Slack v. Rees

• Decision Date: 15 November 1904
• Citation: 66 N.J.E. 447,59 A. 466
• Parties: SLACK et al. v. REES.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

59 A. 466

66 N.J.E. 447

SLACK et al.

v. REES.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 15, 1904.

Suit by George W. Slack and another against Eliza E. Rees. Prom a decree for defendant, complainants appeal. Reversed.

Aaron V. Dawes, for appellants.

Edwin R. Walker, for respondent.

GUMMERE, C. J. The two complainants and the defendant are the only children and heirs at law of George H. Slack, deceased, who died on the 13th day of August, 1902, at the age of 68 years. On the day before his death he executed a deed to his daughter, Mrs. Rees, conveying to her two houses and lots in the city of Trenton. He owned no other real estate, and his personal estate was insufficient for the payment of his debts. His sons seek to have the conveyance set aside and declared void upon the following grounds: That their father lacked mental capacity to make the deed, that it was the product of undue influence exercised by their sister upon him, and that in making the deed he did not have the benefit of competent and independent advice.

The deceased for a number of years before his death suffered from the disease known as "locomotor ataxia." By the progress of the disease his physical powers became gradually weakened, and his mental powers also were somewhat affected. But although his mind was somewhat weakened, we fully concur in the conclusion of the learned vice chancellor, who heard the case below, that he retained sufficient mental capacity to dispose of his property.

The second ground of attack upon the conveyance—that it was the product of undue influence—presents a more difficult question. For a period of nearly three months prior to his death he was an inmate of his daughter's home. He was during all that time dependent upon her for the care and service which a man in his weakened physical and mental condition constantly requires. The normal relation of parent and child, as it had existed in earlier years, had been reversed, and the daughter had become the guardian of the father. In this situation the law presumes that a gift made by the parent to the child is the product of undue influence, and casts upon the latter the burden of proving the contrary. It was considered by the vice chancellor, before whom the case was tried, that she had discharged this burden. After a careful review of the testimony, we are not at one as to the soundness of this conclusion. A decision upon this point in the case, however, is rendered unnecessary, as we conclude that the conveyance must be set aside because, in making it, the donor did not have the benefit of competent and independent advice as to its effect. That the absence of such advice will invalidate a deed of gift which contains no power of revocation, where a relation of trust and confidence exists between the donor and donee, is not denied, and, indeed, it was so held by the vice chancellor. He seems to have considered, however, that such relationship was not shown unless it was made to appear that the donee occupied such a dominant position toward the donor as to raise the presumption that the latter was without power to...