Slade v. Caesars Entm't Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 62720.,62720.
• Citation: 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 36,373 P.3d 74
• Parties: Dr. Joel SLADE, Appellant, v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION; Paris Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC, d/b/a Paris Las Vegas, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

373 P.3d 74

132 Nev. Adv. Op. 36

Dr. Joel SLADE, Appellant

v.CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION; Paris Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC, d/b/a Paris Las Vegas, Respondents.

No. 62720.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

May 12, 2016.

Nersesian & Sankiewicz and Robert A. Nersesian and Thea Marie Sankiewicz, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Santoro Whitmire and James E. Whitmire and Jason D. Smith, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

Before the Court En Banc.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY

, J.:

In this appeal, we are asked to consider whether common-law principles referenced in NRS 463.0129(3)(a)

permit gaming establishments to exclude from their premises any person for any reason. We generally adopt the majority common-law rule permitting the exclusion of persons for any reason that is not discriminatory or otherwise unlawful.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Caesars Entertainment Corporation owns and operates a number of casinos throughout the United States, including Harrah's Tunica Hotel and Casino in Tunica, Mississippi. In 2011, appellant Dr. Joel Slade received a letter from a representative of Harrah's Tunica notifying him that he had been evicted from that casino and that the eviction would be enforced at all Caesars-owned, -operated, or -managed properties. Dr. Slade was interested in attending a medical conference that was to take place at Paris Las Vegas Hotel and Casino, a property owned and operated by Caesars. Dr. Slade contacted Caesars' corporate headquarters in Nevada about attending the conference but was informed that his eviction from Caesars' properties would be enforced at Paris LV.

Dr. Slade then filed a complaint, alleging a breach of the duty of public access and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Dr. Slade does not challenge the casino's right to exclude for proper cause. Instead, Dr. Slade alleged that under the common law and NRS 463.0129(1)(e)

, Caesars could not exclude him without cause.¹ He further argued that the casino owed him a duty of reasonable access either as a purveyor of a public amusement or as an innkeeper. Caesars then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), arguing that it has the right to exclude Dr. Slade pursuant to NRS 463.0129(3)(a) and the common law. The district court granted Caesars' motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. V & S Ry., LLC v. White Pine Cty., 125 Nev. 233, 239, 211 P.3d 879, 882 (2009)

. When a statute's language is unambiguous, this court does not resort to the rules of construction and will give that language its plain meaning. Id. “A statute must be construed as to ‘give meaning to all of [its] parts and language, and this court will read each sentence, phrase, and word to render it meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Harris Assocs. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 642, 81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003) (internal quotation omitted)). “Whenever possible, this court will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules and statutes.” Albios v. Horizon Cmts., Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 418, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).

NRS 463.0129

declares Nevada's public policy concerning gaming establishments. Pursuant to NRS 463.0129(1)(e), “all gaming establishments in this state must remain open to the general public and the access of the general public to gaming activities must not be restricted in any manner except as provided by the Legislature.” However, the statute also provides that “[t]his section does not ... [a]brogate or abridge any common- law right of a gaming establishment to exclude any person from gaming activities or eject any person from the premises of the establishment for any reason.” NRS 463.0129(3)(a)

.² “ ‘Gaming’ ... means to deal, operate, carry on, conduct, maintain or expose for play any game ... or to operate an inter-casino linked system.” NRS 463.0153. “ ‘Establishment’ means any premises wherein or whereon any gaming is done.” NRS 463.0148.

Whether NRS 463.0129(3)(a)

permits gaming establishments to exclude any person for any reason pursuant to common-law principles is an issue of first impression in Nevada.³ Dr. Slade argues that the Legislature has codified a common-law duty to provide reasonable access to the patrons of gaming establishments in NRS 463.0129(1)(e). In making his argument, Dr. Slade urges this court to read NRS 463.0129(1)(e) as requiring Caesars to provide him access to its Nevada establishments because he is a member of the general public. Caesars counters that NRS 463.0129(3)(a) preserves the common-law right to exclude any individual for any otherwise lawful, nondiscriminatory reason. The parties' arguments suggest that NRS 463.0129 presents competing rights to the general public and gaming establishments concerning access to a casino's premises. Therefore, we must first interpret the language in these statutory subsections and determine the common-law rule before reaching the merits of this appeal.

