Skrzat v. Ford Motor Company

• Decision Date: 04 February 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 74-212.
• Citation: 389 F. Supp. 753
• Parties: Joseph SKRZAT v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Menard Ford Sales, Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

389 F. Supp. 753

Joseph SKRZAT v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Menard Ford Sales, Inc.

Civ. A. No. 74-212.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 4, 1975.

Joseph A. Kelly, Providence, R. I., for plaintiff.

Francis V. Reynolds, Paul V. Reynolds, Providence, R. I., for Ford Motor Company.

OPINION

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

This action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident is before the Court on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion raises the question whether, under Rhode Island law,¹ the plaintiff may assert a plea of collateral estoppel by former judgment against the defendant when mutuality of estoppel is absent and when plaintiff was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the earlier litigation.

On November 11, 1970, the plaintiff and Gerald P. Turcotte were passengers in a 1970 Maverick.² The car was traveling on the Massachusetts Turnpike when it was "rear-ended" by another vehicle. A fire broke out, engulfing the Maverick in flames and burning the plaintiff and Turcotte.

As a result of his injuries, Turcotte died. In an action for wrongful death against Ford Motor Company, C.A. No. 73-1251, tried before this Court and a jury in 1973, defendant Ford Motor Company was found liable for the death of Turcotte because of a defect in the design of the Maverick's gas tank. On appeal the judgment was reversed and remanded on the issue of damages and affirmed on the issue of liability. Turcotte v, Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).

This plaintiff, a passenger in the same vehicle who sustained injuries arising out of the same accident, argues that the decision in Turcotte v. Ford Motor Company should estop the defendant Ford from relitigating the issue of its liability for this accident.

Since the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has not definitively set down the standards for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel,

". . . it is our duty, as we see it, to decide the case as we believe it would be decided by the highest court of Rhode Island, taking into account not merely the generalizations and the dicta in cases from years past but also trends in modern legal thought which we think would be accepted by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island today." Graves v. Associated Transport Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir. 1965).

In Hill v. Bain, 15 R.I. 75, 76, 23 A. 44, (1885), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and stated:

"Undoubtedly the rule, as generally laid down, is that judgments avail as estoppels only for or against parties and privies; but, nevertheless, the courts allow themselves a good deal of latitude in applying the rule, observing the spirit of it rather than the letter."

Employing the "spirit" of the rule of collateral estoppel, the court allowed a plea of estoppel by a defendant who was neither a party nor in privity with a party in the earlier action by the same plaintiff because

". . . the defendants, though not parties to the judgments, were so connected in interest or liability with the parties that the judgments when recovered could be regarded as virtually recovered from them, for the purposes of estoppel, as well as by and for the parties of record."³ Id. at 77, 23 A. 45.

Since the defendant in Hill v. Bain, supra, was neither a party to the former suit nor in privity with such party, the defendant would not have been bound had the earlier case been decided adverse to his interests. Thus, the estoppel was not mutual. See generally, 1B Moore, Federal Practice, Par. 0.412 1 at 1801 (2nd ed. 1974); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127, 32 S.Ct. 641, 56 L.Ed. 1009 (1912).

The Hill reasoning was recently followed in Harding v. Carr, 79 R.I. 32, 41, 83 A.2d 79, 83 (1951).⁴ There the Supreme Court allowed the defendant to rely upon a judgment obtained by his insurer against the same plaintiff and upheld a defense of collateral estoppel. Once again, the defendant was not a party nor in "actual" privity with the insurer in the earlier action⁵ and the estoppel was not mutual.

Subsequently, in Zuckerman v. Tatarian, 110 R.I. 190, 291 A.2d 421 (1972)⁶ the Rhode Island Supreme Court was asked to rule on the question whether Harding v. Carr abrogated the requirements of mutuality and privity. In that case the defendant argued that Harding reversed the general principle of Brierly v. Union R. R., 26 R.I. 119, 120, 58 A. 451, 452 (1904), which held that privity was a necessary condition for a plea of collateral estoppel. Zuckerman v. Tatarian, supra, 110 R.I. at 193-194, 291 A.2d at 424. Thus, although defendant was neither a party nor in privity with any party in the earlier litigation, it was argued he should be allowed to plead estoppel.

The Supreme Court held:

"It is our opinion, then, that little consequence attaches to whether Harding was intended to overrule Brierly in whole or in part. Predicated upon our analysis of the decision in Harding, we now hold that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applicable to bar a derivative suit when in a prior action on the claim from which the later claim derives a court of competent jurisdiction had made a determination of an ultimate and decisive issue and the court is satisfied that in the prior action the rights and interests of the parties sought to be bound by the estoppel in the subsequent litigation were substantially and properly protected."

Zuckerman v. Tatarian, supra 110 R.I. at 195-196, 291 A.2d at 425.

Thus, the court decided only the narrow issue of whether to allow collateral estoppel in a derivative action and not the broader question of whether Harding eliminated the requirement of mutuality and privity entirely.

It is important to note that the Zuckerman decision effectively overruled Brierly because in both Brierly and Zuckerman the claims were derivative. Moreover, the court in Zuckerman at no time limited the Harding decision to derivative suits but merely relied on the Harding rationale to reach its decision.

In Harding the Supreme Court stated:

"At any rate the true reason for this type of res adjudicata is said to be based not so much upon the existence of mutuality and privity in the strict sense as upon the policy of the law to end litigation in a proper case. Under that view a plaintiff who has sought and obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction a determination of an ultimate and decisive fact on the merits is not permitted to again present such fact for litigation in another action wherein the interest and liability of the parties are so necessarily connected and dependent as to require that they be treated virtually the same as the parties to the former action. In our judgment the justice of that reasoning would support the application of the principle in the circumstances of the instant case even if we were to assume that the actions under consideration are different."

Harding v. Carr, supra, 79 R.I. at 41, 83 A.2d at 83.

This alternative basis for decision, predicated upon the policy favoring an end to litigation rather than on the rules of mutuality and privity, is essentially identical to the analysis used in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), the leading case abrogating the doctrine of mutuality and privity.⁷

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are judicial in origin, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948), as is the requirement of mutuality of estoppel. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). When a conflict arises between the doctrine of mutuality and the policy behind res judicata and collateral estoppel against endless litigation, the modern trend of decisional law indiates that the requirements of sound public policy should prevail over the mechanical application of the requirements of mutuality and privity. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assn., supra. See also, B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 146-148, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195, 197-198 (1967) (the court characterizes the "doctrine of mutuality" as a "dead letter".); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421-422 (3rd Cir. 1950) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865, 71 S.Ct. 87, 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950). See generally Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, supra, 402 U.S. at 322 fn. 9, 91 S.Ct. 1434 and 326 fn. 14, 91 S.Ct. 1434 (collecting state cases); and at 325 fn. 13, 91 S.Ct. 1434 (collecting federal cases).

This Court is persuaded by the inherent wisdom in the modern trend abrogating the doctrines of mutuality and privity and that the Rhode Island courts share this view. I conclude that if faced with the question, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island would make more explicit the "liberalized" position already enunciated in Hill v. Bain, supra, 15 R.I. at 76, 23 A. at 45, and Harding v. Carr, supra, 79 R.I. at 41, 83 A.2d at 83, and eliminate in their entirety the mutuality and privity requirements.

In the absence of these requirements, the standard which should be applied to determine whether or not a plea of collateral estoppel should be allowed was given by Justice Traynor in the form of three questions:

"Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?"

Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Assn., supra, 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added).

In considering the question of final judgment attention must also be focused on whether there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue...