokomish Tribal Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Per curiam.
• Decision Date: 16 November 2006
• Docket Number: SKO-CI-3-06-071
• Citation: Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Chaplin (Skokomish Tribal Ct. of App. 2006)
• Parties: SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, v. CHERYL ANN CHAPLIN, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, v. CHERYL ANN CHAPLIN, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

No. SKO-CI-3-06-071

Skokomish Tribal Court Of Appeals

November 16, 2006

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Trial court found that the non-Indian spouse of a tribal member had engaged in behavior that constituted a criminal offense and therefore granted the Tribal Prosecutor's petition to exclude the non-Indian from the reservation. Court of Appeals ruled that all of the evidence demonstrated that the non-Indian spouse had been the victim of criminal activity, rather than the perpetrator; and that the Tribal Prosecutor and the trial judge committed numerous procedural errors in violation of the exclusion ordinance and court rules that denied the non-Indian spouse due process. Trial court order reversed.

Appearances: Cheryl Ann Chaplin, pro se; Marilou Rickert, for the Skokomish Indian Tribe.

Before: Michelle Demmert, Chief Justice; Greg Iverson Justice; Darwin Long Fox, Justice.

OPINION

Per curiam.

I. INTRODUCTION

There is no question that Indian tribes have the sovereign authority to exclude nonmembers from their reservations. At the same time, most tribes understand that exercising this authority arbitrarily or in violation of established procedures creates a climate that discourages the investment of time, energy and financial resources in the tribe and the reservation by the tribe's business partners, tribal tenants, the non-member spouses and parents of tribal members, and other non-members who count on stability and the rule of law in making decisions whether or not to invest their time, energy and resources in the tribe and its members. For these reasons, the Skokomish Tribal Council adopted a Civil Exclusion and Removal Ordinance that sets forth in great detail the grounds for exclusion and the procedure for exclusion of a non-member. See Chapter 3.05 Skokomish Tribal Code, §§ 3.05.006 and 007. The Ordinance protects the rights of non-members, and protects the Tribe's and its members' relations with non-members, by specifying the fifteen acts which constitute grounds for exclusion. STC § 3.05.006.

In the case of the Appellant, Cheryl Ann Chaplin, the procedures specified in the Exclusion Ordinance were not followed and the record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that the Appellant committed any of the fifteen acts listed in the code as grounds for exclusion. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court excluding the Appellant, Cheryl Anne Chaplin, from the Skokomish Indian Reservation for the reasons specified below.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Cheryl Chaplin, a non-member of the Skokomish Tribe, was married to Richard Giles, an enrolled member of the Tribe. It appears from the record that Ms. Chaplin and Mr. Giles are divorced, but that Ms. Chaplin has continued to live with Mr. Giles and their two children on the Skokomish Indian Reservation. Joan Pell, an enrolled member of the Tribe, is Mr. Giles' mother. On September 19, 2005, Ms. Pell filed a one page handwritten complaint with the Tribal Council alleging that Ms. Chaplin had "knocked her around;" stolen about two thousand dollars worth of Pell's belongings, including money, guns and jewelry; that Chaplin's actions were the reason for numerous police calls to the Chaplin-Giles residence; and that Chaplin is "in drugs." Pell appears to have followed up the written complaint with a telephone request to Council staff that she "would like her [Chaplin] kicked off the rez."

Based on Ms. Pell's allegations, without hearing from Ms. Chaplin, and without making any findings of its own as to whether the allegations were true, on November 30, 2005, the Tribal Council authorized the Tribal Attorney to take any and all actions necessary to protect all members of the tribal community, including, but not limited to, filing a complaint for exclusion. While the Council authorized the Tribal Attorney to file a complaint for exclusion, the Council did not direct the Tribal Attorney to do so, nor did the Council authorize a complaint to be filed in the name of the Council.

On March 29, 2006, the Tribal Attorney filed a Petition for Exclusion of a Non-Indian and a proposed Order of Exclusion with the Tribal Court.

Following a Notice of Show Cause Hearing, Mr. Giles (Ms. Chaplin's husband/partner) filed a letter with the Tribal Court stating that to his knowledge, Ms. Chaplin had never stolen from or harmed his mother, Ms. Pell, in any way. Mr. Giles' letter stated further that his mother had continuously meddled in Giles' and Chaplin's marital affairs. Ms. Chaplin also filed a letter with the Court denying all of Ms. Pell's allegations.

