Skrodzki v. Sherman State Bank
| Decision Date | 08 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 20876.,20876. |
| Citation | 181 N.E. 325,348 Ill. 403 |
| Parties | SKRODZKI v. SHERMAN STATE BANK. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by Konstanty Skrodzki against the Sherman State Bank. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate Court for the First District (261 Ill. App. 16), and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.Appeal from First Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; George Fred Rush, Judge.
James Percival Pio, of Chicago, for appellant.
Joseph F. Elward, of Chicago (Philip Conley, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
This cause is here on an appeal granted by the Appellate Court for the First District to review its judgment (261 Ill. App. 16) reversing a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county in favor of appellant. The action is one in fraud and deceit against appellee, in which it is charged that it sold appellant gold mortgage bonds of the face value of $800, representing to appellant that the bonds were secured by a first mortgage on real estate, whereas, as a matter of fact, the bonds constituted a second lien on such real estate; there being a first mortgage of $28,000 on the property at the time of the issuance of the bonds sold to appellant. The declaration alleges foreclosure of the first mortgage, and that after the payment thereof the bonds constituting a second lien were practically worthless. The trial was on the second count of the amended declaration. It charges that the Polonia Soap Company, an Illinois corporation, on July 25, 1921, executed its trust deed conveying certain real estate in Cook county to secure the payment of a bond issue of that company in the sum of $250,000, and that the bonds stated on their face that they were a first lien on the real estate. On July 15, 1922, appellant, who was a depositor in the appellee bank, purchased bonds of this issue of the face value of $600, and thereafter, on August 10, 1922, other bonds of the face value of $200, paying face value therefor. The declaration alleges that appellant was induced to purchase these bonds on the representation of appellee that they were secured by a first mortgage on real estate, which representation appellee knew was false and knew that the trust deed securing the bonds was junior to another mortgage on the same property, and that by reason of these false and fraudulent representations of appellee the sum so paid to the bank became wholly lost to appellant. Appellee filed pleas of the general issue and special pleas alleging that the sales charged in the declaration to have been made were ultra vires the corporation, and also pleaded the statute of limitations, requiring such actions to be brought within five years. To the latter plea appellant filed a replication, averring that appellee fraudulently concealed from appellant the fraud constituting his cause of action until within less than five years before the commencement of the suit; that on January 25 and July 25 in each year until January 25, 1925, appellee paid or caused to be paid the interest due on the bonds, though it knew that the bonds were not secured by a first mortgage on the real estate; and that appellant did not learn until about the last-mentioned date that the bonds were a junior lien on the real estate. The cause went to trial on these issues.
The facts proved on the trial were in accordance with the allegations of the declaration. From the evidence it appears that one Bruno Kowelewski was president of both the soap company and the appellee bank. Appellant had money on deposit with appellee and approached the cashier of the bank and inquired about the purchase of bonds, and this officer replied that it had the soap company bonds and stated that they were secured by a first mortgage and were as good as gold. Appellant thereupon withdrew his money from his savings account and purchased these bonds at their face value, receiving a receipt of the bank therefor, and, as stated in his declaration, received from appellee interest payments until January, 1925. It also appears that appellant was made party defendant to the foreclosure of the first mortgage and appeared before the master in chancery and made proof of these bonds, and after sale of the property received the sum of $13 as his proportionate share of the proceeds after payment of the first mortgage.
At the close of all the evidence appellee moved for a directed verdict in its favor. This motion was overruled and the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant for the sum of $1,047. Appellant entered a remittitur in the sum of $41.16, and judgment was entered for $1,006.84.
On appeal the Appellate Court held that appellee had failed to sustain the burden cast upon it to show that the sale of the bonds was ultra vires the corporation, but also held that appellant had not maintained the burden cast upon him to prove his replication to appellee's plea of the running of the statute of limitations, and also that the judgment was excessive. Concerning the plea of the statute of limitations the Appellate Court held there was no proof of fraudulent concealment, as required by section 22 of the Statute of Limitations (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 83, § 23), and the fact that appellee paid interest coupons to appellant as they became due did not constitute a fraudulent concealment of appellant's cause of action within the meaning of that statute. The judgment of the Appellate Court first entered remanded the cause to the circuit court of Cook county. On request of both parties the judgment was on rehearing amended, striking out the remanding order, and a judgment was entered reversing the judgment of the circuit court without remanding and granting an appeal to this court.
The first question arises on the plea of the statute of limitations and replication thereto. Section 22 of that statute provides: ‘If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of...
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Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp.
...person entitled to bring the same discovers that he has such cause of action, and not afterwards.'34 See Skrodzki v. Sherman State Bank, 348 Ill. 403, 407, 181 N.E. 325, 327 (1932); Sabath v. Morris Handler Co., 102 Ill.App.2d 218, 229-230, 243 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1968).35 Tartar v. Maxon Cons......
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Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc.
...requires affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent discovery of the cause of action. (Skrodzki v. Sherman State Bank (1932), 348 Ill. 403, 407, 181 N.E. 325); Lancaster v. Springer (1909), 239 Ill. 472, 482, 88 N.E. 272; Bush v. Continental Casualty Co. (1969), 116 Ill.App.2d ......
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Melko v. Dionisio
...is available, a plaintiff must take heed of it even though the defendant makes representations to the contrary. Skrodzki v. Sherman State Bank (1932), 348 Ill. 403, 181 N.E. 325; Gadsby v. Health Insurance Administration, Inc. (1988), 168 Ill.App.3d 460, 473, 119 Ill.Dec. 203, 522 N.E.2d 86......
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Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp.
...Bank, 300 Ill.App. 435, 448, 21 N.E.2d 157, later decisions of the court repudiate this extreme view. Thus, in Skrodzki v. Sherman State Bank, 348 Ill. 403, 181 N.E. 325, 327, the court stated that "the rule that the statute begins to run only from the discovery of the fraud does not apply ......