Construction of NRS 463.0129

The plain language of NRS 463.0129(1)(e)

assures access to the general public to a gaming premises, except as provided by the Legislature. But the Legislature appears to have qualified that access by recognizing a common-law right of gaming establishments in NRS 463.0129(3)(a) to eject any person from the premises. In harmonizing NRS 463.0129(1)(e) and 3(a), we must determine the breadth of an owner's common-law right to evict patrons.

There is overwhelming authority recognizing the common-law right of a private owner of a public amusement to exclude any person for any reason from the premises. See, e.g., Brooks v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 791 F.2d 512, 513, 516 (7th Cir.1986)

(“find[ing] that Illinois follows the common law rule” in determining that a race track operator had the absolute right to exclude a patron for any reason); Ziskis v. Kowalski, 726 F.Supp. 902, 908 (D.Conn.1989) (“The weight of the case law upholds the common law rule that owners of places of amusement, like theaters and racetracks, are permitted to exclude patrons without cause.”); Donovan v. Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, LP, 934 N.E.2d 1111, 1112, 1115–16 (Ind.2010) (following the majority rule in holding that the owner of a riverboat casino had a common-law right to exclude any person from its premises).⁴

A narrower interpretation of the common-law rule to exclude persons stems from the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982)

. In Uston, a casino banned a card counter from its premises based on his method of playing blackjack. Id. at 371. The court held that the exclusion was invalid because the controlling gaming authority “alone has the authority to exclude patrons based upon their strategies for playing licensed casino games.” Id. at 372. The court went on to conclude that the common-law right to exclude in New Jersey was “substantially limited by a competing common law right of reasonable access to public places.” Id.

We decline to follow the more narrow position that a common-law right of reasonable access to public places limits a private owner's right to exclude because its restrictive articulation of the common law is inconsistent with the plain language of NRS 463.0129(3)(a)

. Thus, in harmonizing NRS 463.0129(1)(e) and NRS 463.0129(3)(a), we conclude that casino establishments are to be open to the general public but have the common-law right to exclude any individual from the premises pursuant to the majority common-law position.

We emphasize, however, the right to exclude is not without significant and important limitation. We further conclude that NRS 463.0129(3)(a)

does not grant gaming establishments an unlimited right to exclude anyone for any reason as that common-law right can be abridged by other statutory provisions. For example, under NRS 651.070, “[a]ll persons are entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of any place of public accommodation,^[5

^] without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity or expression.”⁶ (Emphasis added.) This interpretation of a gaming establishment's right to exclude is consistent with other jurisdictions that recognize the majority common-law position. See, e.g.,

Brooks, 791 F.2d at 513 (“[T]he operator of a horse race track has the absolute right to exclude a patron from the track premises for any reason, or no reason, except race, color, creed, national origin, or sex.”); Ziskis, 726 F.Supp. at 905 (recognizing that the common-law rule was limited by a state law that “deals with public accommodations, including places of amusement, creat[ing] ... a right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin”); Madden, 72 N.E.2d at 698 (“The common-law power of exclusion ... continues until changed by legislative enactment. In this State, a statute explicitly covering ‘race courses' limits the power by prohibiting discrimination on account of race, creed, color, or national origin.”). Accordingly, we conclude that while gaming establishments generally have the right to exclude any person, the reason for exclusion must not be discriminatory or otherwise unlawful. We now turn our attention to whether Dr. Slade's exclusion was for an unlawful reason.

Dr. Slade failed to demonstrate that his exclusion was for an unlawful reason

This court reviews a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under “a rigorous, de novo standard of review.” Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 267, 277 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2012)

. A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim “only if it appears beyond a doubt...