Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., CIV. A. 98-61-MPT.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Delaware)
Citation119 F.Supp.2d 444
Docket NumberNo. CIV. A. 98-61-MPT.,CIV. A. 98-61-MPT.
PartiesOrrin T. SKRETVEDT, Plaintiff, v. E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, Plan Administrator; Pension and Retirement Plan; Hospital and Medical-Surgical Plan; Dental Assistance Plan; Non Contributory Group Life Insurance Plan; Contributory Group Life Insurance Plan; Total and Permanent Disability Income Plan; Savings and Investment Plan; Tax Reform Act Stock Ownership Plan; and Short Term Disability Plan Defendants.
Decision Date06 September 2000
119 F.Supp.2d 444
Orrin T. SKRETVEDT, Plaintiff,
v.
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, Plan Administrator; Pension and Retirement Plan; Hospital and Medical-Surgical Plan; Dental Assistance Plan; Non Contributory Group Life Insurance Plan; Contributory Group Life Insurance Plan; Total and Permanent Disability Income Plan; Savings and Investment Plan; Tax Reform Act Stock Ownership Plan; and Short Term Disability Plan Defendants.
No. CIV. A. 98-61-MPT.
United States District Court, D. Delaware.
September 6, 2000.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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John M. Stull, Wilmington, DE, for plaintiff.

Gretchen Ann Bender, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams LLP, Wilmington, DE, Evelyn H. Brantley, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington, DE, for defendant.

OPINION

THYNGE, United States Magistrate Judge.


Plaintiff, Orrin T. Skretvedt brought this claim pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., in an attempt to recover long term disability benefits allegedly due him under defendants' disability plans. Before this court are plaintiff's motion to amend complaint and cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons expressed below, plaintiff's motion to amend and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment are DENIED, and defendants', E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company ("DuPont"); E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company, Plan Administrator, Pension and Retirement Plan; Hospital and Medical-Surgical Plan; Dental Assistance Plan; Noncontributory Group Life Insurance Plan; Contributory Group Life Insurance Plan; Total and Permanent Disability Income Plan; Savings and Investment Plan; Tax Reform Act Stock Ownership Plan; and Short Term Disability Plan, motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

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I. Facts

a. Background

Orrin Skretvedt was employed as a Senior Research Environmental Engineer with DuPont at its Richmond Spruance Plant site, from June 28, 1974 until his termination on February 7, 1995.

In November 1994, plaintiff began receiving treatment from Dr. Harold Binhammer for job related anxiety and stress. This period of treatment also marked a three month absence from work for plaintiff.1 During this period, plaintiff also saw Dr. James Layton, Medical Supervisor at the DuPont Spruance Plant, who treated plaintiff with Paxil and referred him to Dr. Graenum Schiff. Dr. Schiff, in turn, referred plaintiff to Dr. Theresa Buczek, a clinical psychologist, specializing in stress related job disorders.

In December 1994, Dr. Layton sent "Physician's Report `B'" forms to Drs. Buczek, Binhammer and Schiff for their contributions to a medical report being prepared by DuPont to determine whether plaintiff's condition was temporary or permanent, and thus, whether plaintiff would qualify for permanent medical disability benefits.

On February 7, 1995, plaintiff was terminated from DuPont charged with having committed an act of serious misconduct.2 On February 10, 1995, plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging discrimination based upon disability pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). On June 25, 1995, the EEOC determined that it was unable to find a violation of the ADA based upon the information submitted. As plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, the EEOC granted plaintiff the right to sue.

In September 1995, plaintiff contacted an attorney regarding obtaining disability benefits from DuPont. On September 29, a "Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims" was entered into between plaintiff and defendants. The agreement allowed plaintiff to apply for disability benefits with DuPont, and DuPont assured that plaintiff's application and medical information would be received and reviewed in a neutral manner.3

Following a review of plaintiff's medical information,4 the DuPont Board of Benefits and Pensions ("Board"), the body responsible for the review and determination

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of disability claims for DuPont employees,5 determined that plaintiff was not "permanently incapable of performing the duties of his job with the degree of efficiency required by the Company, at the time of his termination."6 (D.I. 102 at A-237) Thus, plaintiff's application for an Incapability Pension and benefits pursuant to DuPont's Total and Permanent Disability Income Plan was denied on May 23, 1996.

