Skovronski v. Genovese

• Decision Date: 30 June 1938
• Citation: Skovronski v. Genovese, 124 Conn. 482, 200 A. 575 (Conn. 1938)
• Parties: SKOVRONSKI v. GENOVESE.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

200 A. 575

124 Conn. 482

SKOVRONSKI v. GENOVESE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 30, 1938

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Edward J. Daly, Judge.

Action by John Skovronski against Mickinley Genovese for injuries sustained by plaintiff when struck by defendant's automobile, brought to the superior court and tried to the court.From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.

No error.

Thomas F. McDonough, of New Britain, for appellant.

Cyril F. Gaffney, of New Britain, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

The only issue pursued concerns the conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence which was a proximate cause of his injuries.The following are the facts found which are relevant thereto with such additions as the defendant is entitled to.Broad Street in New Britain runs east and west and Grove Street intersects it at approximately right angles.The plaintiff, at about 8:20 p. m. on November 22d, 1936, after walking northerly along the westerly side of Grove Street, was crossing Broad Street upon the westerly crosswalk and had reached a point thereon ten feet from the northerly curb when he was struck by the defendant's automobile traveling westerly on that street and was seriously injured.Broad Street was forty-five feet in width including gutters two and one-half feet wide on each side.There was an unobstructed view of that street for a distance of more than a quarter of a mile easterly from the intersection.Upon reaching the intersection the plaintiff looked to the west and the east and upon stepping from the curb looked again in both directions, did not see any automobiles approaching from any direction, and proceeded to cross without looking again to observe traffic conditions and did not see the defendant's car before it struck him.There was no other traffic at the intersection at the time.The defendant was driving at a speed greater than twenty-five miles per hour, did not slow down on approaching or passing through the intersection, gave no warning of his approach and his car continued on for forty feet after striking the plaintiff.It is not now questioned that the conclusion that the defendant was negligent was warranted.

Specifically the defendant's claim is that because the plaintiff, after looking in both directions upon leaving the curb, did not again look for approaching traffic while proceeding across the street, he is to be adjudged guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.Whether he was negligent depends upon whether he exercised reasonable care under all the circumstances of the case.Russell v. Vergason,95 Conn. 431, 436, 111 A. 625.Ordinarily a conclusion of negligence or of freedom from it is one of fact.The reason is that ‘ the law itself furnishes no certain, specific, sufficient standard of conduct, and, of necessity, leaves the trier to determine, both what the conduct is, and whether it comes up to the standard, as such standard exists in the mind of the trier.* * * In every such case, the trier, for the time being, adopts his own opinion, limited only by the general rule of what the man of ordinary prudence would or would not do, under the circumstances, and makes such opinion the measure or standard...