Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., No. S03Q1075.
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
| Writing for the Court | HUNSTEIN, Justice. |
| Citation | 277 Ga. 189,587 S.E.2d 24 |
| Decision Date | 06 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. S03Q1075. |
| Parties | SLAKMAN v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY et al. |
587 S.E.2d 24
277 Ga. 189
v.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY et al
No. S03Q1075.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
October 6, 2003.
Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Charles Edward Rogers, William Paul Jones, Hassett, Cohen, Goldstein, Port & Gottlieb, Robert C. Port, Atlanta, for appellee.
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
Shana Slakman, the wife of appellant Barry Slakman and daughter of appellees Barbara Adamo and Sherwin Glass, was insured under a life insurance policy issued by appellee Continental Casualty Company naming her husband as the beneficiary. After Shana's death and Slakman's indictment for her murder, Continental initiated an interpleader action in United States District Court to resolve conflicting claims to the benefits under the policy. Slakman subsequently was convicted of murder and his motion for new trial is currently pending before the Fulton County Superior Court. After Slakman's conviction, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees finding that Slakman was prohibited from recovering life insurance benefits under OCGA § 33-25-13. Slakman filed an appeal
OCGA § 33-25-13 provides:
No person who commits murder or voluntary manslaughter or who conspires with another to commit murder shall receive any benefits from any insurance policy on the life of the deceased, even though the person so killing or conspiring be named beneficiary in the insurance policy. A plea of guilty or a judicial finding of guilt not reversed or otherwise set aside as to any of such crimes shall be prima-facie evidence of guilt in determining rights under this Code section.
Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, an individual may be barred from receiving the benefits of a life insurance policy even in the absence of a criminal conviction if it is determined under the appropriate standard of proof that the individual committed murder or voluntary manslaughter or conspired to commit murder. Criminal proceedings against the individual may give rise to prima facie evidence of guilt for purposes of OCGA § 33-25-13 only upon the entry in the...
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Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. S12Q0625.
...their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.” Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003). The statute uses “fault” synonymously with “responsibility” and “liability” for and “contribut[ion]” to the damag......
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Legacy Data Access, LLC v. Mediquant, Inc., DOCKET NO. 3:15-cv-00584-FDW-DSC
...Charter. Sch., Inc., 293 Ga. 629, 631, 748 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2013) (citing Ga. Ann. Code § 1-3-1(a); Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 190, 587 S.E.2d 24, 26 (2003)). Here, the non-competition provision does not "contain[] a list of particular competitors as prohibited emplo......
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Mayor v. Harris, S17G0692
...86 S.E.2d 511 (1955), so as to avoid "a construction that makes some language mere surplusage," Slakman v. Continental Gas Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003).Turning to the relevant portion of OCGA § 51-3-25, the liability protections of the RPA do not apply "[f]or i......
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Sheriff v. State, No. S03G0492.
...when a party is denied the closing argument to which it is statutorily entitled under OCGA § 17-8-70). Appellant's right to make a closing [277 Ga. 189] argument was not completely abridged since one of his attorneys was allowed to address the jury. However, while there was sufficient evide......
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Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. S12Q0625.
...their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.” Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003). The statute uses “fault” synonymously with “responsibility” and “liability” for and “contribut[ion]” to the damag......
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Legacy Data Access, LLC v. Mediquant, Inc., DOCKET NO. 3:15-cv-00584-FDW-DSC
...Charter. Sch., Inc., 293 Ga. 629, 631, 748 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2013) (citing Ga. Ann. Code § 1-3-1(a); Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 190, 587 S.E.2d 24, 26 (2003)). Here, the non-competition provision does not "contain[] a list of particular competitors as prohibited employers[......
-
Mayor v. Harris, S17G0692
...429, 440, 86 S.E.2d 511 (1955), so as to avoid "a construction that makes some language mere surplusage," Slakman v. Continental Gas Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003).Turning to the relevant portion of OCGA § 51-3-25, the liability protections of the RPA do not apply "[f]or injury......
-
Sheriff v. State, No. S03G0492.
...when a party is denied the closing argument to which it is statutorily entitled under OCGA § 17-8-70). Appellant's right to make a closing [277 Ga. 189] argument was not completely abridged since one of his attorneys was allowed to address the jury. However, while there was sufficient evide......