Skouteris v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., W2013–01254–SC–R3–BP.

• Citation: 430 S.W.3d 359
• Decision Date: 21 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. W2013–01254–SC–R3–BP.,W2013–01254–SC–R3–BP.
• Parties: George Ernest SKOUTERIS, Jr. v. BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF the SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

430 S.W.3d 359

George Ernest SKOUTERIS, Jr.

v.BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF the SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE.

No. W2013–01254–SC–R3–BP.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Jackson.

Nov. 6, 2013 Session.

Feb. 21, 2014.

Robert L. Green, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, George Ernest Skouteris, Jr.

Krisann Hodges, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

SHARON G. LEE, Justice.

This is a direct appeal of an attorney disciplinary proceeding involving six complaints of professional misconduct. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel's decision that the attorney had violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct and should be disbarred from the practice of law. After review of the evidence presented and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

George Ernest Skouteris, Jr. was licensed to practice law in Tennessee in 1988. In the years 1997, 2000, and 2003, Mr. Skouteris was disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility (“the Board”). On July 18, 1997, Mr. Skouteris received an informal admonition for withholding money from two clients' settlement proceeds for payment of their medical bills, issuing worthless checks to the medical providers, and being dilatory in making payment to the medical providers until a complaint was filed with the Board. On July 10, 2000, Mr. Skouteris was publicly censured for withholding funds from clients' settlement proceeds for payment to medical providers, failing to pay the medical providers, and failing to maintain the clients' settlement proceeds in his trust account. He was ordered to attend a Board ethics workshop; to complete six additional hours of continuing legal education in ethics for the year 2000; to make himself available to speak at three seminars to explain how he mismanaged his trust account; to have his trust account monitored for the year 2000; and to submit quarterly reports to disciplinary counsel during that period. On November 21, 2003, Mr. Skouteris received an informal admonition when he misstated the date of a client's injury on a civil warrant that was not timely filed, failed to disclose his neglect to his client, and failed to withdraw from the case when he was no longer providing legal services to the client.

This appeal arises from three Petitions for Discipline filed against Mr. Skouteris alleging six complaints of misconduct occurring from 2007 to 2011. The Board's first Petition, filed on August 26, 2010, alleged misconduct arising from Mr. Skouteris's representation of Tiffany Pruett, Valerie Cox, Gary Crawford, and Jacqueline Baker. The second Petition, filed on April 6, 2011, alleged misconduct by Mr. Skouteris arising from his representation of Danzel Davis. On January 23, 2012, a third Petition was filed alleging misconduct arising from Mr. Skouteris's representation of Justin Levick.

On March 28, 2012, a hearing panel (“the Panel”) appointed by the Board pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 8.2 heard evidence on the petitions.¹ On May 23, 2012, the Panel issued its judgment finding that Mr. Skouteris should be disbarred for violating Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.5(c), 1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). The Panel also concluded that as a condition precedent to any subsequent reinstatement to the practice of law, Mr. Skouteris should be required to make restitution to Ms. Pruett and Ms. Cox.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, Mr. Skouteris appealed the Panel's decision to the Shelby County Chancery Court (the “Trial Court”). On February 4, 2013, the Trial Court conducted a trial on the transcript and the record of the Panel proceedings. On March 6, 2013, the Trial Court issued its Memorandum Opinion affirming the Panel's findings and recommendations. Mr. Skouteris appeals the decision of the Trial Court.

II.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee is the source of authority of the Board of Professional Responsibility and all its functions. Brown v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 29 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tenn.2000). As a part of our duty to regulate the practice of law in Tennessee, we bear ultimate responsibility for enforcing the rules governing our profession. Doe v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d 465, 469–70 (Tenn.2003). We review judgments under our “inherent power and essential and fundamental right to administer the rules pertaining to the licensing of attorneys.” Hughes v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 259 S.W.3d 631, 640 (Tenn.2008) (citing In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Tenn.1995)).

