Slack v. Cnty. of Suffolk & Police Officer Kenneth J. Ripp (P.O. No. 5439) in His Official Capacity
| Decision Date | 20 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | 11-CV-2711 (ADS)(SIL) |
| Parties | WILLIAM SLACK, Plaintiff, v. THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and Police Officer KENNETH J. RIPP (P.O. No. 5439) in his official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
Henry Law
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Garden City, NY 11530
By: Chauncey D. Henry, Esq., of Counsel
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 556 Peninsula Boulevard
Hempstead, NY 11550
By: Fredrick K. Brewington, Esq.
Gregory Calliste, Jr., Esq., of Counsel
100 Veterans Memorial Highway
P.O. Box 6100
Hauppauge, NY 11788
By: Brian C. Mitchell, Assistant County Attorney
On June 6, 2011, the Plaintiff William Slack (the "Plaintiff") commenced this action against the Defendants the County of Suffolk (the "County") and Suffolk County Police Officer Kenneth J. Ripp (P.O. No. 5439), in his official capacity ("Ripp" and, together with the County,the "Defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff asserted federal claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. He also brought causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process under New York State law.
In November of 2013, a trial was held, and at the conclusion of the evidence, the Court granted the County's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 50(b) motion and dismissed the federal Monell claim against the County, so that the only remaining claims against the County were the state law causes of action, which were premised under a theory of respondeat superior. On November 27, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against Ripp on the federal § 1983 false arrest claim, but in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff on the federal and pendant state law claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory damages.
Presently before the Court is a post-trial motion filed by the Defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59. The Defendant seek judgment as a matter of law in their favor on the ground that Ripp is entitled to qualified immunity, or in the alternative, a new trial.
The Court pauses here to note that the Defendant's moving papers contain footnotes, which is contrary to this Court's Individual Rule II.A. Notwithstanding this infraction, the Court will consider the Defendant's papers in rendering its decision. However, the Court advises the Defendant's counsel that any future filings that contain footnotes will not be considered by this Court.
For the reasons that follow, the Defendant's motion is denied.
On July 12, 2009, the Plaintiff and his family were having a Christening party for their grandson at the Plaintiff's home in Lindenhurst, New York. During the party, two of the guests ended up having a minor car accident in front of the Plaintiff's house. In order to obtain a police report of the incident, the two guests called the police.
Hours later, the Defendant Ripp and his partner, Suffolk County Police Officer Matthew Friedrich arrived at the scene of the accident. The Plaintiff's daughter, Carol Slack, testified that at this time, she was standing in front of her father's house and observed Ripp and Friedrich race into the backyard of the home, where the Christening party was still taking place. She did not know what prompted Ripp and Friedrich to run into the backyard. However, according to Ripp and Friedrich, they were responding to fireworks that they claimed were being fired at them from the backyard.
Once in the backyard, Ripp and Friedrich escorted Peter Gange, who was the father of the baby that had been Christened and who testified as a witness in the trial, from the backyard to the front of the Plaintiff's house. Ripp then arrested Gange, allegedly using excessive force to do so.
About this time, Ripp claims that the Plaintiff tried to interfere with Gange's arrest. In this regard, on the day of the incident, Ripp initially claimed that the Plaintiff interfered with Gange's arrest by yelling and screaming in protest. Thereafter, when submitting a statement to the Suffolk County Police Departments' Internal Affairs Bureau, Ripp claimed that the Plaintiff was leading a group of the party guests that circled around him and Friedrich. At trial, Ripp testified that the Plaintiff interfered with his radio communications to headquarters.
However, all of the Plaintiff's witnesses, who were guests at the Christening party, testified that the Plaintiff did not interfere in any way with the arrest of Gange. Nevertheless, Ripp proceeded to arrest the Plaintiff for the crime of obstruction of governmental administration. This charge was ultimately dismissed. The Plaintiff claimed that Ripp's conduct in improperly arresting him caused him to be prosecuted without basis; wrongfully subjected to lengthy and costly criminal proceedings; and suffer psychological injuries leading to substantial medical bills.
Following the July 12, 2009 occurrence, Ripp's actions were subjected to an investigation by the Internal Affairs Bureau. This investigation apparently involved the review of the Plaintiff's 50-h hearing and multiple witness interviews. However, during the trial, the Defendants offered no evidence demonstrating that the Internal Affairs Bureau interviewed any witnesses, including independent civilian eyewitnesses who were present during the incident. Further, Ripp testified that he never spoke to the Internal Affairs Bureau concerning this matter other than the statement he submitted.
Similarly, Friedrich testified that he also never spoke directly to the Internal Affairs Bureau about the July 12, 2009 occurrence and other officers who eventually arrived at the scene were also never contacted by the Internal Affairs Bureau. In addition, Friedrich explained that although he and Ripp were supposed to submit independent statements to the Internal Affairs Bureau, they nonetheless collaborated with one another so that their statements were substantially similar.
Following the investigation, the Internal Affairs Bureau issued a memorandum exonerating Ripp, which the Plaintiff admitted into evidence without objection from the Defendants. According to the memorandum, Ripp had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff.This finding of the memorandum was endorsed by Lieutenant Thomas Kenneally, who conducted the investigation, and Captain Joseph Capolino, who reviewed the investigation, as well as by a Deputy Inspector and a Deputy Police Commissioner.
On the morning of November 25, 2013, following a two week trial, the Court charged the jury on the applicable law. Thereafter, at approximately 3:07 p.m. that same day, the charge concluded and the jury began its deliberations. About an hour and a half later, at 4:30 p.m., the jury was recessed until the next day.
On November 26, 2013, the jury reconvened and commenced deliberations at approximately 9:40 a.m. At 12:15 p.m., the jury sent a note to the Court, which stated as follows: (Tr. 1603.)
The Court informed the parties that it intended to give the jury a modified Allen charge, to which neither party objected. In addition, despite the Defendants objection, the Court stated that it would be advising the jury that they could still consider the Plaintiff's other claims in the event they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to the first cause of action.
The jury was brought into the courtroom, at which time the Court provided them with the Allen charge. In this regard, the Court stated the following:
Members of the jury, I have this note saying that you are unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to the false arrest claim . . . . I estimate that you have been deliberating for about a little more than four hours. I assume that in that time each of you has had the opportunity to present your individual views about the case, that you consulted with one another and listened to and thought about the arguments of your fellow jurors. And after careful, conscientious consideration of the evidence, have nevertheless, at least one of you arrived at the view as to how the federal Section 1983 false arrest claim should be decidedI must point out to you that this trial has lasted about two weeks and has been with some effort by everybody to try this case. If your deliberations don't end in agreement on a verdict, the case is necessarily left open . . . and in all likelihood will have to be tried again before another jury . . . . There appears to be no reason to believe the case will be differently tried or would reveal any more or different evidence than you have heard. Nor is there any reason to believe that nine or 10 different men and women will be more intelligent, more impartially chosen or more competent to decide this case than you are.
Now, these considerations are but a reminder that the essential cast [sic] is one of conscientious decision which I feel that you are fully equipped to make, and while a jury must not surrender their conscientious convictions nevertheless it is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching agreement if you can possibly do so without doing violence to any judgment based upon a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.
. . . .
In the course of your deliberations, you should not hesitate to reexamine your own views with candor and frankness and change your own opinion if convinced that it's erroneous. I can't emphasize too strongly that each of you should give attention to the views of the others, respect them, and listen to each other's arguments with a disposition to keep your own views under your...
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