Slack v. City of Salem

• Decision Date: 18 June 1964
• Docket Number: No. 38460,38460
• Citation: 31 Ill.2d 174,201 N.E.2d 119
• Parties: F. B. SLACK, Appellant, v. CITY OF SALEM et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 119

201 N.E.2d 119

31 Ill.2d 174

F. B. SLACK, Appellant, v. CITY OF SALEM et al., Appellees.

No. 38460.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1964.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 25, 1964.

Robert D. Albright, Salem, for appellant.

Frederick E. Merritt, City Atty., Salem, for appellees.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The plaintiff, F. B. Slack, city treasurer of the city of Salem, brought this action against the city and its governing officers to restrain the holding of a referendum election to approve or disapprove the issuance of revenue bonds authorized by the Industrial Building Revenue Bond Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 24, pars. 11-74-1 et seq.) The complaint alleged that both the Act and the city's ordinance calling the election were unconstitutional and that the expenditure of public funds to defray the cost of holding the referendum would therefore be illegal. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction, but after the defendants had answered and evidence was heard, the court dissolved the injunction and entered an order finding the Act and ordinance constitutional in all respects. Plaintiff has appealed directly to this court.

The declared purpose of the Act is 'to relieve conditions of unemployment, to aid in the rehabilitation of returning veterans, and to encourage the increase of industry within this state, thereby reducing the evils attendant upon unemployment.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 24, par. 11-74-3.) The Act provides that municipalities may issue revenue bonds to finance the purchase, construction or rehabilitation of industrial buildings to be leased to industrial concerns, and it contemplates that the rents received from the lessees of the buildings will be used to retire the bonds. Before any bonds may be issued, a majority of the qualified voters of the municipality voting at a special public policy referendum must approve their issuance. It is this election that the plaintiff seeks to enjoin, on the ground that the authorizing Act and the ordinance are unconstitutional.

The issues primarily argued by the parties are whether the Act and the ordinance authorize a lending of the city's credit in aid of a private corporation in violation of section 20 of article IV and Separate Section 2 of the Constitution of Illinois, S.H.A. The circuit court passed upon these and other constitutional issues, but we are of the opinion that it erred in doing so, for under long established principles it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter presented by the complaint.

The situation in this case is precisely analogous to that which was involved in Fletcher v. City of Paris, 377 Ill. 89. There the court pointed out that the election sought to be enjoined was not an ordinary election, saying: 'It is one which constitutes one of the steps necessary in the passage of the ordinances. Under the Municipal Ownership act, ordinance No. 6 could not become effective until said ordinance has been submitted to, and approved by, the voters of the city of Paris. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 111 2/3, par. 98.) The purpose of the election called by ordinance No. 7 was to comply with this provision of the statute. Until ordinance No. 6 should be so approved it could never become operative or effective. In order to bring into operation and effect an ordinance of the character of ordinance No. 6 it was necessary that certain steps be taken. First, such ordinance must be duly adopted and passed by the city council; second, it must be...