When reviewing a hearing panel's judgment, a trial court must consider the transcript of the evidence before the hearing panel and its findings and judgment. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 1.3. On questions of fact, the trial court does not substitute its judgment for that of the hearing panel as to the weight of the evidence. See Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Allison, 284 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tenn.2009). Any modification to a hearing panel's decision must be based on one of the enumerated factors included in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3. See Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Love, 256 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tenn.2008). Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3 provides that a trial court:

may reverse or modify the [hearing panel's] decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the [hearing] panel's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the panel's jurisdiction; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5) unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.

Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 9, § 1.3.

Our standard of review on appeal is the same as that of the trial court. Hoover v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 395 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tenn.2012).

III.

We begin our review with a summary of the evidence presented to the Panel and reviewed by the Trial Court.

A. Pruett Case

In October 2005, Tiffany Pruett was seriously injured in an automobile accident. Mr. Skouteris visited Ms. Pruett in the hospital. After Ms. Pruett was released from the hospital, she agreed for Mr. Skouteris, who had previously handled some minor legal matters for her, to represent her in her claim for damages. According to Ms. Pruett, Mr. Skouteris agreed to represent her at no charge because he was concerned for her and her son. Mr. Skouteris, however, testified that Ms. Pruett orally agreed to pay him a one-third contingency fee. Mr. Skouteris admitted that there was no written contingency fee agreement.

In March 2007, Mr. Skouteris settled Ms. Pruett's claim for $197,480. On April 16, 2007, Mr. Skouteris deposited Ms. Pruett's settlement check in his trust account. According to Ms. Pruett, Mr. Skouteris did not tell her about the settlement until several months later and did not provide her with any settlement documents. When Mr. Skouteris advised her of the settlement, he told her he would pay her medical bills and send her the remaining settlement funds. In June 2007, instead of disbursing the remaining balance of the settlement to Ms. Pruett, Mr. Skouteris began depositing payments in small amounts—such as $1000 or $2500—into Ms. Pruett's bank account on an irregular basis. Mr. Skouteris testified that Ms. Pruett requested this method of distribution. Ms. Pruett, however, testified that she never agreed to accept periodic disbursements, was strapped for money, and repeatedly requested that the entire balance be sent to her.

Mr. Skouteris did not maintain Ms. Pruett's funds in his trust account. The ending balance in Mr. Skouteris's trust account for the time period spanning April 13, 2007, through May 14, 2007, was $204,662.28, which included Ms. Pruett's $197,480 settlement deposit. The ending balance of Mr. Skouteris's trust account on June 14, 2007, was less than $197,480, even though Mr. Skouteris had not disbursed any of Ms. Pruett's settlement proceeds. In the following months, the balance in Mr. Skouteris's trust account declined even further below the total amount of Ms. Pruett's settlement proceeds. Mr. Skouteris admitted that as of June 13, 2008, he did not have sufficient funds in his trust account to cover his obligations to Ms. Pruett. Two of the payments that Mr. Skouteris made to Ms. Pruett were drawn on Mr. Skouteris's personal checking account, rather than his trust account. Mr. Skouteris continued disbursing Ms. Pruett's settlement proceeds to her in small increments from July 2007 to August 2008.

As of June 2008, no disbursements had been made from Ms. Pruett's settlement proceeds other than the payment of one of her medical bills in November 2007 and the periodic deposits into her bank account. Mr. Skouteris testified that he was holding approximately $80,000 in his trust account in order to ensure payment for a hospital lien, yet the balance in his trust account was not sufficient to pay the hospital lien. Ms. Pruett testified that Mr. Skouteris told her on several occasions that all of her other medical bills had been paid. Ms. Pruett discovered that her medical bills had not been paid when she applied for a student loan and learned that her credit rating had been adversely affected by Mr. Skouteris's failure to pay her medical providers.

Ms. Pruett testified that she had repeatedly asked Mr. Skouteris to send her proof of the payments that he had allegedly made to her medical providers, but he did not do so. In July 2008, Ms. Pruett became frustrated with Mr. Skouteris's lack of...