Slagley v. Illinois Central Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 30 July 1968
• Docket Number: No. 16682.,16682.
• Citation: 397 F.2d 546
• Parties: Clio E. SLAGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, and Order (Brotherhood) of Railway Trainmen, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

397 F.2d 546 (1968)

Clio E. SLAGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, and Order (Brotherhood) of Railway Trainmen, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16682.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

June 20, 1968.

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1968.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald T. Bosco and Donald J. McLachlan, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert Mitten, John W. Foster, Lawrence Lawless, Burke Williamson, Jack A. Williamson, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Harry Wilmarth, Cedar Rapids, Iowa for defendant-appellee Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen.

Before CASTLE, Chief Judge, DUFFY, Senior Circuit Judge, and HASTINGS, Circuit Judge.

HASTINGS, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Clio Slagley, plaintiff below, appeals from an order entered November 14, 1967 granting appellees' motion to dismiss his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The substance of the allegations of the complaint follow. Appellant has been employed by appellee Illinois Central Railroad Company (I.C.) since 1928 and was a conductor on July 1, 1960. At all pertinent times he was a member in good standing of the appellee Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen (O.R.C. & B.).

At all pertinent times the cooperative agreement to which all appellees were parties, contained this provision:

"(e) Conductors may not voluntarily relinquish their rights as such and take a position as trainman without forfeiting their rights as conductors, except that the two general chairmen, by mutual agreement, may sub-divide seniority districts and/or territories over which conductors hold seniority; provided that exceptions to the aforesaid may be made if mutually agreed upon. It is further provided that the two general chairmen may, when it is mutually agreeable, permit a conductor, when sick, disabled, or injured, to work in a junior class, under such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon."

In 1960, appellant obtained and submitted to appellee Order (Brotherhood) of Railway Trainmen (B.R.T.) the recommendation of his physician that he be permitted to work in a position junior to that of conductor because of a physical disability. In accordance with the contract provision quoted above the two appellee unions agreed to permit appellant to work in a junior class for six months beginning May 23, 1960. I.C. approved and sanctioned this agreement. On November 18, 1960, appellant's physician recommended that he continue working in the junior position.

When appellant reported for work on November 24, 1960, the day after the six months period expired, he was assigned by I.C.'s trainmaster to work in a junior position. He worked that day in the position assigned. Immediately thereafter the O.R.C. & B. compelled I.C. to deprive him of his seniority rights as a conductor.

The complaint further alleges that appellees' actions violated the cooperative agreement and deprived appellant of valuable property rights without due process, in violation of the Federal and Indiana Constitutions. It alleges that their actions were arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory. It seeks recovery of compensatory damages of $25,000, punitive damages of $1,000,000 and an injunction prohibiting further interference with appellant's seniority rights and requiring I.C. to restore his seniority.

I.C. and O.R.C. & B. filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on August 28, 1967 and September 7, 1967. respectively.¹ The district court granted the motions on the alternative grounds that appellant's exclusive remedy is in the National Railroad Adjustment Board, that if the option of court action were open to him he waived it by submitting his dispute to the Adjustment Board,² and that he did not allege the requisite diversity of citizenship.

We first consider whether the Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction of appellant's claims.

Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i) provides:

"(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions * * * shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes."

By this provision of the Act, Congress has provided an exclusive procedure for the settlement of so-called "minor disputes" — those involving the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions.³ Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 79 S.Ct. 1322, 3 L.Ed.2d 1422 (1959); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957); Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795 (1950); Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 66 S.Ct. 322, 90 L. Ed. 318 (1946). Concomitantly, by this provision Congress deprived the state and federal courts of jurisdiction of "minor disputes." Ibid.

Appellant's claims clearly involve a minor dispute, concerning the interpretation and application of the contract provision quoted above.

Appellant implicitly concedes the Adjustment Board's exclusive jurisdiction of minor disputes. He contends, however, that the Board's jurisdiction is exclusive only in the sense that minor disputes must be submitted to the Board initially, and that to come within the jurisdiction of state or federal courts the employee need only first attempt to exhaust his contractual and administrative remedies under § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act. In support of this proposition he relies on language in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965) and Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), both decided under the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-187.

In Maddox the Court held that federal labor policy requires an aggrieved employee to attempt use of established contract grievance procedures before seeking other modes of redress, where those procedures are made exclusive by the applicable bargaining agreement. The Court thereby gave effect to Congress' declared preference for the use of contractual procedures to settle labor disputes. Labor-Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 173(d).

However, in Vaca the Court indicated that the aggrieved employee need not exhaust his contract remedies before seeking judicial enforcement of his contract rights under § 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a), where "the union has sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and * * * the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting his contractual remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance." 386 U.S. at 185, 87 S.Ct. at 914. As the Court subsequently stated in Vaca, the wrongful refusal must constitute a breach by the union of its duty of fair representation — arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit. 386 U.S. at 186, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903.

Both the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act have the purpose of promoting the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. Both impose upon employers and employees the duty to meet and confer in good faith concerning disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), (b) (3), (d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (5), (b) (3), (d); Railway Labor Act § 2 First, Second, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 First, Second. Both favor settlement of such disputes by procedures mutually agreed upon by employers and employees or their representatives. See National Labor Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 173(d); Railway Labor Act § 3 First (i), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i). There are, however, important differences between the two statutes.

The statutes provide different procedures for the settlement of labor disputes. Under the National Labor Relations Act the employer and the bargaining representative may decide whether the contract grievance procedure shall be exclusive or nonexclusive and whether the procedure shall culminate in binding arbitration. See Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1493 (1960); Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 5 Cir., 362 F.2d 414 (1966); Lodge No. 12, etc. v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 5 Cir., 292 F.2d 112, cert. denied 368 U.S. 926, 82 S.Ct. 361, 7 L.Ed.2d 190 (1961). Under the Railway Labor Act arbitration of unsettled disputes is mandatory and a federal agency, the Adjustment Board, is created as arbiter. § 3 First (i), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i).

The statutes provide different roles for the courts in settling labor disputes. The National Labor Relations Act confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to entertain suits for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a). The courts' jurisdiction is limited only by the requirement that the plaintiff-employee has attempted to exhaust contract grievance procedures, if they are exclusive. The Railway Labor Act confers no original jurisdiction on the courts to entertain suits to enforce bargaining agreements. It grants the federal district courts limited review jurisdiction over decisions of the Adjustment Board and the "special adjustment boards." § 3 First (p), (q), Second, 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (p), (q), Second.

Finally, the statutes are distinguishable on the scope of power afforded the union to control the...