Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., S03Q1075.
| Decision Date | 06 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. S03Q1075.,S03Q1075. |
| Citation | 277 Ga. 189,587 S.E.2d 24 |
| Parties | SLAKMAN v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Barry S. Slakman, Hardwick, for appellant.
Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Charles Edward Rogers, William Paul Jones, Hassett, Cohen, Goldstein, Port & Gottlieb, Robert C. Port, Atlanta, for appellee.
Shana Slakman, the wife of appellant Barry Slakman and daughter of appellees Barbara Adamo and Sherwin Glass, was insured under a life insurance policy issued by appellee Continental Casualty Company naming her husband as the beneficiary. After Shana's death and Slakman's indictment for her murder, Continental initiated an interpleader action in United States District Court to resolve conflicting claims to the benefits under the policy. Slakman subsequently was convicted of murder and his motion for new trial is currently pending before the Fulton County Superior Court. After Slakman's conviction, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees finding that Slakman was prohibited from recovering life insurance benefits under OCGA § 33-25-13. Slakman filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which certified to this Court the question of whether OCGA § 33-25-13 bars an individual from receiving benefits under a murder victim's life insurance policy before his conviction and sentence become final under state law.1 We hold that it does not.
OCGA § 33-25-13 provides:
No person who commits murder or voluntary manslaughter or who conspires with another to commit murder shall receive any benefits from any insurance policy on the life of the deceased, even though the person so killing or conspiring be named beneficiary in the insurance policy. A plea of guilty or a judicial finding of guilt not reversed or otherwise set aside as to any of such crimes shall be prima-facie evidence of guilt in determining rights under this Code section.
Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, an individual may be barred from receiving the benefits of a life insurance policy even in the absence of a criminal conviction if it is determined under the appropriate standard of proof that the individual committed murder or voluntary manslaughter or conspired to commit murder. Criminal proceedings against the individual may give rise to prima facie evidence of guilt for purposes of OCGA § 33-25-13 only upon the entry in the criminal prosecution of a guilty plea or a judicial finding of guilt not reversed or otherwise set aside.
Appellees urge this Court to construe OCGA § 33-25-13 to provide that prima facie evidence of guilt arises after entry of a criminal conviction alone, regardless of whether the conviction is final under Georgia law. Unlike the foreign statutes upon which they rely, however, OCGA § 33-25-13 establishes prima facie evidence of guilt not upon the mere conviction of a criminal defendant but "upon a judicial finding of guilt not reversed or otherwise set aside." Accordingly, we reject appellees' proposed construction of the statute. Likewise we reject Slakman's proposed construction that would equate the phrase "not reversed or otherwise set aside" with the right to exhaust every potential collateral challenge to a criminal conviction. Collateral challenges, such as habeas corpus, are not part of the criminal proceeding but are intended to provide an avenue for upsetting judgments that have otherwise become final. See Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855(1), 513 S.E.2d 186 (1999). Further, nothing in the language of the statute or its legislative history suggests that the General Assembly intended to indefinitely delay distribution of life insurance proceeds.
Rather, in construing OCGA § 33-25-13, we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe a statute according to its terms, to give...
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