A hearing on the merits was held on May 25, 2006. Although the Pell complaint and the Tribal Attorney's proposed Order of Exclusion alleged that Ms. Chaplin had committed theft and assault against Ms. Pell, no evidence was presented on these allegations. Instead, the evidence presented at the hearing by the Tribal Attorney was limited to reports of domestic violence involving Ms. Chaplin and Mr. Giles in which Ms. Chaplin was the recognized victim. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge issued an oral decision granting the Petition for Exclusion. The judge expressed her concern that if Ms. Chaplin remained on the reservation, tribal police would have to continue to respond to reports of domestic violence at the Chaplin– Giles residence. The judge stated on the record "You (Chaplin) have engaged in repeated behavior that constitutes a criminal offense under the Skokomish Criminal Code." On the same day, the trial judge signed and entered the Tribal Attorney's proposed Order of Exclusion, which essentially mirrored the allegations in the petition, i.e., that the grounds for exclusion are that Ms. Chaplin assaulted and stole from Ms. Pell, conduct which constitutes Class B and Class C offenses under the Tribal Code, despite there being no evidence presented to support such findings.

Ms. Chaplin filed a Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2006. The Court of Appeals heard oral argument from both parties on September 26, 2006. Neither party availed itself of the opportunity offered by this Court to file written briefs.

III. JURISDICTION

The Tribal Court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Petition for Exclusion pursuant to STC § 3.05.003 ("The provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to all persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe to the fullest extent authorized by federal law") and STC § 3.05.005(a) and (c). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to STC § 3.05.007(g) ("Final Orders may be appealed to the Skokomish Tribal Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure").

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The Skokomish Tribal Code is silent regarding the standard for appellate court review of a trial court decision. In the absence of any specified standard of review, we review issues of fact under the 'clearly erroneous' standard and issues of law de novo." Johns and McGhee v. Allen, No. SKO CV 06/03-171, at 1 (Skokomish Tribal Ct.App. Oct. 22, 2004) (6 NICS App. 196).

V. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Notice of Appeal filed by Ms. Chaplin, appearing pro se, claims the trial court committed procedural error ("I was band [sic] for something else, and not the reason I was brought to court") and factual error ("I did not do what I was accused of and that is wrong").

The Skokomish Tribal Code provides that "[t]he rules of procedure for the Skokomish Tribal Court shall be liberally interpreted and applied to achieve the following purposes: revealing the truth, treating all parties fairly and without prejudice, protecting individual rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act and the Skokomish tribal constitution, resolving disputes efficiently." STC § 3.01.012(b).

In more formal legal terms, the issues raised by this appeal can thus be stated as:

(1) Were the procedures for exclusion of a nonmember set forth at STC § 3.05.007 followed?

(2) Did the lower court violate Appellant's due process rights by allowing evidence beyond the scope of the petition?

(3) Were grounds for exclusion under STC § 3.05.006 established by sufficient evidence?

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Improper Procedure

The Exclusion Ordinance requires that specific procedures be followed for the Tribal Council's review and again requires specific requirements for the Tribal Court's review. These procedures were not followed as will be detailed below.

1. The Complaint

The procedure to exclude non-members requires a "complaint for exclusion" on a "form" provided by the "tribal manager" and that it is to be "signed" by the complaining witness and "delivered" to the Secretary of the Tribal Council. STC. 3.05.007(a)(1) (emphases added). Because the Ordinance requires that the complaint must be "signed" and "delivered," it clearly must be in writing. If the Tribal Council determines that cause "may exist" for exclusion, the Council may then authorize the Tribal Prosecutor to file the complaint in the Tribal Court along with a petition for exclusion. STC § 3.05.007(a)(4). Following notice from the Tribal Court to the non-member named in the complaint, which must include service of the complaint, the petition for exclusion and the resolution authorizing initiation of exclusion proceedings, a hearing is then held before the Court. STC § 3.05.007(b) and (c). "Except as specifically provided [in the Ordinance], the Rules of Civil Procedure of the Tribal Court shall apply to an exclusion hearing." STC § 3.05.007(c)(1). Exclusion proceedings are civil in nature, thus Civil Rule 51 requires the filing of "a written complaint which describes the injury or breach at issue, names or...