On June 28, 1996, plaintiff sent a written appeal to Claude Edmonds, the Board's designated contact for submission of appeals. Plaintiff's appeal letter sought "clarification" on the types of objective medical evidence ("OME")7 he needed to perfect his appeal.8 Despite subsequent letters to DuPont, plaintiff did not receive additional clarification, and thereafter formally submitted his appeal to the Board on May 16, 1997. On September 19, approximately 120 days after filing his appeal, plaintiff sent a letter to DuPont inquiring as to the status of his appeal. He received no immediate response to his inquiry. In early February 1998, plaintiff contacted a lawyer and began the process for litigating the instant matter.

On February 4, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint against DuPont alleging an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits and bad faith and conflict of interest in the evaluation of his application for benefits and in his termination. On June 23, DuPont, after having considered the issues raised in plaintiff's lawsuit, agreed to consider plaintiff's appeal for disability benefits. On August 31, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, Judge Sue Robinson ordered a stay of the instant proceedings and ordered that only the appeal or "final decision" of the Board would be subject to judicial review. Finally, on October 13, 1998, the DuPont Board of Benefits and Pensions denied Skretvedt's final appeal for disability benefits.

b. The Pension & Disability Benefit Plans

DuPont offers two types of long term disability benefits for its employees: (1) an "Incapability" Pension; and (2) "Total and Permanent" Disability Income Plan. The

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incapability benefits are part of the DuPont "Pension and Retirement Plan" ("P & I Plan"). The incapability portion of the P & I Plan provides benefits to employees who have 15 years of continuous employment with the company, and who have become "incapable" of performing their jobs with the "degree of efficiency" required by DuPont.

"Total and Permanent" disability benefits come from DuPont's Total and Permanent Disability Plan ("T & P Plan") which requires that an employee be totally and permanently incapable of working; that is, one "totally disabled by injury or disease and presumably will be totally and permanently prevented from doing any work." (D.I. 102 at A-82.)

Therefore, in order to receive any long term disability benefits, claimants must show that they are incapable of working at their position at DuPont (P & I Plan) or in any position (T & P Plan), and that the incapability was present at the time of termination. (D.I. 101 at 3.) In addition, there are two stages to any long term benefits eligibility determination. Initially, DuPont decides whether an employee is eligible for incapability benefits, characterized by DuPont as the "lower disability standard." Then, if this threshold is met, the Board will determine the employee's eligibility for total and permanent disability benefits. (D.I. 101 at 4.)

II. Law

a. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over this matter is exercised pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

b. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and "[f]acts that could alter the outcome are `material' and disputes are `genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct." Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 302 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Thus, on any motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383 n. 2 (3d Cir.1998).

If an adequately supported motion for summary judgment has been made, "the adverse party `must [have] set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), thus, compelling the nonmovant to "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, at 586 (citation omitted). Thereafter, if the non-movant cannot satisfy his burden, the movant is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. Discussion

a. Standard of Review Under ERISA

In the seminal case of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court recognized de novo review as the standard for evaluating the propriety of a benefit determination under ERISA, unless a "benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan," in which case the administrative decision will be evaluated based on whether it was an "arbitrary

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and capricious" determination. 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). Thus, where discretionary authority is given, "the administrator's...

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4 cases
  • Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • June 16, 2004
    ...manner]" and that "a genuine issue does not exist as to the propriety of the Board's action...." Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 119 F.Supp.2d 444, 453-55 (D.Del.2000). Skretvedt appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DuPont and the denial of summary judgment in his f......
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    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of New Jersey
    • November 9, 2007
    ...as a complaint which, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, 119 F.Supp.2d 444, 457 (D.Del.2000); see also, In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 137, 153 (3d Cir.2004) (stating that leave to amend wil......
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    ...Davies v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 2001 WL 681321, at *8 (M.D.Pa. June 13, 2001) (same). See also Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 119 F.Supp.2d 444, 451 (D.Del.2000) (implying that an employer-administered plan should only be accorded the ordinary Firestone arbitrary and capric......
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    ...75 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (internal citations omitted) 12. Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) 13. Skretvedt v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, 119 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457 (D. Del. 2000); In re Fleming Cos., Inc., 347 B.R. 163, 167-68 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) ("Futility of amendment exists whe......

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