Slade v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 6:94-CV-0097 (WLS).,6:94-CV-0097 (WLS).
• Citation: 36 F.Supp.2d 1370
• Parties: Linda K. SLADE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

36 F.Supp.2d 1370

Linda K. SLADE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 6:94-CV-0097 (WLS).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Thomasville Division.

March 17, 1998.

Ralph Felward Simpson, Mr., Tifton, GA, Ben Kirbo, Mr., Bainbridge, GA, for plaintiffs.

Gary William Diamond, Mr., Royston, GA, Brian M. Weiss, Mr., Mark W. Wortham, Mr., Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

ORDER

SANDS, District Judge.

On February 10, 1987, Plaintiff Linda K. Slade purchased a new Dodge Omni car from Defendant Chrysler's dealer in Bainbridge, Georgia. Throughout the following year, Plaintiff experienced numerous problems with the car's engine stalling. Plaintiff returned the car to the dealer's service department, yet mechanics evidently failed to adequately repair the car's engine. In July, 1988, Plaintiff and her family were involved in a serious highway accident, allegedly caused by the car's engine stalling. On December 22, 1994, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court for damages arising from alleged fraud by Defendant for selling her a car equipped with a defective engine. Plaintiff alleged, and continues to maintain, that Defendant knew about the engine's defect at the time she purchased the car, and breached its duty to disclose its defect to her. Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court now holds that it is.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Court is required to "resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant, and draw all justifiable inferences in his or her favor." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (quotations and citations omitted).

The moving party carries the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The substantive law governing the case determines which facts are material, and "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For issues on which the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "simply may show — that is, point out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Alternatively, the moving party may support its motion for summary judgment with affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case." Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116 (quotations and citations omitted).

If the moving party fails to overcome this initial burden, the Court must deny the motion for summary judgment without considering any evidence, if any, presented by the non-moving party. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. If, on the other hand, the moving party overcomes this initial burden, then the non-moving party must show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that remains to be resolved at trial. Id. Moreover, the adverse party may not respond to the motion for summary judgment by summarily denying the allegations set forth by the moving party. Rather, the adverse party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

II. Applicable Statute of Limitations

Under Georgia law, an action for fraud must be brought within four years after the claim accrues. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31. Limoli v. First Georgia Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 756-57, 250 S.E.2d 155, 156-57 (1978), reh'g denied Oct. 30, 1978. The cause of action accrues when a plaintiff could first institute and maintain her action to a successful result. Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. 388, 396, 173 S.E. 680 (1934). The time within which a plaintiff must bring her action may be tolled by virtue of fraud by the defendant: "If the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitations shall run only from the time of the plaintiff's discovery of the fraud." O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96.

Both parties agree that the decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808, 267 S.E.2d 244 (1980), provides the authority for determining whether the fraud alleged in this action tolls the statute of limitations:

Actual fraud which tolls the statute arises in two entirely different circumstances....

The first circumstance is where the actual fraud is the gravamen of the action. In such cases the statute of limitations is tolled until the fraud is discovered or by reasonable diligence should have been discovered. No other independent fraudulent act is required to toll the statute. Silence is treated as a continuation of the original actual fraud, 20 EGL 185, Lim. of Actions, § 22. Failure to exercise reasonable diligence to discover fraud may be excused where a relationship of trust and confidence exists between the parties.

245 Ga. at 808-809, 267 S.E.2d 244 (emphasis added). In general, the defendant carries the burden of proving that the statute of limitations bars an action. However, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that the limitations period should be tolled:

The fraud established to toll the statute of limitations must be of a character which involves moral turpitude, and must have the effect of debarring or deterring the plaintiff from [her] action. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing fraud involving moral turpitude. In the absence of a fiduciary relation, even fraud will not prevent a suit from being barred, where the plaintiff has failed to exercise reasonable diligence to detect such fraud.

Bates v. Metropolitan Transit System, Inc., 128 Ga.App. 720, 721, 197 S.E.2d 781 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Bates, the Court of Appeals clearly explained that "if [the plaintiff] was misled by the adjustor, [the plaintiff] has not illustrated reasonable diligence to detect such deception," necessary to justify tolling the statute of limitations to encompass the date on which he ultimately filed his complaint. Id. at 722, 197 S.E.2d 781. In a similar context, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained: "As a general rule, a plaintiff relying on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment must show affirmative actions by the defendant constituting concealment. [She] must also show that [she] exercised reasonable diligence to discover [her] cause of action within the limitations period." Hill v. Texaco, Inc., 825 F.2d 333, 335 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

III. Facts

Resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the Plaintiff and drawing all justifiable inferences in her favor, there is no genuine controversy concerning any of the following material facts:

1. "On February 10, 1987, Plaintiff Linda Slade ("Plaintiff") purchased a new 1987 Dodge Omni automobile." Def.'s Statement of Uncontested Facts ¶ 1.

2. Plaintiff did not experience any problems related to the engine's stalling when she test drove the car and claims that "these problems occurred only sporadically." Aff. Linda Slade ¶¶ 3, 4.

3. About "a week or two" after she purchased the car, and after she had driven it "about fifty or sixty miles," she experienced the car's engine stalling. Dep. Linda Slade at 61.

4. Nonetheless, Plaintiff experienced "repeated operational problems with [the car's engine] cutting off." Aff. Linda Slade ¶ 7.

5. When she experienced "these problems," Plaintiff returned the car to the Chrysler dealer where she purchased it. Aff. Linda Slade ¶ 9.

6. Plaintiff returned the car to the dealer's service department "at least ten or fifteen times." Dep. Linda Slade at 63, 77. Plaintiff's husband testified that he experienced the car's engine stalling "twenty-five, thirty times at least." Dep. Charles Slade at 15-16.

7. The car's engine regularly stalled. As Plaintiff testified: "[W]e learned to know when it was likely to [cut off] if we turned it too sharp or, you know, something like that. But it would cut off when we turned to the right as we go on [interstate 85 near Atlanta]." Dep. Linda Slade at 64.

8. When Defendant's counsel asked her if she believed it was unusual for a car to "cut off" in the way she described, Plaintiff replied: "For a new car to act that way." Dep. Linda Slade at 109.

9. "In July 1988, Plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving the subject vehicle. Allegedly, the car's engine ceased operating while she was driving around a curve in the road, causing her to drive off the road and hit a tree." Def.'s Statement of Uncontested Facts § 21. Plaintiff explained that as she was driving along a big curve in the road, "the car cut off on me." Dep. Linda Slade at 11.

10. Plaintiff testified that the crash caused her head and back injuries, Dep. Linda Slade at 12, and suggested that it caused a slipped disk in her back. Id. at 25.

11. Plaintiff testified that both of her sons were riding in the car and were injured, as each hit his head on the window next to his seat. Dep. Linda Slade at 22.

12. Following this accident in July, 1988, Plaintiff did not consult an attorney to determine whether she had any claim against Chrysler or the Chrysler dealer to recover damages for injuries related...