Slagle v. Slagle

• Decision Date: 20 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1492-88-3,1492-88-3
• Parties: , 59 USLW 2388 Teddy Joe SLAGLE v. Janice Marie SLAGLE. Record
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

Page 346

398 S.E.2d 346

11 Va.App. 341, 59 USLW 2388

Teddy Joe SLAGLE v. Janice Marie SLAGLE.

Record No. 1492-88-3.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 20, 1990.

Robert W. Detrick, Bristol, for appellant.

Robert B. Dickert (Warren & Dickert, Bristol, on brief), for appellee.

Present: KOONTZ, C.J., and KEENAN and MOON, JJ.

KEENAN, Judge.

Teddy Joe Slagle (husband) appeals from a decision of the trial court ordering him to pay child support in accordance with the final decree of divorce. In this appeal, he argues that he should no longer be obligated to support Teddy Slagle Jr. (child) because blood tests performed after entry of the final decree conclusively establish that he is not the biological father of the child. The sole issue presented here is whether the husband, in a motion, is estopped from challenging his paternity and his attendant obligation to support the minor child, where the final divorce decree states that the child was born of the marriage. We find that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars such a challenge. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Teddy and Janice Slagle (wife) were married in June 1982. Prior to that, in March or April of 1981, Janice informed Teddy that she was pregnant with his child. A son, who was named Teddy Slagle Jr., was born on November 21, 1981. The parties lived together from June 1982 until September 1983, at which time they separated. The husband paid pendente lite support in the amount of $600 per month to the wife until a final decree of divorce was entered on April 28, 1986. At that time the wife was awarded custody of the child. The husband was ordered to pay $250 per month in child support and $350 per month in spousal support. In the final divorce decree, the trial court found that Teddy Slagle Jr. was a child born to the marriage of the parties. No appeal was taken from this decree.

On July 9, 1987, the husband petitioned the juvenile and domestic relations court to order blood grouping tests to determine his paternity in light of assertions made by the wife that he was not the biological father of the child. In addition, the husband requested that the court review, and if warranted, abate both his spousal and child support obligations. After receiving a report which concluded that the husband cannot be the child's father, ¹ the juvenile court abated the husband's child support obligation as of October 1987. The juvenile court did not reduce spousal support payments, however, and also ordered payment of support arrearages totalling $2524. Both parties appealed.

A hearing ore tenus was held in circuit court on July 15, 1988. At that hearing, the trial court found that the April 1986 final decree of divorce constituted a final adjudication of the husband's paternity and thus was not subject to collateral attack. Accordingly, the trial court reversed the order of the juvenile court abating the husband's child support obligation and ordered the husband to resume making child support payments in the amount of $250 per month. The husband then noted this appeal.

The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in determining that the husband's evidence that he was not the father of the child was not a proper basis on which to modify his child support payments because the issue of his paternity already had been conclusively adjudicated in the final divorce decree. Under the principle of collateral estoppel, "the parties to the first action and their privies are precluded from litigating [in a subsequent action] any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and final personal judgment in the first action." Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 640, 272 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1980); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) ("A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a 'right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the parties.' "); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).

The husband raised the issue of his paternity in a 1987 petition for modification of child support wherein the wife was named as a defendant. There is no question, therefore, that the issue was being raised in a subsequent action between the same parties. Furthermore, no appeal was taken as to the final decree. Thus, it is a final judgment. Rule 1:1. The remaining issues therefore, are whether the husband's paternity was actually litigated in the divorce proceedings, whether the question of the husband's paternity was essential to the judgment, and whether the judgment was valid.

It is well settled that the burden rests with the party asserting the collateral estoppel bar to establish by a preponderance of the evidence "that the precise issue or question he seeks to preclude was raised and determined in the first action." United States v. Davis, 460 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir.1972). Before finding that a party has met its burden, the trial court is " 'required to determine exactly what was decided in the earlier trial, and the inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.' " Davis, 460 F.2d at 796 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194).

Neither of the parties made the record of the divorce proceedings a part of the record on appeal in the paternity action. Moreover, the parties did not file the transcripts of the ore tenus hearing with this court. Consequently, our review of the trial court's finding of collateral estoppel is limited to the facts established by the court documents in the paternity action, including the final decree of divorce between the parties. Incorporated in that decree was the trial court's finding that the child was born of the marriage. In addition, the decree specifically awards custody of the child to the mother and orders that the father pay child support. We hold that implicit in these rulings is a finding by the court that the husband was the father of the child, and thereby obligated to make support payments until the child reached the age of majority. Therefore, we find that the issue of the husband's paternity was actually litigated in the prior divorce proceedings.

This holding is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions which have considered this issue. See, e.g. Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 797 (5th Cir.1983) (applying Texas law); Anderson v. Anderson, 407 Mass. 251, 258, 552 N.E.2d 546, 551 (1990); Rucinski v. Rucinski, 172 Mich.App. 20, 22, 431 N.W.2d 241, 242 (1988); Marriage of Yakubec, 154 Ill.App.3d 540, 544, 107 Ill.Dec. 453, 456, 507 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1987); Marriage of Detert, 391 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Iowa Ct.App.1986); Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 804, 108 S.Ct. 49, 98 L.Ed.2d 14 (1987); Lerman v. Lerman, 148 Vt. 629, 528 A.2d 1121 (1987); Chrzanowski v. Chrzanowski, 325 Pa.Super. 298, 305, 472 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1984); N.C. v. W.R.C., 317 S.E.2d 793, 797 (W.Va.1984); Luedtke v. Koopsma, 303 N.W.2d 112, 114 (S.D.1981); DeWeese v. Unick, 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 105-06, 162 Cal.Rptr. 259, 263 (1980); McNeece v. McNeece, 39 Colo.App. 160, 163, 562 P.2d 767, 769 (1977); Butler v. Brownlee, 152 Mont. 453, 456, 451 P.2d 836, 838 (1969). But see Spears v. Spears, 784 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Ky.Ct.App.1990) (applying res judicata to the presumed father's attempt to challenge paternity would lead to an unjust result).

Furthermore, we hold that the issue of the husband's paternity was essential to the judgment with respect to the custody and child support provisions incorporated therein. Code § 20-107.2 provides in pertinent part: "Upon decreeing ... a divorce ... the court may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the custody and support of the minor children of the parties, and concerning visitation rights of the parents." As part of the final decree, the court awarded custody of the child to the wife and ordered the husband to pay support. Before the trial court could enter a decree as to the custody and support of the child, the court had to determine that the child was a child of the parties.

Finally, it is generally held that "[i]n the absence of fraud, accident or surprise, a judgment, when entered and no appeal taken, is conclusive, even though the judgment is manifestly wrong in law or fact." Carpenter v. Ingram, 152 Va. 27, 36, 146 S.E. 193, 195 (1929). The husband has not argued, however, either in the trial court or on appeal that the April 1986 final decree of divorce was entered either by accident or surprise, or as a result of a fraud perpetrated on the court, nor has the decree itself been invalidated on any of these grounds. Consequently, the decree is a valid, conclusive judgment.

For these reasons, we find that the trial court properly concluded that the wife met her burden of proving that the collateral estoppel bar applied to the issue of the husband's paternity. Our inquiry, however, does not end here. Application of the collateral estoppel bar is inappropriate in situations where, although the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects to that decided in the first proceeding, either the controlling facts or the applicable legal rules have changed since the original action. See United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 935 (4th Cir.1982). Further, collateral estoppel does not apply "when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Finally, "[r]edetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness,...